A long path to denuclearization

By Tong Kim

More than two weeks after the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore, June 12, the two sides have yet to hold follow-up negotiations that should lay out a specific path toward the announced goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Many are wondering what is going on now.

Apparently as of last Friday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is still waiting for Pyongyang's agreement for his third visit there to work out the details of how to proceed on the denuclearization process.

The North is yet to name Pompeo's counterpart for the follow-up talks. Once the follow-up talks begin, a lower working level negotiation may complement the ministerial talks, as the negotiations will deal with highly technical details.

Returning home from Singapore, President Trump tweeted that North Korea poses no nuclear threat to the U.S., and he portrayed the summit as a big success, denouncing criticisms to the contrary as fake news.

He claimed he did not give anything to the North, other than a meeting. Trump campaigned on his gains: freeze on nuclear and missile tests, demolition of test sites, release of three American hostages, and return of the remains of American war dead from the North.

A simple fact-check shows North Korea remains as a nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies. Perhaps more importantly, the historic summit was Kim's biggest gain, appearing on the world stage as an equal to the President of the United States, who praised the young North Korea leader as “talented and a great negotiator,” whom he trusts and had chemistry with.

Trump appears confident that he can pull off a successful end state of denuclearization. He and his secretary of state have said they will not push for a timeline for the implementation of the Singapore agreement.

For North Korea to agree on any specific road map, it will be required to address the complicated relevant issues _ such as security guarantees, a peace regime, and a normalized relationship to the satisfaction of North Korea, as they go down the road toward the ultimate state of denuclearization.

By now, the Trump administration has become realistic to seriously consider the acceptability of “a phased and synchronized approach,” as proposed by the North. Washington no longer demands immediate and total denuclearization upfront. Yet, there is still an unanswered question of the credibility of Kim's commitment to “complete denuclearization.”

There is one consensus that even if Kim's commitment is genuine, it will take a long time. How long will it take? Nobody seems to have an answer. However, we know this much: North Korea wants the security and survival of its regime and economic improvement. It is taking advantage of its threatening nuclear arsenal as negotiating leverage, without which the Singapore summit would not have happened.

Washington can provide what the North wants in return for its denuclearization. The North will not give up and dismantle everything first and wait for rewards later. Provision of benefits can and should be built in an overall phased process that should include a complete declaration of the DPRK's nuclear and missile arsenal, verification measures, freeze and dismantlement of all nuclear activities, and the final disposition of these WMD programs.

Even if everything goes well, the North will question whether U.S. policy or any agreement with the U.S. will be upheld and honored by a next administration. The North learned that when administrations change in Washington or in Seoul, policy on North Korea changes. In this regard, Pompeo has talked about the possibility of congressional ratification of binding agreements that can be produced by negotiations with North Korea.

In this context, Kim has a stake in Trump's prospects of re-election in 2020. Will Kim expedite the denuclearization process in order to help Trump or will he delay the process as a safeguard against a potential successor to Trump?

The issue of human rights is important but it is not viewed as a priority over the nuclear issue. The issues of joint military exercises between the South and the U.S. will be adjusted depending on the progress on denuclearization.

Even if denuclearization may take a protracted course, it has its merits, provided that the mistakes of the past are avoided.

The denuclearization process will serve to reduce tensions and minimize the chance of military conflict. It will provide a security environment in which inter-Korean cooperation can be enhanced to settle peace and stability on the peninsula and to promote co-prosperity.

A diplomatic solution is better than a military solution, and peace is better than war.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies (ICAS).