By Oh Young-jin
I don't necessarily buy the proposition that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons on its southern brethren when it is painted into a corner; but still, it is worth following up on just for the sake of giving a once-over of our current reasoning about the North's nuclear armament. The prevalent thought is that Pyongyang is giving its all in developing nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are capable of striking key population centers in the United States. The purpose is security guarantees from the United States. The world's most powerful nation almost wiped out the North during the 1950-53 Korean War that started with its Soviet-backed and China-coached invasion. Such bitterness rarely fades. So by reaching a nuclear equilibrium (not in terms of destructive power but by possessing the ultimate kind of weapon), the North wants to extract U.S. guarantees for its survival. It makes sense. After all, Muammar Gaddafi, the dictator of Libya, cut a deal with the West for his survival in return for giving up his plan for weapons of mass destruction. The West didn't keep its end of the deal, letting him die a terrible death at the hands of his own people in October 2011.
So the North has learned its lesson or so the experts think.
To avoid the same fate, Kim Jong-un, the third generation of the Kim dynasty that has controlled the North for more than seven decades, would dig his heels in to see its ICBM program through. Even the U.S. would not make light of the North as a nuclear power.
Would this be the end of the North's nuclear story? Matching the nuclear weapons of the U.S. with its own is enough?
What about the North's unfinished raison d'être _ communizing the South?
The South has grown incomparably bigger in the size of economy over the stagnant one of North Korea _ so, long forgotten is the North's aim of conquering the South for unification.
Few would seriously think that the North is capable of taking over the South. Whenever he has a chance, President Moon Jae-in would assure the North that his government has no intention to seek to absorb the North. Absorption took place in German unification, a much-touted model set for the Korean version.
Pyongyang has been stuck in the 1990s without giving proper upgrades to its conventional weapons, while the wealthy South has turned its military into a mighty powerhouse through the purchases of top-of-line American hardware.
Therefore, the North's nuclear weapons can be seen as a game changer, overturning the balance in one fell swoop.
If the North becomes a nuclear weapons state, how would its unification policy evolve?
The first possibility is that it reverts to its old policy of unification by force.
The second is that it milks the South for extortion money _ threatening the South to cough up or face nuclear strikes.
For the first, the North faces a lot of barriers. The South has a population of over 50 million, twice as many as the North's. Then, the southerners have enjoyed a far higher standard of living, meaning the northerners would be upset to find the wretched life they have put up with, and on the top of that, the northern leadership should maintain a semblance of the southerners' living standard. Or it would face a riot.
But the real dilemma is that the North would be exposed to the outside world and forced to unlock its hermetically-sealed kingdom. Would Kim be able to maintain his control in a Korea unified on his terms? That's highly unlikely. The reason why the free world prevailed over the communists can be explained by many factors but one is the closed nature of communism that made its system weak to outside influences. It may be compared to a vampire who is faced with the ultimate baptism of sunlight.
For the second, enslaving the bigger and stronger South with the threat of nuclear weapons is far-fetched to say the least. The South would naturally go after its own nuclear armament or seek to nullify the North's threat. In a short time the South would attain the balance of power, painting the North into a corner again.
That may leave out one option _ the nuclear one. The North is developing nuclear weapons for its survival but under terms different than the existing nuclear powers that think that they would best be kept unused. The North would be driven into a corner, facing great pressure to use them because in any event _ whether it conquers the South or keeps the South at nuclear gunpoint _ it can't get any guarantee for survival. Any transition is bound to be a reprieve that puts a temporary hold on its ultimate demise. That is the most compelling reason to stop the North's nuclear development.
Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com) is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer.
I don't necessarily buy the proposition that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons on its southern brethren when it is painted into a corner; but still, it is worth following up on just for the sake of giving a once-over of our current reasoning about the North's nuclear armament. The prevalent thought is that Pyongyang is giving its all in developing nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are capable of striking key population centers in the United States. The purpose is security guarantees from the United States. The world's most powerful nation almost wiped out the North during the 1950-53 Korean War that started with its Soviet-backed and China-coached invasion. Such bitterness rarely fades. So by reaching a nuclear equilibrium (not in terms of destructive power but by possessing the ultimate kind of weapon), the North wants to extract U.S. guarantees for its survival. It makes sense. After all, Muammar Gaddafi, the dictator of Libya, cut a deal with the West for his survival in return for giving up his plan for weapons of mass destruction. The West didn't keep its end of the deal, letting him die a terrible death at the hands of his own people in October 2011.
So the North has learned its lesson or so the experts think.
To avoid the same fate, Kim Jong-un, the third generation of the Kim dynasty that has controlled the North for more than seven decades, would dig his heels in to see its ICBM program through. Even the U.S. would not make light of the North as a nuclear power.
Would this be the end of the North's nuclear story? Matching the nuclear weapons of the U.S. with its own is enough?
What about the North's unfinished raison d'être _ communizing the South?
The South has grown incomparably bigger in the size of economy over the stagnant one of North Korea _ so, long forgotten is the North's aim of conquering the South for unification.
Few would seriously think that the North is capable of taking over the South. Whenever he has a chance, President Moon Jae-in would assure the North that his government has no intention to seek to absorb the North. Absorption took place in German unification, a much-touted model set for the Korean version.
Pyongyang has been stuck in the 1990s without giving proper upgrades to its conventional weapons, while the wealthy South has turned its military into a mighty powerhouse through the purchases of top-of-line American hardware.
Therefore, the North's nuclear weapons can be seen as a game changer, overturning the balance in one fell swoop.
If the North becomes a nuclear weapons state, how would its unification policy evolve?
The first possibility is that it reverts to its old policy of unification by force.
The second is that it milks the South for extortion money _ threatening the South to cough up or face nuclear strikes.
For the first, the North faces a lot of barriers. The South has a population of over 50 million, twice as many as the North's. Then, the southerners have enjoyed a far higher standard of living, meaning the northerners would be upset to find the wretched life they have put up with, and on the top of that, the northern leadership should maintain a semblance of the southerners' living standard. Or it would face a riot.
But the real dilemma is that the North would be exposed to the outside world and forced to unlock its hermetically-sealed kingdom. Would Kim be able to maintain his control in a Korea unified on his terms? That's highly unlikely. The reason why the free world prevailed over the communists can be explained by many factors but one is the closed nature of communism that made its system weak to outside influences. It may be compared to a vampire who is faced with the ultimate baptism of sunlight.
For the second, enslaving the bigger and stronger South with the threat of nuclear weapons is far-fetched to say the least. The South would naturally go after its own nuclear armament or seek to nullify the North's threat. In a short time the South would attain the balance of power, painting the North into a corner again.
That may leave out one option _ the nuclear one. The North is developing nuclear weapons for its survival but under terms different than the existing nuclear powers that think that they would best be kept unused. The North would be driven into a corner, facing great pressure to use them because in any event _ whether it conquers the South or keeps the South at nuclear gunpoint _ it can't get any guarantee for survival. Any transition is bound to be a reprieve that puts a temporary hold on its ultimate demise. That is the most compelling reason to stop the North's nuclear development.
Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com) is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer.
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