By Tong Kim
U.S. Secretary of State nominee Mike Pompeo traveled to Pyongyang for a secret meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un over the Easter weekend.
On April 18, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted: "Mike Pompeo met with Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Meeting went very smoothly and a good relationship was formed. Details of summit are being worked out now. Denuclearization will be a great thing for world, but also for North Korea!"
Perhaps the most important task for Pompeo was to verify Kim's intent and his awareness of what is happening or what can happen to impact North Korea, and his seriousness to discuss denuclearization with Trump.
Pompeo seems to have confirmed Kim's commitment to denuclearization. It appears Pompeo returned home with the answers to other questions as well.
Pompeo told a Senate confirmation hearing on April 12, after his return from Pyongyang: "I'm optimistic that the United States government can set the conditions … so that the president and the North Korean leader can have that conversation [that] will set us down the course of achieving a diplomatic outcome that America and the world so desperately need."
On April 19, in a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Trump showed optimism for "a great meeting" with the North Korean leader in early June or sooner, for which the venue is yet to be determined. But he also said he will cancel the meeting or walk out "if it is not going to be fruitful." This time he said he wants to be flexible, not unpredictable.
Trump has warned that if the meeting fails, he would go back to maximum pressure on North Korea. All things considered, including his political interests at home, Trump genuinely seems to desire a resolution of the North Korean nuclear program with his wishes for both Koreas "to live in security, peace and prosperity."
At Panmunjeom on April 27, the leaders of the two Koreas are expected to lay out an initial path to end the technical state of war in Korea that has lasted for 65 years since the armistice agreement was signed in 1953.
Trump said: "They do have my blessing to discuss the end of the war." Trump's comment shows Seoul's close consultation with Washington regarding its preparations for the summit with the North.
Of course, the two Koreas cannot establish a peace regime or conclude a peace treaty alone without the agreement of the U.S. or also China. But they can and should take the initiative to that end.
If Moon and Kim announce a declaration to end the war and to begin the peace process, along with an agreement to work together for denuclearization, it would be encouraging progress in support of the coming U.S.-North Korea summit.
In the past, Pyongyang has shown its flexibility on the troop issue. In 1992 and 2000, the DPRK conveyed to Washington its willingness to allow a continued U.S. military presence in return for improvement of bilateral relations, provided the U.S. military changes its role from an invasion force to peace keeping, maintaining regional balance and stability.
One of the biggest impediments to a peace agreement has been North Korea's linkage to it with its demand of U.S. troop withdrawal. Some believe that the U.S. troop presence was the pretext for North Korea's nuclear development. This argument may be fundamentally correct. But the North Koreans have complained more about military threats from the combined ROK-U.S. military drills and U.S. hostile policy to stifle their regime.
At this point, Seoul and Washington have accepted the DPRK as their negotiating counterpart. No advocacy for regime change or military action against the North is being voiced. Yet, there is a lot of concern and uncertainty about what could really happen to the fate of the Korean Peninsula from these summits.
The inter-Korean summit will herald a prelude to the potential summit between Washington and Pyongyang. Even if both summits are successful, they are not expected to resolve all the complicated details at once. It will take follow-up negotiations over time, possibly a minimum of one to two years. Expecting too much too soon is a non-starter.
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.
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On April 18, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted: "Mike Pompeo met with Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Meeting went very smoothly and a good relationship was formed. Details of summit are being worked out now. Denuclearization will be a great thing for world, but also for North Korea!"
Perhaps the most important task for Pompeo was to verify Kim's intent and his awareness of what is happening or what can happen to impact North Korea, and his seriousness to discuss denuclearization with Trump.
Pompeo seems to have confirmed Kim's commitment to denuclearization. It appears Pompeo returned home with the answers to other questions as well.
Pompeo told a Senate confirmation hearing on April 12, after his return from Pyongyang: "I'm optimistic that the United States government can set the conditions … so that the president and the North Korean leader can have that conversation [that] will set us down the course of achieving a diplomatic outcome that America and the world so desperately need."
On April 19, in a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Trump showed optimism for "a great meeting" with the North Korean leader in early June or sooner, for which the venue is yet to be determined. But he also said he will cancel the meeting or walk out "if it is not going to be fruitful." This time he said he wants to be flexible, not unpredictable.
Trump has warned that if the meeting fails, he would go back to maximum pressure on North Korea. All things considered, including his political interests at home, Trump genuinely seems to desire a resolution of the North Korean nuclear program with his wishes for both Koreas "to live in security, peace and prosperity."
At Panmunjeom on April 27, the leaders of the two Koreas are expected to lay out an initial path to end the technical state of war in Korea that has lasted for 65 years since the armistice agreement was signed in 1953.
Trump said: "They do have my blessing to discuss the end of the war." Trump's comment shows Seoul's close consultation with Washington regarding its preparations for the summit with the North.
Of course, the two Koreas cannot establish a peace regime or conclude a peace treaty alone without the agreement of the U.S. or also China. But they can and should take the initiative to that end.
If Moon and Kim announce a declaration to end the war and to begin the peace process, along with an agreement to work together for denuclearization, it would be encouraging progress in support of the coming U.S.-North Korea summit.
In the past, Pyongyang has shown its flexibility on the troop issue. In 1992 and 2000, the DPRK conveyed to Washington its willingness to allow a continued U.S. military presence in return for improvement of bilateral relations, provided the U.S. military changes its role from an invasion force to peace keeping, maintaining regional balance and stability.
One of the biggest impediments to a peace agreement has been North Korea's linkage to it with its demand of U.S. troop withdrawal. Some believe that the U.S. troop presence was the pretext for North Korea's nuclear development. This argument may be fundamentally correct. But the North Koreans have complained more about military threats from the combined ROK-U.S. military drills and U.S. hostile policy to stifle their regime.
At this point, Seoul and Washington have accepted the DPRK as their negotiating counterpart. No advocacy for regime change or military action against the North is being voiced. Yet, there is a lot of concern and uncertainty about what could really happen to the fate of the Korean Peninsula from these summits.
The inter-Korean summit will herald a prelude to the potential summit between Washington and Pyongyang. Even if both summits are successful, they are not expected to resolve all the complicated details at once. It will take follow-up negotiations over time, possibly a minimum of one to two years. Expecting too much too soon is a non-starter.
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.
