It is a pity in this regard that officials from the government and governing party decided Friday to keep the punishment in place until the reclusive regime takes some "responsible steps," meaning apologizing for the armed provocation and vowing never to repeat it.
True, reasons for the sanctions remain unchanged. And they will never change in future, either because Pyongyang would not acknowledge, let along apologize for, its involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan.
Have the penalties worked as desired, then?
The answer is negative, too. It seems increasingly clear that South Korean companies suffer more from lost business opportunities caused by the cut of economic ties because North Korea is stepping up cooperative projects with China and Russia as an alternative. The North is even threatening to stage slowdowns or walkouts in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, demanding pay raises, another sign of the South's declining importance in the economy of the communist regime.
To their credit, the government and ruling party officials left room for some exceptions, such as Seoul's humanitarian aid and Korean firms' participation in international projects conducted in North Korea's border areas with China and Russia. But the humanitarian aid provided by the Park administration is even smaller than that of the Lee administration.
Despite the ostensible flexibility of President Park's North Korea policy, the inter-Korean relationship has moved an inch forward from where her predecessor stood, or even retreated. Former President Lee, another conservative hardliner toward the North, attempted to realize a summit through behind-the-scenes negotiations. The incumbent leader, however, seems to be making no such efforts, reiterating her "principled" diplomacy numerous times. As most Koreans see it, however, such a rigid stance only reveals her diplomatic ignorance, whether her partners are North Korean or Japanese leaders.
President Park and her diplomatic team need to be far more active than now. Park, instead of demanding the North show trust by her "trustpolitik," should try to convince Pyongyang that its counterpart in the South is a trustworthy partner by making bold initiatives. North Korea can hardly concede to the South because concessions by the weaker side look like cowardice, but South Korea can do so as it is far stronger and wealthier than its northern counterpart.
Any further inaction by this administration only reveals its lack of ability or eagerness, or both.