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From mid-September to mid-December, Hong Kong was home to massive school and university students' protests. With up to 500,000 people on the streets (depending on the day and particular rally) as well as some 1,000 jailed individuals, these were the most pronounced manifestations of civil disobedience Hong Kong had ever experienced. Now they are over, apparently. But, are the consequences?
Hong Kong has a thriving tradition of free speech and civil disobedience that has accelerated since its handover from the U.K. to China. Protests with more than 100,000 participants are not unknown: "Occupy Central" (Central is Hong Kong's city) began as a version of the "We are 99" movement, and as China wanted the Special Administrative Region (SAR) to introduce "nationalism studies" in school curricula, huge crowds protested it and won. However, the students' protests, labeled the "Umbrella Movement," broke records for crowd mobilization and length of protest.
There are at least three shifts that have begun already: One within the pro-democracy camp; another within Hong Kong's politics and the third in relations between the SAR and its masters in mainland China.
Beginning with the pro-democracy camp: There is no united pro-democratic movement, but several groups favoring one type of political reform or another. Some groups are pro-liberty and pro-market; some are more social-democratic types. Even their political representation, the so-called pandemocratic camp in Hong Kong's Parliament, is as diverse as it could get.
The Umbrella Movement ― that has been backed by pandemocratic lawmakers ― accelerated the inner differentiation of this parliamentary group. Moderate democrats (often of the pro-market variety) are very likely to lose support with certain parts of the electorate, such as middle-class supporters that considered the protests too radical. Then there are the younger folks who considered the political actions accompanying the protests as too moderate.
Stricter democrats (in Hong Kong parlance: radical) are expected to win the support of young sympathizers and completely lose the others. The danger of this inner differentiation in the pandemocartic group is that if it splits, it loses the veto power that the united front actually has in Hong Kong's parliament.
But then again, the whole political landscape is already showing some changes: The pro-Beijing camp is at least as diverse as the pandemocartic group. It too shows signs of distress. The strictly pro-business, pro-market Liberal Party left the group and took a more centrist position. The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the SAR's largest political party, admitted that obedience to Beijing was more important than H.K.'s freedoms (including its relatively free economy).
Also, in the executive branch, an outspoken blame game began. Some secretaries are pointing fingers at education, blaming the school curricula, especially in the humanities, for the ignition of the Umbrella Movement. And, the recently launched public consultation on the process of the next elections faces opposition within the same administration that started it.
Enter mainland China. Although the official line has been remarkably non-intervenient, selected officials were chosen to deliver the hard message. They suggested a new law on national security (i.e. curbing rights of free speech and enabling censorship of the press), scrutiny of the SAR's educational system by the central government in China, and more national studies in schools and universities (i.e. the inculcation of Chinese-nationalist ideology).
What is the way ahead? It is certain that Beijing will use the protests to get a firmer grip of Hong Kong. However, it is far from certain how the SAR will react. Whichever camp is less divided (pro-Beijing or pro-democracy) is more likely to take the lead. Compromise, however, is the least likely to succeed.
Henrique Schneider is Chief Economist of the Swiss Federation of Small and Medium Enterprises. He can be reached at hschneider@gmx.ch.
