A Tasters Choice Moment

By Lee Byong-chul

As South Korea's ``success stories'' are frequently advertized to the American public by their political leaders, a growing number of pro-American foreign and defense policy pundits here in Seoul, it seems to me, tend to over-interpret it, as if Korea-U.S. ties couldn't be better.

For most Koreans, U.S. President Barrack Obama still comes across as an affable leader. And South Korean President Lee Myung-bak highly values the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, particularly when compared with the late President Roh Moo-hyun who presided over the most strained relations between Seoul and Washington in terms of the so-called ``equal partnership.''

In addition, Lee has already presented himself as a pragmatist or an advocate of ``compassionate conservativism,'' while creating a faith-based presidency.

As soon as Lee took office in 2008, he started convincing his U.S. counterparts ― George W. Bush included ― how crucial the ROK-U.S. alliance was to regional stability in Northeast Asia where the rise of China is becoming an unavoidable challenge to America.

In short, the conservative president acknowledged that America's role would be bigger than that of China in the course of achieving Korean unification in the future.

It is thus no wonder that from the alliance perspective of the conservatives, President Obama's easy-to-remember comments about South Korea's unprecedented economic and educational achievements can be used as an emblem to bolster their tendentious assertions in favor of delaying the transfer of wartime operation control from the U.S. to South Korea, albeit that the miracle-like tales are quoted in a simplistic manner.

However, the conservatives' groundless predilection for Obama's accolade ― which I'm sure is aimed at giving a wakeup call to his disheartened people ― will eventually feel cathartic, but change nothing.

Worse, it can distort or weaken the sound relationship between Seoul and Washington, given that some military leaders' high-flown rhetoric often defies reality.

On cue, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young allegedly expressed on Feb. 24 that ``the U.S.-led defense plan will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.''

The four-star-general-turned minister also insinuated that the government might renegotiate with the U.S. over the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) that Seoul and Washington agreed to in 2007.

Roh must be turning in his grave. In terms of substance, however, some of what he had to say was unsurprising. It is correct that the Lee government's possible volte-face must give away many things, as the minister remarked.

There is an overarching question of whether the transfer of OPCON during wartime from the U.S. to Korean commanders should be made in 2012 as planned or be delayed.

Today, many military experts embrace a different view of South Korea's self-defense capability against the communist North Korea, but the reality is that the transfer of wartime operational control is entirely based on the U.S. military strategy that South Korea-based U.S. troops can be, although temporarily, pulled out at any time in consideration of its national interest.

In other words, it is clear that America cannot forever bankroll the security of South Korea exclusively. That will be a reality of the 21st century between the two countries.

For beyond the deadlocked North Korean nuclear issue, an eloquent expression of South Korea's brilliant economic development, and beyond the question of the alliance, lies a still more fundamental issue: what exactly is the alliance facing North Korea as a nuclear state and how will American power be projected within the dilemma?

In the broadest sense, most people ― regardless of whether they want to obtain wartime operation control as planned in 2012 ― share the same goals in South Korea.

At the same time, each wants South Korea's defense capabilities to be independent and is watching cautiously as North Korea, a de facto nuclear state, directly negotiates with the U.S. over the denuclearization of the communist regime that would fundamentally reshape the political geography of the Korean Peninsula.

Each is also worried about insecurity, as the U.S. and Japan are concerned about the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons in North Korea, as well as the possibility that China could become the fastest to cross into its neighboring state in the case an emergency takes place.

Inevitably, South Korea is paying close attention to what many China experts consider newfound Chinese activism across the globe.

An expanding Chinese influence in North Korea would be especially alarming to decision-makers in Washington, given that Beijing and Pyongyang share a long and robust relationship. That said, China has always considered North Korea to be its backyard or another poor province.

From America's perspective, the Korean Peninsula's geopolitical significance can be in no way ignored, in that North Korea already went nuclear. (Not difficult now to find some articles in America's leading newspapers of describing the North as a nuclear state!)

Likewise, the peninsula has emerged as a crucial site where America's global strategies could potentially be embarrassed by the North Korea's foolhardy nuclear weapons program.

Beijing has begun to tighten security on their side of the border crossing the Tumen River in the name of searching for North Korean defectors, while being reluctant to impose stronger sanctions on the North.

China's efforts to crack down on defectors have successfully made North Korea more vigilant. For over six decades now, China has been deeply influential in North Korean affairs, political and economic.

My own view, based on the conviction that the alliance cannot endure another several decades in its current form, is that a new form of security for the defense and expansion of a more stable order in Northeast Asia needs to be created as soon as possible. That new security forum, of course, contains China and North Korea.

One of the Lee government's central strategic tasks is to set up detailed and strategic plans toward the current Korea-U.S. alliance and to forge a more balanced order in the region. A taster's choice moment for the alliance is over.

Lee Byong-chul is a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul. He can be reached at bcleebc@gmail.com. The views expressed in the above article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Korea Times.