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| French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel attend a press conference on the situation in Sahel during the G7 summit in Biarritz, southwestern France, Sunday. AP |
By Alexander Krabbe, Sava Stomporowski
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| Alexander Krabbe |
Since the Munich Security Conference in 2014, the term "responsibility" has gained new weight in foreign policy. The then leading figures in Germany in that year ― Federal President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen ― were committed to ensuring Germany is involved internationally "earlier, more decisively and substantially" and had to assume "more responsibility in the world".
This marked the beginning of a public debate about a foreign policy reorientation of Germany. In plain language, it is an expectation and the fulfillment of the desire of NATO and European Union (EU) partners in military missions ― it is about war missions. This more direct description does not occur in the speech application and is circumvented by the use of moral terms.
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| Sava Stomporowski |
The German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a state organization, writes about this anthology: "... Germany is highly respected. There is a feeling it should be doing better at the international level. Given its economic power and leading role in Europe, Germany ought to show more commitment, and act with more courage and visibility. It is expected to use its strength and capacity to benefit others, too. In terms of international cooperation, the study participants, from 34 countries on four continents, wanted to see a balance of give and take."
This reorientation itself has a history of Germany's first involvement in missions abroad, such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, covert operations in Iraq and direct involvement in Syria, while Germany in these wars participated militarily in different coalitions. The question of "responsibility" would be posed again in every new crisis. Today, this topic is revived by the suspension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement by the U.S. government and the triggering of the Iran crisis, with the question of a "mission" to the Persian Gulf.
Two NATO partners contributed to the development of the crisis: the U.S. government unilaterally terminated a treaty bound by international law, while the British held a merchant ship in contravention of international law in the Strait of Gibraltar.
The U.S. government is pursuing a strategy of maximum pressure. The Iranian side has made the announcement to respond to any provocation with appropriate countermeasures. The seizure of the Iranian ship "Grace 1" was followed by the arrest of the British tanker "Stena Imperio," which was also illegal under international law, which in the opinion of Western states endangered free shipping.
When the British government made a request for a joint European mission under outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May, several states, politicians and experts considered assistance, even when Germany hesitated. "To date, a German participation in the federal government is expressed very cautiously. It is likely that Germany would support, at least politically, a mission led by Great Britain and France. Increased diplomatic efforts are also subjects of discussion."
Green foreign policy spokesman Omid Nouripur, on the other hand, supported the request, so that the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) came under pressure because of its resistance. Shortly thereafter, the head of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, complied and called on the federal government to participate in the naval defense mission in the Strait of Hormuz proposed by the United Kingdom.
"Hardly any other country is as dependent on the freedom of international shipping as Germany, the world's champion in exports ... Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany may not watch from the reserve bank, when now a maritime EU protection mission in the Persian Gulf is being discussed," warned Ischinger.
Common sense with regard to responsibility would have, from the beginning, supported and agreed on the exchange of the detained oil tankers, which Iranian President Hassan Rohani had proposed early on. The new British Foreign Minister, Dominic Raab, however, rejected this idea for a long time. "There is no quid pro quo," Raab told BBC radio. "This is not about some kind of barter. This is about international law and the rules of the international legal system are upheld, and that is what we will insist on."
However, with the new British PM Boris Johnson, who, if necessary, reaffirms a hard Brexit, this "mission" would rather no longer be led by the EU, but more likely be under U.S. leadership, so that the German government still seems ambivalent on the question whether to participate. Instead, the German Foreign Minister is now promoting an "independent" project under German leadership. However, according to a recent German advisory note, the EU now plans a European naval mission that would include five frigates, two corvettes and protection teams with planes and logistical ships.
The fact this military deployment of warships would have the duty to stand between the NATO partners the USA and Britain and Iran, is a new and extraordinary constellation that carries special dangers. If so many ships, including South Korean warships, meet at this strait, the danger of an armed clash increases, which would be the opposite of a de-escalation. Also, Iran's general distrust of allies has not eliminated NATO partners. The idea of deploying a European fleet to patrol the Persian Gulf "sends a hostile message" and is "provocative and will increase tensions," Iranian government spokesperson Ali Rabiei said on Sunday, as cited by Fars News Agency.
Under these conditions, the situation could be difficult to control and might lead to an unwanted war. Then Germany would be directly involved. Nevertheless, according to the chairwoman of the German Green Party, Annalena Baerbock, such a mission would not be declared as a classic foreign assignment, so that from her standpoint no UN mandate would be required.
"It makes a difference," she said, "whether we are talking about a pure observation mission or about armed operations in international or national waters, whether the Convention on the Law of the Sea or the Charter of the United Nations is applicable." In its election program, the Green Party had still determined that it would not agree to German military operations unless there was a mandate from the United Nations.
Because this mission would be about the sending of warships under German leadership to secure the free shipping, and not about sending commercial or rescue ships, the ethical principles that are assembled in international law would be legally bypassed, although the dispatch of the navy could result in an (unintentional) warlike conflict.
These are only sketchy representations of a case in which mainly the German reactions were discussed. Meanwhile, the authorities in Gibraltar have released the Iranian oil tanker and one can hope for a settlement of the tanker crisis. Nevertheless, Poland has announced that it would like to support the U.S.-led military mission in the Strait of Hormuz.
It is striking that a possible warlike conflict is most rarely concretized and expressed in a pertinent (military) language. Instead, this case fits into the perspective of the new German "responsibility." Rarely, diplomatic considerations for de-escalation are endeavored. Certainly not the simplest solution, by exchanging both ships early on. But the reality of a possible war, attacks, real dangers, or even deaths remain hidden under the guise of the ambiguous term "responsibility." Neither governments, the majority of parties with their political actors, military nor other experts or even journalists broach the issue of this blurring of reality in its sharpness and possible consequences.
This "responsible" language has several functions that should be outlined here. It is, first of all, a concealment. This blurs the realities and we do not get a comprehensive picture of the situation. We are not aware of any resources and potential implications, so we cannot ask questions. Also, the question of sovereignty under international law in the Strait of Hormuz is ignored. All this is introduced in a highly unsystematic way and only in fragments in the political decision-making debate. The term "responsibility" morally adds to manifold militarily risks.
Throughout the discussion surrounding "Germany's New Responsibility," there is a pedagogization and trivialization of adaptation to the behavior of the transatlantic alliance and partner states.
Jan Techau discusses ethical criteria for decision-making in his article "Foreign Policy as a Moral Teardrop" in his anthology (which appeared before the crisis with Iran) in order to review "one's own motives and the consequences of one's own actions." In the process, an "... excessive effort in this country is set right from the beginning to ensure from the outset that Germany is morally unassailable at the end of every political project" which to him appears disturbing.
He writes: "This neurotic endeavor to remain morally 'clean' runs through almost all domestic and foreign policy debates like a red thread, whether it is pension or social policy, educational issues, tax justice, issues of domestic security or foreign and security policy. It sets in motion a powerful mechanism that is particularly reflected in Germany's external relations, its role in the world, and its role as a military actor."
Certainly things are difficult in a complex world. Foreign policy is seldom about optimal or risk-free issues. But it cannot be that ethical decision-making criteria are considered as moral ordeal, but to disqualify this aspiration as neurotic at the same time before it has been properly applied. The ethical consideration must be about not losing sight of this endeavor, even if it seems unreasonable or hardly feasible.
Techau explains this German mistrust of politics with the historical experience and after-effects of a collective trauma from World War II and the fact that back then one was not "on the right side of history." Compared to France, the United States or Britain, where this phenomenon does not exist and where "despite all wrong decisions, derailments and deviations, one is ultimately on the right side of history. Not being blue-eyed against own failures (especially in the U.S., these mistakes are, unlike often suspected in Germany, discussed intensively), but the dysfunction does not fundamentally shatter the self-image of a community, which means well and believes itself to stand for the good."
He locates moral considerations from the point of standing on the "right" side of the story. However, it is crucial how one recognizes whether one stands on the "right side" and how an adequate answer would look. Does liberal democracy by itself already stand on the right side and is it entitled to carry out military operations beyond international law? Is our legitimacy not often based on questionable economic motives and contracts that exploit third parties, socially or ecologically? Do we not suspect that we are applying double standards in the rating of friend and foe that contradicts authentic universalism?
Of course, Techau knows that he thinks himself to be on the "right side" because Germany is embedded and does not strive on unilateralist leanings. Error, doubt or criticism of a Western world that practices more self-righteousness than justice against exploited thirds ― in which we let ourselves be misled in the name of liberalism or human rights ― does not exist in the concept of this "responsibility." There is no doubt to be found about whether one is on the "right side" to enforce a certain order that wants to forcibly bring the world to a common denominator. But such an ethically pure "responsibility" includes transparency. Undefined "responsibility" appears veiled, irresponsible and immoral simply because it can end up costing innumerable victims ― more victims than those to be saved.
After all, it is important to examine these decisions on the basis of historical, factual and ethical criteria, to recognize the contexts and, if necessary, to criticize them and, if necessary, to oppose them. Meanwhile, we also have experience from numerous foreign assignments from which no lessons are yet drawn, although we generally should "learn from history." This does not only refer to the Second World War, but to Kosovo and Iraq.
Instead, Techau does not even go into these ethically or practically complex balancing processes, but lectures about an "avoidance to speak." He writes that: "For some, the compromise is a difficult one. For the others, it is the end of the world, which should be avoided with all might. A strategy of avoidance is the refusal of moral compromise." The statement of former Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who in this context fears "German passivity more than German power," fits in well. With all these considerations, the result of this thought process is already clear.
However, "responsibility" in this sense can only take place in the context of an intensive, systematic weighing of all information, pros and cons, opportunities and risks, what is calculated and not calculable, and alternatives. "The fabric of our life and work is formed of very different threads, in that everything that is necessary and accidental, arbitrary and pure-willed, of the most varied kind and often indistinguishable, is interwoven," Goethe said in Poetry and Truth (Dichtung und Wahrheit).
Our technological abilities, information and moral considerations are not perfect and we cannot predict the evolution of things because they carry their own dynamics. Mistakes and omissions are never the agenda for these crucial questions. As long as this remains unchanged, we may not draw conclusions about how these mistakes and omissions could be avoided in the future. We do not learn anything in these discussions about balancing the commensurability of the means that would be appropriate given drone missions or long-term effects such as those of uranium ammunition.
By putting a broad, well-respected social coalition right up to representatives of the German Green Party behind the term, this layout of "responsibility" does not become tangible but remains diffuse. There is no concrete responsibility for an action or an aimed goal. Who will be politically and legally responsible when such military operations destroy more than they cause "good." All these considerations would provide clues that one should carefully and not recklessly analyze military operations, while true responsibility should be assumed. The superficial assuring of assumption of responsibility is a concealment, which on the contrary produces more suspicion and even less trust.
A balancing of military operations can only take place in an open-ended process. But anyone who wants military involvement from the outset does not want to learn anything from history, defend human rights or the implementation of universal principles. Blind allegiance is what is wanted then. It's simply about being party to any process. The beautiful words about "responsibility" are used to conjure the belonging. It is presented as a positive development in which there cannot be: A simple "no." A renunciation, refusal or protest is dismissed as immature and inappropriate. It is also not substantiated and argued what a "no" could mean. While, or perhaps because, a "no" can as well come into existence out of genuine responsibility.
A peace movement evolved in the 1980s against nuclear dangers and armament and achieved its goal of disarmament as the people denied nuclear madness. The protest movement was an expression of responsibility because its protest was directed against something that elected governments still considered necessary and "responsible." A "no" resulted from the fact that the apparent reason of those who implemented these steps was consumed by the revealing of their own irrationality and the irrationality of the "overkill," thus spurring significant resistance. In this sense, the combined reason of numerous people had won and enabled disarmament. Today's politics steals the concept of reason and wants to sell us military missions as morality.
Levinas refers to a philosophical discourse by writing ― as quoted above ― "Everyone will readily agree with us that it is most important to know if we are not fooled by morality." Reason would then be interpreted as to keep an eye on the permanent possibility of war in the sense of Levinas. "... In war, reality tears apart words and images which were used to conceal it and reality imposes itself in its nakedness and harshness."
With references to the statements of German politicians or political advisers, it is shown that politics serves a morality that tries to keep us (also) as fools. Nevertheless, it must not happen that a peace movement allows its ethics and moral concepts to be stolen by those who want military involvement from the beginning. Instead, it is necessary to sharpen the critical view when our ethics and moral concepts are held at gunpoint.
Alexander Krabbe is a peace activist, a citizen journalist and medical doctor who engages with a broad range of citizens in Europe to discuss critical issues in international relations. He has worked with the Asia Institute since 2013.
Sava Stomporowski is a member of the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens). She is also an active member in the Federal Working Group on Peace and International Affairs and part of the Bonn Peace Alliance.
