``Election promises are empty promises.” Such is the widely accepted view among Koreans, politicians and even voters alike. But how long should this would-be advanced country share this self-deprecating joke?
Last week, President-elect Park Geun-hye rejected calls, mainly from her own governing party, for revising costly welfare pledges she made while campaigning. ``Such discussion is premature,” she said. ``We should always keep our promises with people to win their trust.”
Park is right. Period. The fact that her remark, quite natural to the extent of banal, made the news shows the widespread political skepticism here.
Some conservative newspapers even began to warn against a ``fiscal disaster” unless Park withdraws or sharply scales down many of her welfare pledges, in analyses made as soon as her election victory became certain. Now Park is facing a most unfamiliar situation of being sandwiched between conservative opponents and liberal supporters.
Granted, no presidents can fulfill all their election promises.
However, if and when the leaders find it necessary to reverse or revise previous pledges, they first need to tell voters why and win the latter’s assent through earnest persuasion. And that should come after ― not before ― the new government takes office, and makes its best efforts to turn promises into policies in practical and feasible ways. The two key words in this process should be transparency and plausibility.
Unlike what some ultra-rightists say, welfare is neither luxury nor populism but a prerequisite for growth. Without sharply raising Korea’s birthrate and women’s economic participation, this rapidly aging society has little economic future. Park was right when she proposed free childcare for under-fives. Without a better safety net, this society cannot attain unity Park stresses, as shown by the world’s highest poverty and suicide rates among its senior citizens.
Yes, Park hurriedly borrowed bolder welfare pledges from her liberal rival toward the end of campaigning while underestimating costs for some of her own. For instance, shortening the term of military service and raising the wages of conscripted troops may be able to wait until Korea starts basic discussion of a shift from a draft to a voluntary system. She also could sacrifice a part for the whole by putting pledges to win regional votes on the back burner. Voters need to show their political maturity in this regard.
To keep her promises to the people, Park must break one of her key pledges ― not to raise taxes. She won’t be able to make good on most of her promises without tax hikes, which should no longer be a matter of whether but when and how.
Korea’s tax burden still remains at 19 percent of its GDP, far lower than the OECD average of 25 percent and even hovers below the 21 percent under the Roh Moo-hyun government. It is irresponsible and brazen-faced that the outgoing Lee Myung-bak administration and the ruling Saenuri Party, which pulled down revenue by tax cuts for the rich and big businesses and aggravated popular livelihoods, are the first to take issue with the successive government attempting to take steps in the right direction.
Voters are certain, from experience, that boiling down their opposition is not so much fiscal patriotism as adherence to vested interests. Park must be allowed to go her way, at least as far as she can.