By Tong Kim
The repatriation of 27 North Koreans who drifted into the South Korean waters by a fishing boat a month ago had become an issue that may affect the prospects of inter-Korean dialogue that ended with a recent failed preparatory military talk at Panmunjeom. The South was trying to return them to the North through Panmunjeom Friday, but the North declined to receive them unless the South returned all 31 who were rescued by the South in the West Sea.
Four of the 31 have chosen to remain in the South, after having been exposed to the high standards of living. The North Korean Red Cross demanded the return of all 31 of their citizens on humanitarian grounds. However, the South’s decision to accept the four North Koreans based on their free intent is arguably justified in humanitarian terms as well. In the past, the North did not take issue with some of its citizens who refused to return to the impoverished North.
Implications of the latest repatriation issue is multifold: (1) a continuing flow of defectors may eventually lead to the instability of the Kim Jong-il system, (2) the North may want to use this incident as a new pretext not to engage the South seriously, and (3) it may try to portray the South as the villain who is obstructing resumption of denuclearization talks that the international community supports.
Given its pronounced goal of a ``strong and prosperous nation” beginning 2012, the North would have to address its chronic food shortage, above all other economic problems. With U.N. sanctions in place, China’s assistance is not sufficient to tide the North over until self-sufficiency. The North would require massive assistance from other countries, especially from South Korea. The North’s continuing desire for dialogue with the South, if it is still the case, is based on its interests to: (1) improve relations with the South, which is termed as a precondition to its talks with the United States and six-party talks, (2) bury into the past its responsibility for the sinking of the ship the Cheonan and other provocations, and (3) get food assistance from the international community, by erasing its negative image.
While the Lee Myung-bak government’s position has been consistent in principle as it has always maintained it is ready to engage in a serious dialogue with the North any time and at any level, there has been an impractical condition that the North shows its ``sincerity” and undertake a process of nuclear dismantlement. Yet, the South has defined what exactly the North should do to prove its seriousness.
On March 1, President Lee reiterated, ``We are prepared for dialogue with the North at any time with an open mind.” In response, Pyongyang questioned Seoul’s ``sincerity, demanding the South show it in action.” A few days later, the unification minister told a National Assembly hearing that the President’s offer of dialogue did not reflect any shift in the government’s position on talks.
The Lee government has two years of its term left and there is some speculation that Lee wants to make some progress on inter-Korean relations to leave as his legacy. But, there is no evidence that supports such a claim. He and his principal aids seem firm on their belief that they should stick to the ‘principled’ policy of no serious dialogue and no provision of aid, unless the North is serious about denuclearization. Adherence to this hardliner policy is welcomed by conservatives but it has not contributed to improved inter-Korean relations, denuclearization or facilitation of regime change. North Korean behavior worsened in the last three years of the Lee government.
The Lee administration’s intent obviously does not want to be seen as a party refusing dialogue with the North, which is encouraged by the United States and China as a prerequisite to multilateral nuclear talks. President Lee’s people seem to hope that their policy will be kept by another conservative government in 2012 so that it will eventually correct the ``mishaps of the two previous liberal governments that provided so much aid for the North but only to be returned with nuclear threats.” If the North collapses soon although it is impossible to tell how soon or if it ever will, the current North Korea policy makers will be vindicated. In connection with this, leaflet-dropping operations or radio broadcasts by activist refugee organizations, even with the support of the government, would have a negligible impact on the collapsibility of the North Korean system.
From a recent U.S. Senate hearing (March 1), it was confirmed that there is no change in the Obama administration’s North Korea policy of passive waiting. Washington is waiting for: (1) Pyongyang to show its seriousness to carry out its commitments to denuclearization, but still without specifying what it would take for the North to show its seriousness, and (2) improved inter-Korean relations to a point where Seoul would feel comfortable in supporting U.S engagement with the North. However, the United States does not want ``talks for the sake of talks” but ``constructive dialogue.”
The Senate hearing also confirmed U.S. policy positions on some of the hottest issues of debate: (1) redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the South is ``not an issue under active consideration,” (2) the U.S. goal is not ``regime change” but ``a change in regime behavior,” (3) U.S. concerns about North Korea’s proliferation and illicit international activities have not been abated, (4) the U.S. supports South Korean efforts to raise the issue of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program at the UN Security Council to denounce it as a violation of the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005 and the relevant UNSC resolutions, and (5) Washington will tighten up implementation of sanctions on the North in a continued two tract policy of pressure and keeping the door to dialogue open.
In Seoul conservatives, who are convinced of the North’s refusal to denuclearization, strongly advocate the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea as a deterrent to North Korean threats. This was a bad proposal for a number of reasons: (1) redeployment would accept the North as a de facto nuclear weapons state, (2) this would weaken the justification for demanding the denuclearization of North Korea though negotiation, (3) it would amount to disapproving Obama’s policy of reducing nuclear arms and building a world without nuclear weapons, and (4) according to Steve Bosworth, U.S. North Korea Policy Representative, the United States has ``more than adequate tools … for deterrence.”
Bosworth’s statement that Washington is not seeking regime change in the North should be accepted as a positive signal to Pyongyang that has been seeking direct talks with the United States. However, the ``right conditions” for dialogue that the United States requires would not come easily under Washington’s current policy, as some Senate leaders showed their skepticism. Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urged the administration to initiate bilateral negotiations with the North, while Senator Richard Lugar, another ranking Republican, questioned whether the administration had viable strategy to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program.
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Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.