This is the second in a three-part series about South and North Korea. ― E.D.
By Doug Bandow
North Korea has tested a mid-range missile, sparking the usual expressions of concern in Washington. But worse is likely to come.
In his New Year’s Day address North Korea’s Kim Jong-un said his nation was close to testing an ICBM which could hit the U.S. Predictably, President Donald Trump responded via tweet: “It won’t happen.”
Which means what? He doesn’t believe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be able to develop such a missile or miniaturize such a weapon? It would be foolish to make hope the basis of U.S. policy toward the North.
Maybe the president-elect means, well, nothing. Going back to George H.W. Bush every U.S. president has insisted that North Korea would not develop nuclear weapons. But it has.
Perhaps Trump expects to talk the latest scion to rule the de facto monarchy into abandoning the dynasty’s geopolitical ambitions. But very few Korea watchers believe Pyongyang is prepared to voluntarily cede its nuclear program.
The presidentt might insist that Beijing pressure the North to stop the latter’s weapons programs. However, China’s influence is limited and Beijing is not interested in imposing regime change for America’s benefit.
Finally, perhaps Trump plans to attack North Korea. That might trigger retaliation and a much larger war.
No one would deny the U.S. the right, indeed, obligation, to destroy any missile about to be launched at America. But having successfully defended against the resumption of the Korean War over the last more than 63 years, Washington should not risk starting another devastating round. Although the DPRK would lose, the carnage could be enormous.
So what to do? Trump sounds like he has set one of those infamous “red lines,” but, like his predecessor, has set himself up for an embarrassing climb-down when reality intrudes.
Obviously, developments in the North are unsettling. Pyongyang’s existing missile capabilities place much of Northeast Asia within reach. A working ICBM would put the continental U.S. within range, giving the North a nuclear deterrent against the world’s most powerful nation.
The bad news about these developments is obvious enough. Yet there is good news, surprisingly enough.
All of the Kims, including the current ruler, appear to be ruthlessly pragmatic. The North Korean bomb is not a suicide weapon.
All told, the DPRK is extremely unlikely to initiate an attack on America. What would it gain? Almost instant destruction. So as long as Washington doesn’t start bombing the North, nothing much is likely to happen.
That doesn’t mean the situation is not dangerous. But almost the entire risk for America reflects the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea. Were American troops not present, backing up Washington’s promise to go to war on the ROK’s behalf, Kim would have no reason to pay much notice to America.
So what should the Trump administration do?
Get out of Korea.
The U.S. is at risk because it has placed itself squarely within the Korean imbroglio. The South’s advantages are overwhelming—about 40 times the GDP, a massive technological edge, overwhelming international support, and twice the population.
There’s no need for American conventional forces to be stationed in or around the Korean Peninsula. Washington should phase out its military presence and end its security guarantee.
In the short-term the U.S. should maintain its nuclear umbrella over the ROK. But over time Washington should consider other options, including the possibility of South Korea and likely Japan developing countervailing nuclear deterrents.
An American withdrawal would have several advantages: remove Washington from the center of any Korean conflict, turn responsibility for the South’s defense over to Seoul, eliminate Washington’s role as the DPRK’s enemy number one, reduce perceived security threats against Pyongyang, and shift responsibility for lowering regional tensions to countries in the region.
Having gotten out of Korea, the Trump administration would have more options in how to address the North. Washington also would be better able to make a deal with China to pressure the North, dropping any attempt to use a reunited Korea as part of a campaign to contain China.
North Korea remains the perpetual problem with no good solutions. But rather than paint his administration into a corner, the president could begin to put distance between America and the incipient crisis. That might not make the problems any easier to solve, but no longer would Washington be stuck with chief responsibility for dealing with the DPRK.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan.