By Lee Seong-hyon
There is a growing interest in whether changes will occur in relations between North Korea and China as the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China is over. China-North Korea relations have stagnated in recent years. Nevertheless, there are a few indications for this prospect not to be ignored. If the summit between the top leaders of Beijing and Pyongyang is held, it will render a very significant new variable in geopolitics in the region. Seoul and Washington should be prepared for this contingency.
In the early years of the Xi Jinping administration, Xi publicly sent a message to Kim Jong-un "to visit China at a convenient time." He did so a few times. Fast forwarding to the present, earlier this month, Xi sent Kim a courtesy message in response to congratulations from the North Korean leader for securing a second term as the head of China's ruling party. Most commentaries played down the exchange. They pointed out the "lengths" of the messages were shorter, compared to their "good old" times, and also the emphasis on "friendship" in their expressions was not accentuated as before. They therefore concluded that the duo were still in an estranged relationship.
However, an alternative interpretation is possible. It should be noted that the top leaders of the two nations did not stop their "customary" exchanges on an important occasion such as the ruling party congress. That is, even though their relations hit a snag, China and North Korea are maintaining the continuity of their "customary" activities between the two ruling parties of the two socialist countries. It should be noted that Xi addressed Kim as "Comrade Chairman," reflecting the socialist tradition.
Second, despite China's joining the U.N. punitive sanctions against Pyongyang, China has continued to attend to North Korea's "needs." In early 2017, North Korea demanded that the Chinese authorities remove the vulgar expressions (such as Kim's obesity, and also portraying Kim as a child playing with nuclear toys) in the Chinese social media. China immediately accepted the demand. In addition, regarding the U.N. sanctions, China rejected Washington's call for a complete embargo of China's oil supply to North Korea as well as Kim Jong-un's inclusion onto the sanctions list. In the end, these two were not reflected in the U.N. sanctions.
Third, China and North Korea now have a legitimate and opportune reason to exchange high-level envoys. The Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean Workers' Party have "customs" to explain the outcome of their important political events by sending delegations to the other country. As such, China is expected to send a ranking delegation to North Korea soon.
Fourth, there is a view in China that argues that China should actively manage the North Korean issue through the summit so as to secure China's influence over North Korea. North Korea's "usefulness" for China is bound to increase as Xi is poised to unleash a more confident and assertive diplomacy vis-a-vis with the U.S. China needs a "team" (North Korea, Russia) to counter the American regional alliance (South Korea, Japan).
Yet there are challenges for the summit to materialize. China's existing position had been that North Korea should display "some kind of willingness" in the direction of denuclearization. China seems to regard this as a "face" issue that would justify the summit when the whole world will be watching the rare event. However, at this moment, North Korea appears not enthused to utter the word "denuclearization" at all. This stands as a formidable challenge for the summit to go ahead. In addition, if North Korea conducts another nuclear test, that will also likely chill the relationship for months, at least.
Nonetheless, some expect a "big movement" in 2018 between Pyongyang and Beijing. In the complicated China-North Korea love affair, it is seen that it is often Pyongyang that steers the relationship, not Beijing. Pyongyang has so far shut the door and declined engaging China so as to focus on enhancing its nuclear capability. Now, feeling more secure and confident about its nuclear achievements, Kim may shift its foreign policy gear from the "nuclear mode" to the "outreach mode." If North Korea actively courts, China may be persuaded. Xi and Kim haven't had their first summit since their ascending to the top several years ago. In fact, some Chinese scholars also think it's about time to meet.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
.jpg) |
In the early years of the Xi Jinping administration, Xi publicly sent a message to Kim Jong-un "to visit China at a convenient time." He did so a few times. Fast forwarding to the present, earlier this month, Xi sent Kim a courtesy message in response to congratulations from the North Korean leader for securing a second term as the head of China's ruling party. Most commentaries played down the exchange. They pointed out the "lengths" of the messages were shorter, compared to their "good old" times, and also the emphasis on "friendship" in their expressions was not accentuated as before. They therefore concluded that the duo were still in an estranged relationship.
However, an alternative interpretation is possible. It should be noted that the top leaders of the two nations did not stop their "customary" exchanges on an important occasion such as the ruling party congress. That is, even though their relations hit a snag, China and North Korea are maintaining the continuity of their "customary" activities between the two ruling parties of the two socialist countries. It should be noted that Xi addressed Kim as "Comrade Chairman," reflecting the socialist tradition.
Second, despite China's joining the U.N. punitive sanctions against Pyongyang, China has continued to attend to North Korea's "needs." In early 2017, North Korea demanded that the Chinese authorities remove the vulgar expressions (such as Kim's obesity, and also portraying Kim as a child playing with nuclear toys) in the Chinese social media. China immediately accepted the demand. In addition, regarding the U.N. sanctions, China rejected Washington's call for a complete embargo of China's oil supply to North Korea as well as Kim Jong-un's inclusion onto the sanctions list. In the end, these two were not reflected in the U.N. sanctions.
Third, China and North Korea now have a legitimate and opportune reason to exchange high-level envoys. The Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean Workers' Party have "customs" to explain the outcome of their important political events by sending delegations to the other country. As such, China is expected to send a ranking delegation to North Korea soon.
Fourth, there is a view in China that argues that China should actively manage the North Korean issue through the summit so as to secure China's influence over North Korea. North Korea's "usefulness" for China is bound to increase as Xi is poised to unleash a more confident and assertive diplomacy vis-a-vis with the U.S. China needs a "team" (North Korea, Russia) to counter the American regional alliance (South Korea, Japan).
Yet there are challenges for the summit to materialize. China's existing position had been that North Korea should display "some kind of willingness" in the direction of denuclearization. China seems to regard this as a "face" issue that would justify the summit when the whole world will be watching the rare event. However, at this moment, North Korea appears not enthused to utter the word "denuclearization" at all. This stands as a formidable challenge for the summit to go ahead. In addition, if North Korea conducts another nuclear test, that will also likely chill the relationship for months, at least.
Nonetheless, some expect a "big movement" in 2018 between Pyongyang and Beijing. In the complicated China-North Korea love affair, it is seen that it is often Pyongyang that steers the relationship, not Beijing. Pyongyang has so far shut the door and declined engaging China so as to focus on enhancing its nuclear capability. Now, feeling more secure and confident about its nuclear achievements, Kim may shift its foreign policy gear from the "nuclear mode" to the "outreach mode." If North Korea actively courts, China may be persuaded. Xi and Kim haven't had their first summit since their ascending to the top several years ago. In fact, some Chinese scholars also think it's about time to meet.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
