Crucible of NK nuclear negotiation: Pakistan vs. Libya

By Lee Seong-hyon

The U.S. is ultimately concerned that Kim Jong-un may have undeclared plans to seek a tacit nuclear power status, like Pakistan. North Korea is ultimately concerned that the United States may seek a regime change after Pyongyang hands over an inventory of nuclear facilities, as happened with Libya. These remain the key stumbling blocks between Washington and Pyongyang

The U.S. demands North Korea hand over a full inventory of nuclear-related sites first before they will consider relaxing sanctions and proceeding with a declaration of the end of the war. North Korea fears that giving such a list to Washington might become a “target list” for surgical strikes by the U.S. if the current negotiation falls apart. Pyongyang sees it as a recipe for suicide.

Today, there is question in the minds of the international community, not just Washington, as to whether Kim Jong-un still expects the world to live with his nuclear weapons and treat North Korea like Pakistan.

Even though there are some voices among a handful of scholars that insinuate that we should now acquiesce to “living with” a nuclear North Korea, like Pakistan, but that is not going to be the position of most countries in the international community, including Britain and France, two members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The U.N. mandate of sanctions against North Korea has been imposed by the collective will of the UNSC, not just the United States. North Korea demands they ease sanctions. Doing so, however, will also require the consent of the UNSC.

Although North Korea's negotiation strategy is mainly geared toward Washington, it should also do some diligent work, if not go on a charm-offensive, with these countries and the broader international community. The nations in the Western Bloc, particularly Britain and France, are in close communication with the United States about their dealings with North Korea. This may be an issue that's underestimated by North Korean strategists.

Broadly speaking, the international community believes that Kim Jong-un has not crossed the tipping point to convince people when he talked about denuclearization. They remain suspicious as to whether Kim may be thinking about some “indefinite point” in the future where he may or may not denuclearize. If Kim thinks that it would be “acceptance” globally of his asserting his possession of nuclear weapons, as Pakistan did, then we have a problem.

It is very important, therefore, that those with an access to Kim encourage him to feel that the stance of the international community is firm and expects Kim to denuclearize, without secretly entertaining the Pakistan model.

There is also a shift in the international community's thinking towards the Kim regime. In the past, they believed that the only workable way for denuclearization was to get rid of the leadership of the Kim family. What has changed now is that there is a readiness to say to Kim Jong-un that if you want to take your country in a different direction, we will be happy to work with you on this. It is important that Kim can be encouraged to recognize this difference.

At this juncture of nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea, it is particularly critical that this signal comes from Washington in a consistent manner. Hawkish statements or hints of possible military options in North Korea among those in close proximity to the Trump administration may trigger North Korea's deep-seated threat perception and heighten its vigilance.

North Korea's sense of the threat, whether subjective or objective, coming from the United States remains a fundamental issue in its eagerness toward denuclearization. North Korea has had a kind of obsession with U.S. “hostile policy.” Kim needs assurance from Washington, and from the other key stakeholders of the international community that it won't be another Libya.

Kim has to understand that we also need assurance form him as well, precisely on the Pakistan question. It will be very helpful for Kim when he talks about denuclearization, and in fact now is the time, to tell us concretely, exactly what it means and when it will start.

There are sentiments among international interlocutors concerned about Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, that this fundamental question has not been sufficiently addressed by Kim. Likewise, there are also sentiments that North Korea's time-old paranoia and fear of military attacks by the United States has not been sufficiently explained in Washington.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director of the Department of Unification Strategy, and also the Center for Chinese Studies; at Sejong Institute.