Park should give Obama consent on deployment
It is time for Korea to shift from strategic ambiguity to constructive clarity about the wishes of the United States to deploy the latest missile interceptor to protect its troops stationed here.
The Oct. 16 summit in Washington between President Park Geun-hye and U.S. President Barack Obama is the right time and place to make the first moves toward that end. Although the Foreign Ministry denied the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the missile defense system is not on the agenda for the leaders, but Park should raise the issue as an unofficial agenda item, if Obama doesn't bring it up first.
There are two reasons for the added urgency that Seoul stop equivocating in response to repeated suggestions at various levels from the U.S. government that Seoul allow THAAD deployment.
First, it was the display by the North of its sophisticated missiles in the massive parade to mark the 70th anniversary of its Workers' Party last Saturday. To counter this threat, bringing in the top-of-line defense weapon ― THAAD ― is important.
Second, THAAD deployment, however, should be part of the strategy for reconfiguring how to deal with the North's threats. Seoul has so far followed the U.S. policy of containment but the new goals should give more play to the concept of competing militarily with Pyongyang and cornering it into a race that the impoverished nation can never win. Remember how the Soviet Union collapsed into state bankruptcy as it overstretched itself to cope with the immense military buildup initiated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
It is also worthy of recalling what preceded this arms race in the 1980s between the two ideological titans: the era of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the immense size of the nuclear arsenals possessed by the U.S. and Soviet Union that kept the world on the brink of World War III. As shown in this global rivalry that took place for more than 40 years, a fragile peace dominated the Cold
War, punctured by proxy wars, and iced by détente, its closure demanded that the Soviets be defeated.
The inter-Korean rivalry has already outlived the Cold War but its end, most likely, will be brought about by one party's victory over the other, too. It is imperative, then, to make sure that we are the winners. For that, Seoul needs to deal with the North from a position of superior strength, being ready to push the North to its limits and make it realize that it no longer has the luxury of MAD-based security or "If anybody crosses me, be ready to come down with me." What the North will get instead is singularly assured destruction or SAD ― meaning: "You will perish alone."
This new strategic goal-setting can provide a solution to the recent U.S.-China agreement not to accept the North as a nuclear-weapons state, which lacks a master plan to translate it to reality. On a broader sense, it should mean that Korea may gain a greater say and furthermore play a leading role in determining the course of action vis-à-vis the U.S. and China as well as the North.
At the same time, if Park tells Obama about Seoul's readiness to accept THAAD deployment, it would go a long way to clearing U.S. suspicions that Seoul could break with it and form a new alliance with China, especially after Park joined Chinese President Xi Jinping as the only head of state among U.S. allies to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Of course, Park's clarification should be that Korea is not seeking to beef up ties with China at the cost of the alliance.
Last but not least, handling China's objections is tricky but can be managed in a way that Seoul should ask China to come up with a better way of dealing with the North's threat than THAAD deployment that should first be brought into the nation for use by the U.S. military.
It is time for Korea to shift from strategic ambiguity to constructive clarity about the wishes of the United States to deploy the latest missile interceptor to protect its troops stationed here.
The Oct. 16 summit in Washington between President Park Geun-hye and U.S. President Barack Obama is the right time and place to make the first moves toward that end. Although the Foreign Ministry denied the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the missile defense system is not on the agenda for the leaders, but Park should raise the issue as an unofficial agenda item, if Obama doesn't bring it up first.
There are two reasons for the added urgency that Seoul stop equivocating in response to repeated suggestions at various levels from the U.S. government that Seoul allow THAAD deployment.
First, it was the display by the North of its sophisticated missiles in the massive parade to mark the 70th anniversary of its Workers' Party last Saturday. To counter this threat, bringing in the top-of-line defense weapon ― THAAD ― is important.
Second, THAAD deployment, however, should be part of the strategy for reconfiguring how to deal with the North's threats. Seoul has so far followed the U.S. policy of containment but the new goals should give more play to the concept of competing militarily with Pyongyang and cornering it into a race that the impoverished nation can never win. Remember how the Soviet Union collapsed into state bankruptcy as it overstretched itself to cope with the immense military buildup initiated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
It is also worthy of recalling what preceded this arms race in the 1980s between the two ideological titans: the era of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the immense size of the nuclear arsenals possessed by the U.S. and Soviet Union that kept the world on the brink of World War III. As shown in this global rivalry that took place for more than 40 years, a fragile peace dominated the Cold
War, punctured by proxy wars, and iced by détente, its closure demanded that the Soviets be defeated.
The inter-Korean rivalry has already outlived the Cold War but its end, most likely, will be brought about by one party's victory over the other, too. It is imperative, then, to make sure that we are the winners. For that, Seoul needs to deal with the North from a position of superior strength, being ready to push the North to its limits and make it realize that it no longer has the luxury of MAD-based security or "If anybody crosses me, be ready to come down with me." What the North will get instead is singularly assured destruction or SAD ― meaning: "You will perish alone."
This new strategic goal-setting can provide a solution to the recent U.S.-China agreement not to accept the North as a nuclear-weapons state, which lacks a master plan to translate it to reality. On a broader sense, it should mean that Korea may gain a greater say and furthermore play a leading role in determining the course of action vis-à-vis the U.S. and China as well as the North.
At the same time, if Park tells Obama about Seoul's readiness to accept THAAD deployment, it would go a long way to clearing U.S. suspicions that Seoul could break with it and form a new alliance with China, especially after Park joined Chinese President Xi Jinping as the only head of state among U.S. allies to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Of course, Park's clarification should be that Korea is not seeking to beef up ties with China at the cost of the alliance.
Last but not least, handling China's objections is tricky but can be managed in a way that Seoul should ask China to come up with a better way of dealing with the North's threat than THAAD deployment that should first be brought into the nation for use by the U.S. military.
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