"The direction is right, but its feasibility is in doubt.''
This is a usual response to the defense reform plan for 2014-30 that the Defense Ministry reported to President Park Geun-hye on Thursday. The nation's first female head of state had already approved the plan.
The plan calls for merging the 1st and 3rd Armies into the ground operations command, which will lead reinforced six frontline corps units, to ensure more flexible and nimbler operations. It has yet to be determined when the combined command will be established, but the timing will depend on consultation between Seoul and Washington over the transfer of the wartime operational control.
Under the reform package, the number of Army soldiers will fall from 498,000 to 387,000 from 2017 through 2022 with Navy, Air Force and Marine troops remaining unchanged. The troop cuts are inevitable, given demographic changes the low birthrate has caused. To maintain combat capabilities after the troop drawdown, the military will recruit 36,000 more non-commissioned officers (NCOs) by 2025.
The military will also adopt a ''proactive deterrence'' strategy to enable pre-emptive responses, a move aimed at securing capabilities to brace for both local and all-out provocations by North Korea.
The blueprint represents a small change from the last one drawn up in August 2012 under the Lee Myung-bak administration, and reflects changed security circumstances since then, such as the North's third nuclear weapons test and competitive military buildup in Northeast Asia.
The plan is going in the right direction as a whole, but its details are flawed and unrealistic.
To begin with, there is fear of a vacuum in our troop level in the event of contingencies in North Korea. This means there could be a shortage of soldiers needed to maintain stability there in an emergency.
The incumbent government also appears set to pass the buck to the next administration; the plan envisions reducing only 10,000 soldiers until 2017, President Park's last year in office, but most troop cuts will take place under the next government.
More importantly, budget constraints raise questions about the plan's feasibility. The Defense Ministry says the defense budget should increase 7.2 percent annually, but that is definitely unrealistic and rosy, given that our defense spending grew only 4.2 percent annually over the last five years.
The most worrisome scenario is that our troop levels may plunge in a few years without reinforcement and the rise in the number of NCOs due to budget crunches.
More surprising is that the plan dropped a proposal to change the so-called upper command structure, which was aimed at beefing up combined operation capabilities in the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan warship. It was none other than Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin who presented the measure to the National Assembly in 2011. Kim has been serving as defense chief since December 2010.
It is doubtful that the latest defense reform plan will enable our military to react effectively in the event of a fresh North Korean provocation. The Defense Ministry has every reason to complement the package.