By Tong Kim
A second inter-Korean nuclear contact between South Korean nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac and North Korean vice foreign minister Lee Young-ho is scheduled for this week in Beijing.
If this meeting finds ways to meet the preconditions to resume the six-party talks as set by Washington, it would turn back the clock to Sept. 19, 2005, when the multilateral talks adopted a landmark joint statement, which is still unanimously supported by the six participants ― the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia.
Washington is known to have made it clear during the Bosworth-Kim Gye-kwan meeting at the end of last July in New York that Pyongyang should meet three conditions for the resumption of the six-party talks ― suspension of all nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, a moratorium on missile tests, and improvement of inter-Korean relations.
The U.S. demand for these pre-steps is understandable in terms of its basic position that Washington would not return to the nuclear talks unless Pyongyang shows its serious intent by action. It is also understandable in terms of Washington politics at the Republican Congress, many of whose members simply oppose engagement with the North.
Perhaps the negative image of North Korea on the part of the Republicans in particular and the American people in general is very much a self-inflicted consequence by the North’s own provocative behavior and its repressive system of rule. Pyongyang’s defense of its actions is not understood, except by a few sympathetic ears or some objective realists of international relations.
Pyongyang’s position on Washington’s demand is simply, ``Let’s return to the talks without preconditions and negotiate all issues related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The North Koreans want to keep engaging the United States in search for improved relations.
It is unlikely that the North will fully accept Washington’s conditions, other than by a verbal commitment with some conditions. The North is more likely to negotiate away these steps for some sort of reward or a promise of reward, political or economic, without giving anything away just for resuming the talks, as there is no evidence that the North has not changed its negotiating strategy.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il reportedly told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last month that the North ``could temporarily put a hold on fissile material production and nuclear tests, if the six-party talks are resumed.”
Kim made no mention of the uranium enrichment or missile development program. ``Production of fissile material” may exclude the uranium enrichment program (UEP), because the North claims it is for producing energy not nuclear weapons. However, the North knows darn well that its uranium program is a serious concern to Washington and its allies. For Pyongyang, the UEP is one of the best cards it has for negotiation.
The North Korean leader, like any other shrewd politician, only makes a broad general statement of principle. He has been consistent in maintaining his support for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. His subordinates postulate and maneuver Pyongyang’s strategy toward Washington or Seoul. The North Korean foreign ministry said in May 2010 that it would never return to the six-party talks. One reason Pyongyang has reversed its previous positions is probably attributable to the fact that the old stance had not been announced by Kim himself. In other words, Chairman Kim can reverse the positions or strategy determined by his subordinates, even though he approved them.
It should be noted that this week’s North-South meeting in Beijing is not because the North is ready to improve relations with the South, but such dialogue is required by Washington, which closely coordinates its strategy with Seoul. The initial inter-Korea meetings during the ARF last July, while they met the formality of the first step for the resumption of the talks, did not satisfy Seoul in substance.
However, the second nuclear inter-Korean meeting has some significance because first, the North has learned that it cannot go directly to Washington bypassing Seoul, and second, the North is still not responding to the South’s proposals regarding humanitarian aid or the property issue of the Mt. Geumgang tourist complex.
The prospect of improved inter-Korean relations is not clear, despite the appointment of Yu Woo-ik as the new unification minister. During his confirmation hearing last week the nominee made ambiguous statements with respect to what he wants to do except that he would be flexible on humanitarian programs and limited economic projects.
Inter-Korean relations are an internal issue between the North and the South, and it is unlikely they will improve via the six-party talks, whereas improved inter-Korean relations would likely contribute to the multilateral talks. Three conditions should be considered for the improvement of inter-Korean relations ― positive North Korean attitude to the South and vice versa, as well as domestic support in the South. At present, these three conditions are unpromising.
In the North, Kim can make a positive decision to move forward, but for the South, it would take democratic presidential leadership with a vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula. As tension continues in Korea, the neighboring countries are engaged in an arms race, especially between China and Japan, each spending increasing resources.
Japan will reportedly soon undertake the construction of a supersize helicopter carrier and purchase stealth fighter-bombers. China has tested a stealth bomber and launched an aircraft carrier and plans to build two more aircraft carriers by 2020. Russia will deploy a nuclear-power submarine in the East Sea and will conduct a joint military exercise with North Korea this year.
South Korea plans to import Apache attack helicopters and unmanned Global Hawk drones for billions of dollars from the United States. Given an assured rise of China and a possible decline of the United States, and the increasing military roles by Japan and Russia, the Korean people should think hard about their security interest. In a rapidly shifting security environment, the two Koreas should improve their relations first, if they want a peaceful peninsula. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a visiting research professor at Korea University and at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.