What President needs for foreign policy
The latest Korea Times Roundtable last week was planned to deal with the aftermath of President Moon Jae-in's whirlwind diplomacy but ended up diverging into why Korea is not assertive enough on the international stage. The reasons are obvious ― a middle power sandwiched by big powers with competing interests. We tried to go beneath and beyond those obvious ones and came up with four columns ― real reasons for China's fears, encouragement for Korea to take the lead, the U.S. vis-à-vis North Korea relationship and why Korea needs to be fainthearted for its own sake. ― ED.
By Lee Seong-hyon
For the first time, there is a real danger with North Korea. It is no longer a game. South Korea should not be complacent. On the surface, the most important outcome of the summit between President Moon Jae-in and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump was that the U.S. offered its support for South Korea to "take the lead" in dealing with North Korea; the unspoken real meaning was that the U.S. must not carry out preemptive military operations on North Korea without the prior full consultation and full consent from South Korea.
Even then, however, South Korea should not be complacent. Don't forget it is dealing with Trump. In addition, for other countries to utter "support" for South Korea's playing a more major role in what is essentially an inter-Korean affair is the easiest diplomatic lip service they can freely offer.
The "real" reason for Washington to "really" concede the initiative in handling the North Korean affair to Seoul is to divert possible U.S. preemptive strikes against North Korea, which is very likely to spin out of control, with grave consequences. North Korea is no longer an evening pastime entertainment story of a potbellied leader in a faraway exotic nation who plays with a nuclear toy. The coming few months is a critical time for North Korea watchers.
First, North Korea has already crossed the U.S. "red line" and entered into the "red zone" with its latest display of an ICBM, which soon may be able to hit the continental U.S. The attitude of the U.S. is genuinely hardening against Pyongyang. North Korean missiles used to be a threat to Seoul or Tokyo ― two U.S. allies in Asia. Now, they pose a direct threat to America's own security. Accordingly, the U.S. threat perception is changing. North Korea is now a "clear and present" danger to the security of the United States.
Second, Washington has "kinetic options" on the table in real terms. "Kinetic" is a euphemism now increasingly circulated in Washington to mean "military." The officially stated U.S. policy on North Korea, "maximum pressure and engagement," should be understood as "maximum pressure" only. The "engagement" part is a diplomatic cliché. And it even doesn't indicate North Korea; rather it indicates "engagement with China." It is a strategy to engage China to solve the North Korean issue.
Third, Trump's "China card" has failed. Trump mistakenly felt that he made such a deal of "understanding" with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping in their Mar-a-Lago meeting in April.
In a sense, Trump was giving Xi a chance to solve the North Korean issue on the one hand, while on the other he was also making military preparations. With the failure of the "China card," a rapid disintegration of bilateral strategic confidence is unfolding, as seen in the recent high-level talks in which both Washington and Beijing, respectively, cancelled press briefings.
Fourth, "adult supervision" in Washington to restrain Trump is at question. The U.S. under Trump's presidency is increasingly seen as unreliable regarding its commitment to allies and its mature leadership. His tendency to even see alliances from transactional realms has been so far restrained by adult supervision, especially by the Secretary of Defense James Mattis. The day when Mattis steps down over a disagreement with Trump or when he is fired by Trump should be an alarm to South Korea.
For decades, South Koreans have been habituated to the prolonged state of being under the North Korean threat and have taken a complacent "business as usual" attitude to the possibility of war. This is a starkly different perception from people who live outside South Korea. Koreans should realize that the Korean Peninsula is still in a technical state of war. The war can resume at any time soon. Trump as U.S. president could exercise such an authority. While Americans are often deeply divided about Trump's domestic politics, when it comes to foreign policy American citizens and the U.S. Congress tend to support their president's decisions. South Korea should read the tea leaves very carefully. When Trump ordered the recent military strikes against Syria, he didn't consult U.S. allies in the Middle East in advance. North Korea has crossed the red line; it's now in the red zone.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com.
The latest Korea Times Roundtable last week was planned to deal with the aftermath of President Moon Jae-in's whirlwind diplomacy but ended up diverging into why Korea is not assertive enough on the international stage. The reasons are obvious ― a middle power sandwiched by big powers with competing interests. We tried to go beneath and beyond those obvious ones and came up with four columns ― real reasons for China's fears, encouragement for Korea to take the lead, the U.S. vis-à-vis North Korea relationship and why Korea needs to be fainthearted for its own sake. ― ED.
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Participants pose before the start of The Korea Times Roundtable on the subject of the aftermath of President Moon Jae-in's recent whirlwind diplomacy at the Times' conference room last week. From left |
By Lee Seong-hyon
For the first time, there is a real danger with North Korea. It is no longer a game. South Korea should not be complacent. On the surface, the most important outcome of the summit between President Moon Jae-in and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump was that the U.S. offered its support for South Korea to "take the lead" in dealing with North Korea; the unspoken real meaning was that the U.S. must not carry out preemptive military operations on North Korea without the prior full consultation and full consent from South Korea.
Even then, however, South Korea should not be complacent. Don't forget it is dealing with Trump. In addition, for other countries to utter "support" for South Korea's playing a more major role in what is essentially an inter-Korean affair is the easiest diplomatic lip service they can freely offer.
The "real" reason for Washington to "really" concede the initiative in handling the North Korean affair to Seoul is to divert possible U.S. preemptive strikes against North Korea, which is very likely to spin out of control, with grave consequences. North Korea is no longer an evening pastime entertainment story of a potbellied leader in a faraway exotic nation who plays with a nuclear toy. The coming few months is a critical time for North Korea watchers.
First, North Korea has already crossed the U.S. "red line" and entered into the "red zone" with its latest display of an ICBM, which soon may be able to hit the continental U.S. The attitude of the U.S. is genuinely hardening against Pyongyang. North Korean missiles used to be a threat to Seoul or Tokyo ― two U.S. allies in Asia. Now, they pose a direct threat to America's own security. Accordingly, the U.S. threat perception is changing. North Korea is now a "clear and present" danger to the security of the United States.
Second, Washington has "kinetic options" on the table in real terms. "Kinetic" is a euphemism now increasingly circulated in Washington to mean "military." The officially stated U.S. policy on North Korea, "maximum pressure and engagement," should be understood as "maximum pressure" only. The "engagement" part is a diplomatic cliché. And it even doesn't indicate North Korea; rather it indicates "engagement with China." It is a strategy to engage China to solve the North Korean issue.
Third, Trump's "China card" has failed. Trump mistakenly felt that he made such a deal of "understanding" with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping in their Mar-a-Lago meeting in April.
In a sense, Trump was giving Xi a chance to solve the North Korean issue on the one hand, while on the other he was also making military preparations. With the failure of the "China card," a rapid disintegration of bilateral strategic confidence is unfolding, as seen in the recent high-level talks in which both Washington and Beijing, respectively, cancelled press briefings.
Fourth, "adult supervision" in Washington to restrain Trump is at question. The U.S. under Trump's presidency is increasingly seen as unreliable regarding its commitment to allies and its mature leadership. His tendency to even see alliances from transactional realms has been so far restrained by adult supervision, especially by the Secretary of Defense James Mattis. The day when Mattis steps down over a disagreement with Trump or when he is fired by Trump should be an alarm to South Korea.
For decades, South Koreans have been habituated to the prolonged state of being under the North Korean threat and have taken a complacent "business as usual" attitude to the possibility of war. This is a starkly different perception from people who live outside South Korea. Koreans should realize that the Korean Peninsula is still in a technical state of war. The war can resume at any time soon. Trump as U.S. president could exercise such an authority. While Americans are often deeply divided about Trump's domestic politics, when it comes to foreign policy American citizens and the U.S. Congress tend to support their president's decisions. South Korea should read the tea leaves very carefully. When Trump ordered the recent military strikes against Syria, he didn't consult U.S. allies in the Middle East in advance. North Korea has crossed the red line; it's now in the red zone.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com.
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