By Tong Kim
North Korea’s indiscriminate artillery attack of Yeonpyong Island, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians while injuring 20 more people, was an intolerable and inexcusable provocation that deserves strong condemnation. An exchange of artillery shelling between the North Korean MRLs (Multiple Rocket Launching Systems) with support of coastal howitzers and the ROK marines’ self-propelled artillery guns was the first of its kind since the Armistice Agreement of 1953, which ended the shooting in the war but maintained a technical state of war on the Korean Peninsula.
The North’s surprise attack triggered angry public resentment against the North Korean leadership, without whose order the attack would not have been launched. At the same time, the public was disappointed at the South Korean military’s poor state of combat readiness ― including the failure to anticipate such an attack, despite some physical evidence of the North Korean military maneuvers beforehand and a direct warning from the North against the live firings during the South Korea ``Hoguk” (Defense of Fatherland) exercise.
The public in general believe that at the start of the North Korean attack, the ROK military should have responded immediately, not waiting until after the first round of barrages stopped, with stronger retaliation, instead of stopping at 80 rounds in return fire for 170 North Korean shells, of which 80 hit the island. It was also disturbing that the three guns out of the six available for retaliation were inoperable at the time.
The Seoul government seems to be caught between two conflicting demands from the people _ stronger retaliatory punishment and strengthening deterrence against war. The government is agonizing with the question of how to punish the North, militarily, sufficiently enough to satisfy the public without risking a war.
The government’s counter-action plan includes: (1) a four-day combined naval exercise beginning Nov. 28 on the West Sea, involving the aircraft carrier George Washington, overriding China’s concerns; (2) revising the current rule of engagement to include situations where civilians become collateral victims by attack; (3) reinforcement of forces to defend the five vulnerable islands including Yeonpyeong in the vicinity of the Northern Limit Line; (4) budget increase to buy more K9 self-propelled howitzer guns and F-15 fighter-bombers; and (5) replacing the defense minister with a former JCS chairman.
On inter-Korean relations, Seoul will: (1) keep the tough May 24 measures taken in the wake of the Cheonan incident; (2) suspend all government aid for humanitarian purposes; (3) discontinue Red Cross talks; and (4) bar South Korean workers from entering the Gaesung Industrial Complex. In short all channels of dialogue and contact will be shut down.
On the diplomatic front, Seoul has secured strong alliance support from the United States, and political support from many countries around the world, including Japan and EU members. Seoul seeks to build up tougher international pressure on the North. Seoul’s challenge again is how it can work with China, whose primary strategic interest is to maintain a stable Korean Peninsula, without undermining the stability of the North Korean regime. Seoul has asked China to play a constructive role in dealing with the latest incident of North Korean provocation. Chinese premier Wen Jibao on Nov. 25 spoke of his opposition to any form of military escalation. China again asked all parties to calm down, as it did after the Cheonan.
Yet, it is interesting to note Beijing’s disapproval and frustration with Pyongyang’s latest provocation through the official media outlet of the Chinese Community Party, although it would be doubtful that the Chinese leadership would openly condemn the North. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said his government is closely watching the combined exercises, which are taking place 147 nautical miles away from China’s closest coastal shore. Obviously sensitive to China’s concern about the George Washington, the Pentagon said the exercise is defensive and it is not aimed at China but designed to deter North Korea.
Even after its attack on Yeonpyeong, Pyongyang insisted that the attack was provoked by the South, firing live ammunition within the North Korean territorial waters. Instead of apologizing for the killing of the innocent civilians and destroying the villages, from which 1,700 residents were forced to flee, the North made more threats that the North Korean artillery remains ready to fire more shells to “wipe out the enemy with a stronger punishment of fire, if its dignity and sovereignty is challenged.”
There is a high probability that the North will launch another serious provocation, if shells or artillery from the U.S.-Korea exercise underway now on the West Sea fall in the disputed territorial area that North Korea claims is theirs. But, in this case it would be unlikely for the North to attack a U.S. vessel, and the timing of such possible attack would be after the ending of the exercise.
There are several plausible reasons for the latest flare-up in the West Sea. Many pundits see it in the context of the succession plan for Kim Jong-Un. Others see it as Pyongyang’s plan to draw attention and bring the United States to talks after the North revealed its uranium enrichment program less than two weeks earlier. It is true that the North is undergoing an untested second succession process and that it does not want to be ignored of its existence, but there is no concrete evidence showing its provocations are directed to domestic consumption. And the North Koreans know better themselves that their aggression on the island would diminish rather than increase any chance for dialogue, at least in the foreseeable future.
The more likely motivations are, albeit they should not justify the recent act of war by the North: (1) Pyongyang may have determined that it is hopeless to restore relations with the South after some dialogue, reunions of separated families, and economic aid from the South prior to the hosting of G20. Seoul has stuck to its ``principled” position of no compromise on the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism.; (2) Pyongyang was disturbed by the talk in Seoul of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Korea as a deterrent against the nuclear threats from the North, although this was never discussed between Seoul and Washington; (3) Pyongyang may have felt a need to follow verbal threats with action, so that it would be taken more seriously by the South and the international community; and (4) Pyongyang is determined not to accept the NLL, which was not negotiated as part of the Armistice Agreement, but was later in August, 1953 proclaimed unilaterally by the United Nations Command. (Had the NLL been agreed on as an extension of the Military Demarcation Line, all the tragic lethal clashes in the West Sea might have been avoided.)
Whatever the real reason was, the consequences of the Yeonpyeong Island shelling are ominous.
And the problem is Seoul or Washington does not have attractive options to prevent further provocations, other than reinforcing the deterrence, as sanctions or political pressure do not work and a war is not a viable option.
If an exercise designed to deter provocation provides, or serves as, an excuse for new provocation, as was in the case of the ROK Hoguk exercise, isn’t it ironic? What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.