By Chang Se-moon
Practically, everyone thinks Kim Jong Un of North Korea is crazy, if not outright insane. I am not so sure. In this article, I will try to figure out how events are unfolding from his viewpoint.
When Kim's father began to push the nuclear program, neither his father nor his close advisors had any specific plans in mind beyond the thought that they had to be strong to survive. Now that their nuclear weapons program is almost completed, Kim may have a pretty good idea of what he wants and what he believes he can have.
Kim may believe, perhaps correctly, that there are many supporters of his policy in South Korea and in the U.S. as well.
To his view, there are two groups of his supporters in South Korea: those who simply support unification under his control, and those who are constantly critical of their government and thus help his cause in the process, albeit unintentionally. No one has actual numbers, but there are likely many more than we can imagine.
To his view, there are also two groups of supporters in the United States, both of which do not agree with him but end up supporting his cause through their actions. One group is comprised of liberal media constantly reminding the public of how bad the policies of their president are toward North Korea, while the other are innocent Americans who are simply scared of nuclear bombs that they think Kim might drop on them. Both steer public opinion, and thus the U.S. government policy, toward what Kim wants.
What Kim really wants is to generate enough pressure internally both in South Korea and the U.S. so that the U.S. withdraws its troops from South Korea. After that, it would be easy to force South Korea to share its wealth with his North Korea, and eventually steer the Korean peninsula toward a unified Korea under his leadership.
Kim may be aware of many dangers in his plan. Firstly, the U.S. may attack him first. Kim may feel that this is highly unlikely, so long as his aggressive actions are limited to words. In addition, China made it clear that if the U.S. attacks North Korea first, they will intervene to protect him and his North Korea.
Secondly, China may be pressured to cut off oil supplies to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons. This is highly unlikely, either, partly because he can release many poor North Koreans into China, or worse yet, because the target of nuclear weapons under his possession can always be changed from the U.S. or South Korea to Beijing.
Thirdly, Kim should be aware of possible internal revolt against him in North Korea. This is highly unlikely also, because Kim has an extensive internal surveillance network and he is killing everyone who has the appearance of dissatisfaction, let alone opposition toward him. He killed his generals, he killed his uncle and he even killed his own brother, to make sure the preservation of his power.
Kim also tightly controls any information coming from outside. North Korea has an internet system, but North Koreans are not allowed to search websites outside North Korea. North Korea has diplomats, business people, and laborers working in many countries. Kim makes sure, however, that some of their intimate family members remain in North Korea so that they cannot defect to South Korea.
Some of us may believe that Kim's type of one-person control system cannot last long. Kim may think differently. Consider that there is presidential election every four years in the U.S. and five years in South Korea. There is also a change in leadership in China every five years. Every time new leaders emerge, they recite promises that their predecessors have already made.
Negotiations? What negotiations? Kim is so close to completing his nuclear weapons program that he can promise no more testing, without making any real sacrifice, in exchange for heavy economic and political concessions.
Unification? Kim's view may be that President Moon Jae-in's promise of no war in Korea will be kept, not by President Moon, but by Kim himself. He may not see any need for a war, because everything seems to be going exactly as he envisions: support of his policy by a majority South Koreans as well as many Americans, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, gradual acceptance of all his demands by the South Korean government, and eventual unification under his leadership.
If we still think Kim is crazy; that may well be our problem. It is highly likely that Kim could not care less what we think of him, because he knows exactly what he wants and he is getting closer and closer to securing it. I wonder which is worse between a crazy Kim who acts like a mad man and a rational Kim who acts like a crazy man but knows exactly how to calculate everything to his advantage.
Chang Se-moon is the director of the Gulf Coast Center for Impact Studies. Write to him at: changsemoon@yahoo.com.
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When Kim's father began to push the nuclear program, neither his father nor his close advisors had any specific plans in mind beyond the thought that they had to be strong to survive. Now that their nuclear weapons program is almost completed, Kim may have a pretty good idea of what he wants and what he believes he can have.
Kim may believe, perhaps correctly, that there are many supporters of his policy in South Korea and in the U.S. as well.
To his view, there are two groups of his supporters in South Korea: those who simply support unification under his control, and those who are constantly critical of their government and thus help his cause in the process, albeit unintentionally. No one has actual numbers, but there are likely many more than we can imagine.
To his view, there are also two groups of supporters in the United States, both of which do not agree with him but end up supporting his cause through their actions. One group is comprised of liberal media constantly reminding the public of how bad the policies of their president are toward North Korea, while the other are innocent Americans who are simply scared of nuclear bombs that they think Kim might drop on them. Both steer public opinion, and thus the U.S. government policy, toward what Kim wants.
What Kim really wants is to generate enough pressure internally both in South Korea and the U.S. so that the U.S. withdraws its troops from South Korea. After that, it would be easy to force South Korea to share its wealth with his North Korea, and eventually steer the Korean peninsula toward a unified Korea under his leadership.
Kim may be aware of many dangers in his plan. Firstly, the U.S. may attack him first. Kim may feel that this is highly unlikely, so long as his aggressive actions are limited to words. In addition, China made it clear that if the U.S. attacks North Korea first, they will intervene to protect him and his North Korea.
Secondly, China may be pressured to cut off oil supplies to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons. This is highly unlikely, either, partly because he can release many poor North Koreans into China, or worse yet, because the target of nuclear weapons under his possession can always be changed from the U.S. or South Korea to Beijing.
Thirdly, Kim should be aware of possible internal revolt against him in North Korea. This is highly unlikely also, because Kim has an extensive internal surveillance network and he is killing everyone who has the appearance of dissatisfaction, let alone opposition toward him. He killed his generals, he killed his uncle and he even killed his own brother, to make sure the preservation of his power.
Kim also tightly controls any information coming from outside. North Korea has an internet system, but North Koreans are not allowed to search websites outside North Korea. North Korea has diplomats, business people, and laborers working in many countries. Kim makes sure, however, that some of their intimate family members remain in North Korea so that they cannot defect to South Korea.
Some of us may believe that Kim's type of one-person control system cannot last long. Kim may think differently. Consider that there is presidential election every four years in the U.S. and five years in South Korea. There is also a change in leadership in China every five years. Every time new leaders emerge, they recite promises that their predecessors have already made.
Negotiations? What negotiations? Kim is so close to completing his nuclear weapons program that he can promise no more testing, without making any real sacrifice, in exchange for heavy economic and political concessions.
Unification? Kim's view may be that President Moon Jae-in's promise of no war in Korea will be kept, not by President Moon, but by Kim himself. He may not see any need for a war, because everything seems to be going exactly as he envisions: support of his policy by a majority South Koreans as well as many Americans, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, gradual acceptance of all his demands by the South Korean government, and eventual unification under his leadership.
If we still think Kim is crazy; that may well be our problem. It is highly likely that Kim could not care less what we think of him, because he knows exactly what he wants and he is getting closer and closer to securing it. I wonder which is worse between a crazy Kim who acts like a mad man and a rational Kim who acts like a crazy man but knows exactly how to calculate everything to his advantage.
Chang Se-moon is the director of the Gulf Coast Center for Impact Studies. Write to him at: changsemoon@yahoo.com.
