By Tong Kim
"It cuts to the heart that neither do we have power in reality to resolve the issue of the Korean Peninsula that is most urgent to us, nor are we able to induce an agreement on the issue," President Moon Jae-in said at a recent Cabinet meeting. His assessment reflects the cold reality that South Korea faces today.
Moon was expressing his frustrations with the intractability of dealing with the North Korean nuclear/missile threat, following a series of discussions with leaders of world powers, including the U.S., China, and Russia, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hamburg.
They all agree on the denuclearization of the peninsula, but they disagree on how to achieve it or even on imposing additional sanctions against North Korea after its latest test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) labeled the Hwasong-14.
Still, in aspiration for Seoul's initiative to help a peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue, as supported by U.S. President Donald Trump in the joint statement of their June 30 summit in Washington, Moon on July 6 in Berlin announced a comprehensive plan for the North.
The plan would not seek North Korean collapse or regime change, or an artificially expedited unification, but a denuclearized Korean Peninsula that guarantees the North Korean system. It would seek to establish a durable peace regime. It would also promote a new economic map for the peninsula. Finally, it would delink political and military issues from non-political areas of exchange and cooperation.
President Moon proposed four initial steps. First, resume the reunions of separated families on the 10th anniversary of the second inter-Korean summit on October 4. Second, invite the North to participate in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Third, suspend all hostile activities along the DMZ, effective July 27, which marks the 64th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. Fourth, resume contacts and talks for inter-Korean cooperation.
Without Pyongyang's acceptance, these well-intended thoughts may sound hollow, like an idealistic dream. Kim Jong-un is confident in the regime's ability in self-defense and survival. He is busy holding mass rallies and lavish banquets to celebrate his latest success in testing "a ballistic missile with intercontinental range" capable of reaching Alaska.
Pyongyang knows that Seoul consults on its policy with Washington. It also knows the regional dynamics are unfolding in its favor, as China reacts strongly against the growing trilateral alliance of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. China still opposes the THAAD anti-missile battery deployment in the South. Russia is becoming more in concert with China on the North Korean issue.
Everyone I know who knows something about North Korea agrees that the North will never give up or negotiate away its hard-earned nuclear weapons. The successful ICBM test has changed the game. There is no realistic diplomatic option to achieve "a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization."
There is a problem with the dual track of sanction and negotiation, a pronounced policy by both Trump and Moon. Sanctions and pressure are tools that could force the North to come to the table. However, Kim Jong-un will not respond to any offer of talks designed to dismantle his nuclear weapons.
China and Russia are toying with the idea of "double suspension" _ Pyongyang's suspension of nuclear and missile tests and suspension of the U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, a proposition unacceptable to Seoul and Washington. The exercises are an integral part of joint deterrence and defense against possible North Korean attack.
Moon is a pacifist against war. He seeks a peaceful settlement of the disputes. He also believes firmly in strong security against dangerous North Korean provocations. Nobody I know who cares about the value of life supports a military option that would cause unacceptable damage and destruction.
Perhaps, out of desperation or due to the lack of a better option, some pundits are now thinking that the only remaining option is to accept the North for what it is _ a nuclear state with long-range missiles, even if we may not recognize it as such. In other words, we take the option of "acquiescence," as did the United States to China when it developed its own nukes.
If we believe Kim Jong-un is not suicidal, and therefore he would not use his nuclear weapons first, we may consider acquiescence, focusing on deterrence and containment of the North Korean threat until we find a better option or we see a new change. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.
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Moon was expressing his frustrations with the intractability of dealing with the North Korean nuclear/missile threat, following a series of discussions with leaders of world powers, including the U.S., China, and Russia, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hamburg.
They all agree on the denuclearization of the peninsula, but they disagree on how to achieve it or even on imposing additional sanctions against North Korea after its latest test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) labeled the Hwasong-14.
Still, in aspiration for Seoul's initiative to help a peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue, as supported by U.S. President Donald Trump in the joint statement of their June 30 summit in Washington, Moon on July 6 in Berlin announced a comprehensive plan for the North.
The plan would not seek North Korean collapse or regime change, or an artificially expedited unification, but a denuclearized Korean Peninsula that guarantees the North Korean system. It would seek to establish a durable peace regime. It would also promote a new economic map for the peninsula. Finally, it would delink political and military issues from non-political areas of exchange and cooperation.
President Moon proposed four initial steps. First, resume the reunions of separated families on the 10th anniversary of the second inter-Korean summit on October 4. Second, invite the North to participate in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Third, suspend all hostile activities along the DMZ, effective July 27, which marks the 64th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement. Fourth, resume contacts and talks for inter-Korean cooperation.
Without Pyongyang's acceptance, these well-intended thoughts may sound hollow, like an idealistic dream. Kim Jong-un is confident in the regime's ability in self-defense and survival. He is busy holding mass rallies and lavish banquets to celebrate his latest success in testing "a ballistic missile with intercontinental range" capable of reaching Alaska.
Pyongyang knows that Seoul consults on its policy with Washington. It also knows the regional dynamics are unfolding in its favor, as China reacts strongly against the growing trilateral alliance of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. China still opposes the THAAD anti-missile battery deployment in the South. Russia is becoming more in concert with China on the North Korean issue.
Everyone I know who knows something about North Korea agrees that the North will never give up or negotiate away its hard-earned nuclear weapons. The successful ICBM test has changed the game. There is no realistic diplomatic option to achieve "a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization."
There is a problem with the dual track of sanction and negotiation, a pronounced policy by both Trump and Moon. Sanctions and pressure are tools that could force the North to come to the table. However, Kim Jong-un will not respond to any offer of talks designed to dismantle his nuclear weapons.
China and Russia are toying with the idea of "double suspension" _ Pyongyang's suspension of nuclear and missile tests and suspension of the U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, a proposition unacceptable to Seoul and Washington. The exercises are an integral part of joint deterrence and defense against possible North Korean attack.
Moon is a pacifist against war. He seeks a peaceful settlement of the disputes. He also believes firmly in strong security against dangerous North Korean provocations. Nobody I know who cares about the value of life supports a military option that would cause unacceptable damage and destruction.
Perhaps, out of desperation or due to the lack of a better option, some pundits are now thinking that the only remaining option is to accept the North for what it is _ a nuclear state with long-range missiles, even if we may not recognize it as such. In other words, we take the option of "acquiescence," as did the United States to China when it developed its own nukes.
If we believe Kim Jong-un is not suicidal, and therefore he would not use his nuclear weapons first, we may consider acquiescence, focusing on deterrence and containment of the North Korean threat until we find a better option or we see a new change. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.
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