 North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, right, and Wang Jiarui, left, head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, give a toast at a meeting in Pyongyang, North Korea, Jan. 23 in this photo released by North Korea’s official news agency KCNA. Kim met Wang in his first reported meeting with a foreign envoy since a suspected stroke in August. / Reuters-KCNA-Yonhap |
By Lakhvinder SinghUntil the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, ``Juche'' was the guiding philosophy of the North Korean regime. The Korean Workers' Party exercised complete control over all organs of the government, including the armed forces.
A strict chain of command ordered these forces from Kim down to the Central Military Committee (CMC) to the Korean People's Army. However, all this began to change with the death of Kim and the restructuring under Kim Jong-il, who took control of the government and the military after the death of his father.
Convinced that Juche could no longer be the guiding principle of state policy in light of the changed domestic and international realities, Kim Jong-il adopted what has come to be known as a ``military first policy.''
Under this new policy he decided to exercise direct control over the military. The chain of command, which worked through the communist party under his father, was abolished; orders and information started flowing directly from Kim's personal secretariat to various sections of the army and security forces.
This gave Kim Jong-il various avenues through which to control different organs of the government and defense forces, and exert direct influence over issues of national and international importance.
There have been many misconceptions and misunderstandings about the true nature and scope of the military first policy. Many scholars and North Korea observers have argued that with this policy Kim has elevated the position of the military to one of decision-making and overall control of the regime.
However, this might not be the case. Actually, North Korea's military first policy is more related to restructuring of power and influence than with decision-making. Most of the power is still concentrated in Kim Jong-il's personnel office and secretariat, but by putting the National Defense Commission (NDC) at the center of the leadership structure he has secured the support of a very important pillar of government structure.
By doing this, he has integrated the top military brass into national security decision-making, thus strengthening his ability to rule firmly with the support of military and security agencies.
This newly restructured NDC is providing Kim with the mechanism to integrate both external and internal issues on a common platform.
Thus, by bringing together all the different elements of the regime within the national security preview and giving it official recognition, he has altered the policy followed under his father where command and control were enforced through the communist party.
Today, the North Korean military enjoys a dominant position in the government's power structure. More than 15 percent of GDP is allocated to the armed forces. (Unofficially, it is said to be more than 30 percent.)
The country's best and brightest young men and women are encouraged to opt for careers within the military. The control of this elite institution over North Korean society has given Kim Jong-il unmatched power.
But despite the prominence given to the NDC, the Workers' Party has not entirely been sidelined in the North Korean power structure. According to recent media reports, following the health problems of Kim Jong-il, it has been regaining lost ground.
Chang Sung-taek, who does not hold any military position and heads the administrative department of North Korea's Workers' Party, is emerging as a new force in the changing power structure of the country.
Lately Chang, who is also Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law, has been seen playing a bigger role at government functions and is helping to prepare for a possible power transition.
This indicates that in the event of a sudden power change in North Korea, the communist party might be playing a bigger role in the country's affairs than the military, which has been the dominant force in the recent past.
Yet there are some people who do not believe Chang will be the successor to Kim. According to this line of thinking, it is possible he is being used as a decoy in order to promote one of Kim's sons as the real candidate for power. (In recent media reports, Kim's eldest son Kim Jong-nam and youngest son Kim Jong-un have been named as possible successors).
Some also argue that he might even be a military plant, which does not want to attract undue attention during the transition period.
There is also the real possibility that North Korea is seeking a collective leadership of sorts, consisting of Chang and Kim Jong-nam, using the former and his pragmatic tendencies to smooth over any problems with the power transition.
Currently, no one knows for certain what is developing within the top echelons of North Korea's power structure. What we do know is that it is getting murkier by the day and needs to be watched closely.
Any violent interruption in the smooth transition of power and a power struggle among different sections of North Korea in the aftermath of Kim Jong-il will have serious consequences for the peace, security and stability of the region and the whole world.
Lakhvinder Singh, senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, is president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum. He can be reached at kapcenterkyu@yahoo.com The views expressed in the above article are those of the author and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Korea Times.
