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Vinod Anand, a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation. |
However, it is not widely known domestically how India is promoting its own diplomatic, security and defense policies. To seek an answer to our query, Professor Hwang Jae-ho of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies sat down with Vinod Anand, a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), visiting Korea for the 2019 Korea Foundation Invitation Program for Distinguished Guests in Foreign Policies and Security, in the second week of April.
Q1) What is the purpose of your visit to Korea?
The aim of my visit to South Korea was to interact and engage with scholars and experts from think tanks and the strategic community and also government officials to better understand South Korea's foreign and security policies. The interactions at the Korea Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korean National Diplomatic Academy and Korean Institute of Defense Analyses provided me with better insights into the South Korean perspective on a variety of strategic and security issues.
Q2) What is the priority of the Indian security policy?
The main objective of India's security policies is to support peace and stability efforts in the region and world at large in order to enhance prosperity and economic growth. In terms of security threats and challenges, dealing with terrorism remains the top priority. India has been facing the scourge of terrorism from across its borders since almost its inception in 1947. Further, India has a tough neighborhood wherein its borders with nuclearized China and Pakistan remain unsettled. While there is firing across the Line of Control between India and Pakistan almost on a daily basis, not a single shot has been fired on the Line of Actual Control between India and China since 1986.
Q3) How is the modernization of Indian defense forces progressing?
The modernization of Indian defense forces is progressing at a steady pace. Though there is a need to increase the defense budget, the government has to be judicious in allotting funds to other competing sectors, e.g. health, education and many other infrastructure and developmental plans. However, the government is paying particular attention to the development of the indigenous defense industry and transfer of technology from abroad. While India has been importing a variety of defense weapons and systems from abroad, it has also gone in a big way for the "Make in India" program. There are a number of areas where both India and South Korea can cooperate in defense manufacturing for mutual benefit. India has good capabilities in space, cyber and special forces operations; cooperation between both sides would result in exploiting the synergies. Over the year, Indian armed forces have modernized their doctrinal concepts and precepts and also added to their deterrent capabilities with a view to meeting the challenges from potential adversaries.
Q4) How would you evaluate India's Act East Policy?
Since the unveiling of India's Look East Policy in 1992 and now its transformation to the Act East Policy in November 2014, it has undergone many iterations. While the original objective of the policy was to reintegrate with the neighborhood and extended neighborhood through a variety of connectivity efforts and economic initiatives, the policy has now acquired a certain degree of strategic orientation. The Act East Policy also chimes very well with South Korea's New Southern Policy, which was ushered in by President Moon Jae-in. Thus, South Korea's efforts to reach out to ASEAN and beyond to India and South Asia complement New Delhi's objectives of strengthening relationships with ASEAN and East Asian nations. It can be easily said that India has been able to achieve a considerable degree of success in its engagement with ASEAN, South Korea and Japan. The Act East Policy also pre-dates many of the other connectivity and other initiatives in the region. Thus, it cannot be said that India's Act East Policy is counter to or in response to any other policy initiatives promoted by other countries in the region.
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Vinod Anand and Hwang Jae-ho |
Q5) What is India's China policy?
As mentioned earlier, India and China have a disputed border and even mutual perceptions as to where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) lies differ. Thus, there is always a potential for a conflict that could go out of control. However, India's policy is to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC and urge China to at least agree to a shared perception of the LAC, even if the boundary agreement cannot be reached in an earlier timeframe. The Doklam incident along the India-China border in August 2017, where troops from both sides faced each other for 73 days or so, was symptomatic of the possibilities of a hot conflict. Indian forces stood their ground, which later led to the Wuhan meeting and a degree of consensus between both sides.
Further, India's approach is to develop itself economically while putting the differences with China aside. As India has been running a huge deficit of around $60 billion (2018) with China, New Delhi has been urging China to address the trade deficit through the opening up of its markets and removing certain non-tariff trade barriers. There is a wide degree of acceptance by both sides that they cannot afford any conflict as it would not benefit any side.
Q6) What is India's position toward the One Belt, One Road Initiative?
India's objections to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mainly arise from China building its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that passes through Indian territory occupied by Pakistan. Indian leadership has articulated its position at many forums that connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, one of the basic tenets of India's current policy toward China has been to utilize Chinese capabilities to advance India's developmental agenda. India needs a massive amount of funds for its infrastructure projects. India became a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank of BRICS to utilize such opportunities for accessing development funds. India has no objections to China undertaking infrastructure and other developmental projects in India, subject to international norms and mutual agreement on terms and conditions but without being under the overarching ambit of the BRI.
Q7) How do you see current Korean-Indian relations?
With President Moon Jae-in's visit to India in July 2018 and PM Narendra Modi's visit to South Korea in February this year, bilateral relations have gained considerable momentum. President Moon, after coming to power in 2017, has paid particular attention to boosting the relationship with India, which is also reflected in sending a Special Envoy to India for the first time. Earlier in 2015, during PM Modi's visit to Seoul, the existing Strategic Partnership between the two countries, which is based on shared values and interests, was upgraded to the Special Strategic Partnership. Many South Korean brands like Samsung, Hyundai, LG, etc., are household names in India. Though bilateral trade has stagnated around $20 billion for some years, there are plans to increase trade to $50 billion by 2030. For this reason, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement is being reviewed by both sides. India views South Korea as an important partner in India's economic transformation.
Q8) Are there any additional comments?
In addition to developing a strong economic relationship, there is also a need to enhance defense and security ties. Meanwhile, boosting the people-to-people relationship also remains equally important.
Vinod Anand is a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) New Delhi. He holds a post-graduate degree in Defense and Strategic Studies and is an alumnus of the Defense Services and Staff College and College of Defense Management. Earlier, he was a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and the United Service Institution, New Delhi. Song Min-ju, a researcher at the Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, assisted Professor Hwang with the article.