Above all, Korea has revealed the lack of criteria or principles in its arms-acquisition program by swerving from one extreme to the other, seemingly with little or no plausible explanation. The shift to the Lockheed Martin aircraft through a no-bid contract will inevitably result in protests from another U.S. company ― and initially the successful bidder when competitive offers were solicited ― Boeing, and European bidder, EADS.
Defense Ministry officials say they put priority on stealth capability, adding that China, Japan and Russia are also buying or developing the radar-beating feature. That is a hard-to-refute priority. But, didn't they know that a few months ago when they initially picked Boeing's F-15E planes? Or was the shift due to outside pressure to buy the Lockheed-Martin jets, as some unconfirmed reports have suggested?
More importantly, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters are still being developed, and it is far from certain whether the planes will be equipped with all the functions Korean pilots demand by the target year. Even U.S. military leaders have sharply cut down on their orders because of various technical problems and related cost overruns. The developmental delay is especially troublesome for Korea, which badly needs to replace its antiquated fighters as soon as possible.
And this raises the usual question in any high-stake deals: Why is Seoul putting all its eggs in one basket in the $8-billion project? This is a legitimate question especially given the fact that Air Force commanders originally wanted a mixed purchase of both the futuristic planes and more combat-ready ones, such as those supplied by the European consortium.
The no-bid contract will also put Korean officials in a disadvantageous position in terms of both pricing and demanding "offset provisions" ― side deals concerning the procurement of localized parts and, most importantly, the technology transfer help Korea develop its own stealth planes. The worries grow deeper because the deal will be made through a so-called foreign ministry sale (FMS), under which the U.S. suppliers are quite reluctant to hand over related technologies.
Officials here say they will try to learn as many technologies as possible and put these in the contract, but past experience shows that it is the seller, not the buyer, who has the final say in such cases.
In a worst-case scenario, Seoul may lose both international trust and practical benefits because of its wishy-washy handling of things. Whatever the reasons may be, the Korean taxpayers will be left holding the bag ― again.