By James M. Dorsey
Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouaziz’s self-immolation was not simply a cry for justice, freedom and economic opportunity. It was first and foremost an act of desperation in the face of humiliation, a cry for dignity that resonated with the masses across the region.
Bouazizi's death sparked more importantly a move to end not just the yoke of autocracy but of neo-patriarchic rule in which the autocratic father figure replicates himself throughout society from head of state to governor to village mukhtar or chief to the head of the nuclear family. The system franchised authoritarianism. As a result Bouazizi’s cry for dignity was and is a quest for citizenship rather than guardianship, for legitimate authority, transparency and ultimately true sovereignty.
Perhaps more than anything else Bouazizi’s cry integrated the relatively inward-looking Middle East and North Africa into a globalized world. For once the region was part of a global trend and in some ways it is most resilient and most amazing part posed to rewrite political geography.
The demand for greater openness and transparency fuelled by a perceived failure of existing institutions manifests itself in different ways in different parts of the world. In the West it's Occupy Wall Street. In the Middle East and North Africa, pushing for greater transparency more often than not means violence and change of ossified dictatorships incapable of reform and accommodation of people's will and aspirations.
Southeast Asia has not been immune to the global trend. Nonetheless, to suggest that the Arab Spring would spark a counterpart in Southeast Asia would be far-fetched. Southeast Asia was already confronting calls for change before the Arab revolt erupted and the impact of the trend in Southeast Asia is evident.
Myanmar has cautiously relaxed strict government control while Singapore's long-ruling People's Action Party has seen its share of the vote sink to a record low because of surging prices and immigration. Malaysia responded to sharp criticism of the police by repealing two sweeping security laws and lifting restrictions on the media and Thai voters returned to power the party of deposed premier Thaksin Shinawatra, a victory for his red-shirted supporters involved in bloody clashes with the military last year.
In doing so, Southeast Asian governments have proven to be far more attuned than their Middle Eastern and North African counterparts to what is happening around them and have displayed a greater deal of vision and flexibility. Nonetheless, it will also require forward planning.
When rather than if the Arab uprising inevitably spreads to the Gulf, Southeast Asian nations will have to define the risk to their energy security and develop alternatives in case of a disruption in oil and gas supplies as well as increase their focus on alternative energy options. Some Southeastern nations like the Philippines will also have to deal with the impact of large numbers of migrant workers returning home to escape erupting turmoil.
Non-oil producing Southeast Asian nations like Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines depend on the Middle East for 70 percent of their oil and gas imports. In addition, Southeast Asia and the Middle East are crucial links in a seaborne commerce conveyor belt that runs from the Gulf to the Pacific. If the Straits of Malaka and Singapore were seen until now as potentially risky maritime choke points, today it is more than ever the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb that is straddled by Somalia and Yemen.
Asia would be most affected if shipping, particularly through the Straits of Hormuz, were to be interrupted. The United States gets 22 percent of its oil from the Gulf, Europe about 30 percent but in Asia it is a whopping 75 percent. Needless to say, Asia has the most at stake in terms of energy security.
Almost a year into the Arab revolt, the Middle East and North Africa is looking at perhaps a decade of volatility, uncertainty and bloodshed. The region may be the part of the world where resistance to change will prove to be the most resistant with consequences far beyond its borders.
Southeast Asian nations unlike those in the Middle East and North Africa with few exceptions have demonstrated an ability to respond to demands for greater openness and transparency and lack of confidence in institutions in ways that do not immediately escalate tensions.
Nonetheless, steps taken by Southeast Asian governments are likely to prove insufficient. Those steps are by and large designed to remove immediate lightning rods and ensure release valves for pent-up frustration but often do not really address basic grievances, first and foremost among which corruption, with Singapore and Brunei constituting the exceptions, that confirm the rule.
A majority of Southeast Asian governments, unlike their Middle Eastern and North African counterparts, enjoy varying degrees of popularity and legitimacy. To the extent that there is a desire for change, it is a desire to effect change with the government, not in spite of it. That is an asset few rulers can claim. However, to maintain that strategic advantage, Southeast Asian nations will have to develop enlightened, proactive policies that go beyond removing immediate irritants and address real concerns.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, “The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.”