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Under a presidential system, democratic states can enter treaties or agreements with sovereign foreign states on important security issues, normally with the consent of their legislatures. However, the implementation of an agreement by an incumbent administration is not necessarily guaranteed by its succeeding administration.
In the case of the United States, the president has constitutional power to make treaties with foreign states, but only ''by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur."
The requirement of a two-thirds vote also applies to most serious issues, like overriding a presidential veto, amending the Constitution and judging on an impeached president of the United States.
During a series of hearings on the recent Iranian deal by the appropriate committees of both houses of Congress, a few lawmakers who oppose the deal asked why the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should be treated as a treaty that would require the tougher bar of a two-thirds vote, despite the fact that Congress had agreed to review and vote on the JCPOA not as a treaty.
Secretary of State John Kerry's response was succinctly pragmatic: ''The Senate does not pass treaties." Besides, the United States does not have a normal diplomatic relationship with Iran.
The Senate rejected the 1919 Treaty of Versailles on the League of Nations. Recently, it has not yet ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Washington invokes to reign in China' s territorial claims in the South China Sea; or the International Criminal Court, to which a U.N. Human Rights Committee, with U.S. support, was going to bring the case of North Korean human rights abuses.
The reason that the executive branch calls the Iranian deal the JCPOA or its 1994 nuclear agreement with North Korea ''the Agreed Framework" is obvious ― to avoid the semblance of a treaty subject to congressional scrutiny and approval.
This explains why the DPRK's demand for a ''peace treaty" instead of a ''peace agreement" would not be pragmatic. While the Iranian deal, in addition to the recent normalization of relations with Cuba, is an example of U.S. willingness to make a deal with countries which it has had a long hostile relationship, the Obama administration has made it clear that it will not move on the North Korean nuclear issue.
Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, commenting on the impact of the Iranian deal on North Korea on July 16, said, ''Every one of these situations are sui generis," with their own characteristics and history. If the deal is implemented in good faith, she said, that might give North Korea second thoughts about its dangerous path.
Neither the 1994 Agreement Framework nor the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks was formally approved by the U.S. Congress or accepted as international law by the proper procedures of the United Nations.
North Korea and the rest of the world learned an expensive lesson when the George W. Bush administration botched the Agreed Framework, which Pyongyang signed with the Clinton administration. Pyongyang also learned that even inter-Korean agreements, including summit declarations, were thrown away after changes of government in the South.
Republican members of the U.S. Congress are determined to kill the JCPOA, which was agreed upon by the P5+1 and Iran and endorsed by a recent U.N. Security Council resolution. They are running political ads to enlist public support to oppose it. If they fail to stop the deal, they may even go as far as abandoning during the next Republican administration.
Since the United States is still the sole superpower, whose leadership is looked up to by many countries around the globe, a U.S. failure to keep its commitment to a major international agreement like the JCPOA would be a grievous setback for the maintenance of international order. If the deal is rejected by Congress or by the next president, who would seriously negotiate anything with the United States?
The Iranian deal is a matter of war and peace. The administration argues it is a good deal to stop Iran from developing a nuclear bomb and if Iran breaches the agreement, the U.S. will have the same options that it has today, including sanctions and a military strike, which the opponents think would be better.
A military strike can destroy Iran's known nuclear facilities ― but only to slow down its nuclear ambition ― it will not end it permanently. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 29 that a military strike would prompt a response from Iran, which would be more destabilizing to the Gulf region.
By now, all the points in favor of or against the passage of the Iranian deal are out. Criticism includes the areas of Iran's malign activity ― including supporting terrorism against Americans and their allies in the region, especially Israel. Although there is no division between the proponents and opponents of the deal in their support for the security of Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's disagreement serves as an influential element in American politics.
U.S. specialists in Pyongyang are also watching very closely the unfolding of the new international drama surrounding the Iranian deal. If it is rejected by Congress, despite hard lobbying by the president toward as many lawmakers as possible, or if it is turned down by a future American president, it will guarantee that North Korea will not have '' authentic and credible" talks with Washington. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.
