Adjusting mindsets on future of alliance command

By Park Jin-ho

Seoul’s Ministry of Defense has requested a review of the conditions for a successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON), with some going as far to say that the ministry requested another delay in OPCON transition.

From a view of achieving the best strategic interests of the Republic of Korea and the U.S., delaying OPCON transition does not seem to be the best strategic approach because related political controversy between the two nations would distract our strategic focus from discussing the fundamental issue ― sustaining an effective alliance command and control structure capable of addressing the North Korean threat and other security challenges.

A combined wartime command and control structure is a “center of gravity’’ for constituting and sustaining a ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), or installing a new alliance command and control structure. Changing the wartime command and control relationships significantly impacts “how to fight and win a war.’’

Between Seoul and Washington, however, discussion over “who will lead’’ takes priority over “how to structure’’ a combined defense of the Republic of Korea. These characteristics of bilateral discussion go against a ROK-U.S. combined war fighting spirit of “Let’s go together.”

Military force is the measure of last resort for political leaders in the pursuit of vital national interests. So, it is natural that the issue of military command and control is politically charged. However, the issues involved are complex and have two key components ― military and political.

In the military realm, things are more straightforward than in the political arena. Militarily, we can focus on capabilities and readiness, though as already stated in Korea, we tend to focus more on the “who” instead of the “how” in designing the future structure of combined command and control structure. The decision of OPCON transition is ultimately a political call, but the ROK and the U.S. need to change a strategic mindset.

What is key in both the military and political realm is to sustain or enhance our bilateral combined military partnership. Former President Roh Moo-hyun approached wartime OPCON transfer as a matter of regaining sovereignty, which stimulated a massive political controversy.

Now we should transcend this mindset and discard the term “OPCON transfer” because the term reflects and instigates a nationalistic response to a critical national security issue.

The use of inappropriate terminology often makes an issue much more vulnerable to domestic politicization. In the case of OPCON transfer, such politicization obscures and complicates a strategic discussion for making a sound decision.

We have to examine an appropriate and less politically loaded term to facilitate sound decision-making about the future alliance command and control structure. The best alternative term is “Future Alliance Command and Control.”

The strategic agenda for bilateral discussion of alliance command and control should be focused on “how to defend Korea,’’ not on the question of “who is in the lead.’’

As wartime OPCON is at the zenith of planning and executing a war, the result of a war would be dependent on how to manage the control rather than who manages the control. Our basic ability to fight and win wars should not be tied to whether the ultimate commander wears a ROK or a U.S. uniform.

Instead of discussing OPCON transition, we need to discuss future alliance command and control. OPCON transition and who leads the future structure are still issues for discussion, but the more important focus is to be able to answer the question of how we will command and control military forces in the defense of Korea ― we need to hone in on the structure, required capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans and capabilities required for the combined defense.

Former President Roh focused on who managed the control and so experienced severe and unnecessary strains on the alliance. As Korea and the U.S. develop a course ahead for alliance command and control including combined operation plans, they have to optimize their command and control organization, rather than focusing on who is the commander.

CFC or its successor should not focus on who is Korean and who is American, but rather should pursue an integrated command and staff structure, regardless of the origin of commander. This approach would lead to providing maximum unity of the combined forces.

Changing the structure of ROK-U.S. Alliance command and control structure will significantly affect not only the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, but also regional security dynamics by influencing regional leaders’ decisions on developing their own security strategy.

Currently, China focuses on modernizing and building up its military forces and capabilities in responding to a regional uncertainty increased by U.S. military rebalance to Asia.

Adapting our alliance command and control structure may present a vital opportunity to promote the benign and attractive power of the ROK-U.S. military partnership.

We can work together to convince other regional countries that the ROK-U.S. military alliance is not either hedging nor intent on dominating; but rather represents a stabilizing force working toward win-win situations, not a balance of power zero-sum competition.

ROK and U.S. alliance managers and political leaders are mindful of the dynamics discussed above. Still, much adaptation is required regarding the mindset with which our leaders approach the future of the alliance.

The Park administration needs to be strategically creative in approaching political adjustments to the ROK-U.S. combined military partnership, while not losing sight of military fundamentals. All the while, both the ROK and the U.S. must strive to convince others that our alliance is a benign center of gravity for the stability, security and prosperity of Asia.

The writer is a legislative assistant to Rep. Hwang Jin-ha and a non-resident fellow of the Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.