In presiding over a meeting to address the country's low birthrate and aging population Friday, President Park Geun-hye said the next five years would be a "golden time" to find a proper response to the population crisis. Pinpointing the cause to be the social tendency to marry late, the government said it would aim to buck that trend by rectifying the high-cost marriage culture in Korea, increasing the supply of rental housing for newlyweds and expanding medical insurance benefits for couples with fertility problems.
For a society whose birthrate stood at 1.19, the plan at best looks highly idealistic and bland. Although plans will be more fleshed out by September, they are part of the third phase of a five-year government plan to tackle the low birthrate and rapidly aging society. As the special governmental committee and other experts work toward the September deadline, they need to figure out why past measures failed.
The government belatedly set out in 2006 to tackle the low birthrate juxtaposed with a fast-aging society, forewarned when the birthrate in 1983 dropped to 2.06, or the level required to maintain population numbers. Since then, 60 trillion won has been meted out in terms of free childcare and tax benefits to households with multiple children. Yet last year's birthrate of 1.19 was lower than that of Japan, Germany and Italy.
The figure is ominous ― especially when it's set against the other end of the population spectrum ― and because it leads directly to national productivity and society's ability to provide welfare for the elderly. Statistics show that in 2017, the economically active population, or those aged 15 to 64, will start declining. In 2018, 14 percent of the Korean population is expected to be 65 or older.
Thus, the public is skeptical that any government measure can offset the social burden to marry early, produce children even as they pay hefty housing fees, and foot the bill for soaring education costs, while at the same time preparing for retirement. To raise one child through college was estimated, according to 2012 figures, to cost 300 million won. While the third-phase plan envisions a better job market for the elderly and support, the poverty and suicide rate of the elderly in Korea is highest among OECD nations.
It is clear we need some realistic measures that address these concerns. It would not be too early to discuss support for single or unwed mothers, which is not openly debated in Korea even now, and more forcibly compel the private sector to embrace the changing population structure.
For a society whose birthrate stood at 1.19, the plan at best looks highly idealistic and bland. Although plans will be more fleshed out by September, they are part of the third phase of a five-year government plan to tackle the low birthrate and rapidly aging society. As the special governmental committee and other experts work toward the September deadline, they need to figure out why past measures failed.
The government belatedly set out in 2006 to tackle the low birthrate juxtaposed with a fast-aging society, forewarned when the birthrate in 1983 dropped to 2.06, or the level required to maintain population numbers. Since then, 60 trillion won has been meted out in terms of free childcare and tax benefits to households with multiple children. Yet last year's birthrate of 1.19 was lower than that of Japan, Germany and Italy.
The figure is ominous ― especially when it's set against the other end of the population spectrum ― and because it leads directly to national productivity and society's ability to provide welfare for the elderly. Statistics show that in 2017, the economically active population, or those aged 15 to 64, will start declining. In 2018, 14 percent of the Korean population is expected to be 65 or older.
Thus, the public is skeptical that any government measure can offset the social burden to marry early, produce children even as they pay hefty housing fees, and foot the bill for soaring education costs, while at the same time preparing for retirement. To raise one child through college was estimated, according to 2012 figures, to cost 300 million won. While the third-phase plan envisions a better job market for the elderly and support, the poverty and suicide rate of the elderly in Korea is highest among OECD nations.
It is clear we need some realistic measures that address these concerns. It would not be too early to discuss support for single or unwed mothers, which is not openly debated in Korea even now, and more forcibly compel the private sector to embrace the changing population structure.
