Assembly turns nuclear armament into low comedy
It is an ongoing theater of the absurdity with a cast of political demagogues and mad scientists, politicians and engineers. They are trying to use sophistry to lure the public into backing their call for nuclear armament. They plug it as the only option to trump the nuclear-armed North Korea.
The protagonist is Rep. Won Yoo-chul, former floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party and a long-shot presidential candidate. The latest venue was the third forum for nuclear armament for the preservation of peace, Oct. 12, at the National Assembly. Playing Dr. Strangelove were Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute; Choi Kang of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies; and Suh Kune-yull of Seoul National University.
Belatedly, but we want to set the records straight. Rep. Won said, "If North Korea crosses the red line by conducting another nuclear test, we should start our own nuclear armament program." Won was logically untenable. A red line should be part of a climatic series of safety limits that can only be effective, if the other party ― the North in this case, should be made fully aware of the consequences of advancing, each step of the way. This is not the case.
For a violation, crossing the red line also requires proportional punishment but our nuclear program is not a penalty, but a defensive measure. It is like a square peg for a round hole.
Choi, vice president of the Asan Institute, which was founded by former lawmaker Chung Mong-joon, also a nuclear proponent, said, "Our external relationship would suffer a shock in the short term but be restored to the previous level prior to the start of the nuclear program."
Would it?
India, Pakistan and Israel, the examples Choi cited, are different from Korea. The India-Pakistan nuclear equilibrium is, from a U.S. standpoint, a policy of keeping the two archrivals away from each other. Allowing Seoul to go nuclear wouldn't counterbalance the North but would encourage other copycats. Just remember how the U.S. made painstaking effort to cajole and coerce Iran to shelve its nuclear program.
Besides, India and Pakistan are still paying one way or another for their nuclear choice. Israel's nuclear program is also on hold in return for a U.S. security guarantee.
True, Seoul could go nuclear but such an action would carry an immediate cost: Losing the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, besides international isolation. From the U.S. point of view, there wouldn't be much difference between Seoul and Pyongyang, if the two are nuclear armed.
Sejong's Cheong claimed that Korea's move to go nuclear would help the U.S. save costs in defending South Korea and serve as a counterbalance in the U.S. favor in countering China's growing influence.
That is wishful thinking to the extreme. The U.S. presence here serves many purposes ― deterring the North, countering China and keeping the South in line. In short, the U.S. has a self-centered dichotomy between friend and foe: If you are not a friend, you are an enemy.
Thirdly, Prof. Suh, a nuclear engineer, claimed that it would take a total of two years for Korea to become a nuclear state ― six months each of a four-stage program: nuclear bomb, hydrogen bomb, payload miniaturization and deployment. Please keep this professor away from students.
The nuclear option is like suicide for South Korea and therefore should stay off the table. Especially so, when we have a better option: Peace. Their talk of nuclear armament would be best kept only for, well, amusement.
It is an ongoing theater of the absurdity with a cast of political demagogues and mad scientists, politicians and engineers. They are trying to use sophistry to lure the public into backing their call for nuclear armament. They plug it as the only option to trump the nuclear-armed North Korea.
The protagonist is Rep. Won Yoo-chul, former floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party and a long-shot presidential candidate. The latest venue was the third forum for nuclear armament for the preservation of peace, Oct. 12, at the National Assembly. Playing Dr. Strangelove were Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute; Choi Kang of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies; and Suh Kune-yull of Seoul National University.
Belatedly, but we want to set the records straight. Rep. Won said, "If North Korea crosses the red line by conducting another nuclear test, we should start our own nuclear armament program." Won was logically untenable. A red line should be part of a climatic series of safety limits that can only be effective, if the other party ― the North in this case, should be made fully aware of the consequences of advancing, each step of the way. This is not the case.
For a violation, crossing the red line also requires proportional punishment but our nuclear program is not a penalty, but a defensive measure. It is like a square peg for a round hole.
Choi, vice president of the Asan Institute, which was founded by former lawmaker Chung Mong-joon, also a nuclear proponent, said, "Our external relationship would suffer a shock in the short term but be restored to the previous level prior to the start of the nuclear program."
Would it?
India, Pakistan and Israel, the examples Choi cited, are different from Korea. The India-Pakistan nuclear equilibrium is, from a U.S. standpoint, a policy of keeping the two archrivals away from each other. Allowing Seoul to go nuclear wouldn't counterbalance the North but would encourage other copycats. Just remember how the U.S. made painstaking effort to cajole and coerce Iran to shelve its nuclear program.
Besides, India and Pakistan are still paying one way or another for their nuclear choice. Israel's nuclear program is also on hold in return for a U.S. security guarantee.
True, Seoul could go nuclear but such an action would carry an immediate cost: Losing the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, besides international isolation. From the U.S. point of view, there wouldn't be much difference between Seoul and Pyongyang, if the two are nuclear armed.
Sejong's Cheong claimed that Korea's move to go nuclear would help the U.S. save costs in defending South Korea and serve as a counterbalance in the U.S. favor in countering China's growing influence.
That is wishful thinking to the extreme. The U.S. presence here serves many purposes ― deterring the North, countering China and keeping the South in line. In short, the U.S. has a self-centered dichotomy between friend and foe: If you are not a friend, you are an enemy.
Thirdly, Prof. Suh, a nuclear engineer, claimed that it would take a total of two years for Korea to become a nuclear state ― six months each of a four-stage program: nuclear bomb, hydrogen bomb, payload miniaturization and deployment. Please keep this professor away from students.
The nuclear option is like suicide for South Korea and therefore should stay off the table. Especially so, when we have a better option: Peace. Their talk of nuclear armament would be best kept only for, well, amusement.
