US Policy on Korean War (1)

By Kim Yun-sik

After World War II, the United States considered South Korea a geographically vital country for the containment of the spread of communism.

Still, in June 1949 the U.S. withdrew American forces from South Korea and its Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) secretly approved a policy stating that it would not intervene if North Korea invaded South Korea.

In January 1950, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., which stated the Pacific Defense Perimeter, which included the Aleutians, Japan, Ryukyu and the Philippines, did not include South Korea.

This was a potential indication to the American press the U.S. would not defend South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack.

The potential of conflict led both South and North Korea to lobby for international support in the event of war on the peninsula. A North Korean representative requested support from the Kremlin if the North attacked the South.

The Soviet Union agreed to support North Korea only after China did not pose any objections to the request. In early June 1950, American Ambassador to South Korea John J. Muccio warned the U.S. Congress of the unprepared state of South Korea's defense forces. This estimate seems realistic in light of the situation that existed in the spring of that year.

On June 25, North Korea invaded South Korea to achieve its alleged plan of reuniting the peninsula, spearheaded by Soviet built T-34 tanks. The lightly-armed South Korean troops were no match for the invading North Koreans.

At the time, the attack was viewed internationally as a Soviet challenge to the free world. The Korean War, as the first Cold War confrontation, was also viewed as the first test of whether a limited war was possible in the age of atomic weapons.

At the start of the Korean War, Harry Truman's administration was under domestic scrutiny for losing China to communism; as well as, appearing weak in upholding U.S. policy regarding Asia. Following the invasion of South Korea, President Truman instructed Secretary of State Acheson to immediately convene the U.N. Security Council.

The council met and instituted a series of resolutions, which included the establishment of a U.N. Command. The command was to be headed by the United States with 16 nations providing forces to support its efforts of repelling the North Korean forces.

President Truman, with the help of his advisors, responded rapidly with the deployment of U.S. forces to South Korea's aid. Truman ordered the U.S. Air Force and Navy to provide cover and supporting fire to South Korean forces.

On June 30, 1950, Truman issued the order for General Douglas MacArthur to utilize ground forces to support the defense of South Korea and authorized bombing missions against military targets north of the 38th Parallel.

Eventually, seven American divisions, a British Commonwealth division and combat troops from 11 other countries joined the war effort. On July 5, the first engagement between U.S. and North Korean forces occurred in Osan.

Within a month of the invasion, the North Korean army occupied the whole of South Korea except the Busan Perimeter (the area running from the port city of Busan to Daegu). On Sept. 15, Gen. MacArthur split the North Korean forces with a masterful amphibious landing at Incheon, which outflanked the majority of its army.

The result of the amphibious landing turned the tide of the Korean War in favor of the United Nations Command. Seoul was subsequently recaptured by Gen. McArthur's soldiers and the North Korean army was pushed back to the 38th Parallel.

During a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, an American proposal for U.N. forces to occupy North Korea until elections creating a unified government took place was accepted without protest.

U.N. forces then crossed the 38th Parallel with the U.S. 8th Army advancing northwest, and the X Corps marching northeast, toward the Yalu River. Pyongyang was captured by the 8th Army.

The 7th Division advanced northward and proceeded to the Yalu River. Gen. MacArthur predicted U.S. divisions would return to Japan by Christmas. However, the early success of U.N. forces in conquering the North Korean army would soon be erased by the actions of the Chinese army.

In late November, the 7th Division captured several Chinese soldiers in the division's area of operations. The Chinese POWs indicated the presence of three Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) divisions operating in the area of the Chosin Reservoir.

The war was about to take on a new dimension as Gen. MacArthur now faced fresh and splendidly trained CCF Divisions. On Dec. 3, MacArthur sent a cable to Washington, D.C., which explained that unless drastic measures were taken the 8th Army and the X Corps would be destroyed and all of Korea would be lost. The massive, overt intervention of CCF in the Korean War shocked and frightened the Western world.

MacArthur believed the flow of the CCF into North Korea could be halted if bridges along the Yalu River were destroyed. Without consulting or even officially informing the JCS, he ordered the Far East Air Force (FEAF) to bomb the three large Yalu bridges at Sinuiju without violating Chinese airspace.

The writer is a professor at the Asian Division, the University of Maryland, Yongsan, Seoul. He can be reached at rokmankim@hotmail.com