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North Korea represents a Rorschach test for President-elect Donald Trump on how he will conduct his foreign policy.
During his election campaign, Trump seemed to offer contradictory views on North Korea as he did on many other issues. On the one hand, he suggested that he would be willing to negotiate with Pyongyang on its nuclear weapons and missile program, while reducing the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, Trump indicated that he would support a muscular foreign policy in an effort to win renewed global "respect" for the U.S., while describing North Korean leader Kim Jung-un as a "madman" who he would like to see "disappear."
One thing is certain. The issue of North Korea is likely to receive higher priority in a Trump administration as Pyongyang accelerates its nuclear and missile development program, with two nuclear tests this year and multiple missile tests, including those involving submarine launched ballistic missiles.
Trump inherits a situation where Pyongyang appears committed to maintaining its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate security guarantee against regime change by the U.S., while international sanctions have done little in persuading North Korea to back down.
The key question is whether Trump would accept a North Korean nuclear fait accompli. Some of Trump's conciliatory statements could lay the groundwork for a possible arms control agreement, with Pyongyang agreeing to reduce the number of its warheads in return for economic aid.
If Trump abandons the policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea adopted by President Barack Obama and promotes instead high-level direct negotiations with Pyongyang, it would mark a return to the diplomatic approach pursued by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s and which was subsequently abandoned by President George W. Bush.
A rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang would also be aided if Trump follows through with his threat that the U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan would be reduced or removed if both countries do not pay more to maintain American troops on their soil. The withdrawal of the U.S. military could pave the way for a formal U.S.-North Korean peace treaty ending the 1950-53 Korean war since this is a key demand by Pyongyang.
Trump might be willing to accept such a deal since he appears to favor an "America First" isolationist foreign policy so that the U.S. can devote more resources to rebuilding its economy and infrastructure, while telling South Korea and Japan that if they want a stronger defense against North Korea they should obtain their own nuclear weapons.
Another clear signal of the U.S. intention to reduce its military presence in South Korea would be if it accelerated the return of wartime operational control to Seoul, which has been repeatedly delayed. Such moves might be acceptable to the next South Korean government if it is formed by the opposition party, which has favored a more conciliatory approach on North Korea, similar to the policies of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.
The scenario outlined above would horrify the conservative foreign policy establishment in both Washington and Seoul, but would be welcomed by mainly leftist critics of U.S. policy toward Korea. Academics such as Bruce Cummings and libertarian supporters of a non-interventionist U.S. foreign policy such as the Doug Bandow have long maintained that the U.S. military presence in South Korea has increased regional tensions rather than reducing them. Left-wing groups in South Korea would also support the withdrawal of U.S. troops and improved ties with Pyongyang. This is ironic given that Trump is seen by most of the world as a dangerous man who could unleash a nuclear war.
But Trump's reputation for having a volatile temper could also mean that the situation on the Korean peninsula could get much worse, justifying those fears. If North Korea appears intent on continuing to develop nuclear-tipped missiles that could reach the continental U.S., matching this with growing rhetorical threats, it might provoke Trump to launch a pre-emptive strike.
This scenario would also be linked to deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China caused by growing disputes over trade if Trump carries out his threat to slap punitive tariffs on Chinese imports. Trump might believe that Beijing's failure to rein in North Korea through economic pressure underscores that China cannot be trusted and that a military strike against North Korea might serve as a warning to Beijing to behave.
My hunch is that Trump might decide first to pursue a conciliatory approach on North Korea since this adheres to his self-image as a "dealmaker," while reflecting his unconventional views on U.S. foreign policy. But a lot will also depend on who he selects to fill important national security posts in his administration. If he appoints John Bolton, a noted "hawk" on North Korea, as his national security advisor, as has been suggested, then his strategy toward Pyongyang might prove to be an orthodox hardline one.
John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Seoul-based independent journalist and media consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.