By Tong Kim
Largely attributable to the undisputable rise of China, the current political and military map of Northeast Asia defines two groups of nations in confrontation that may signal the beginning of an unwanted, new Cold War ― with the United States, Japan and South Korea on one side and China, North Korea and Russia on the other. However, unlike under the old Cold War, the rule of conflict is not collective action of one camp against the other.
Under the newly evolving international environment, each actor is seeking its own interest that may be in conflict with the common interest of the group to which it is supposed to belong. Each actor has stakes in the strengthening of cooperation within its respective group, but it also has bilateral issues to address directly with a member of the other group.
Since the Cheonan incident South Korea has confirmed its perspective that efforts to resolve the North Korean issues ― such as denuclearization, implementation of U.N. sanctions, changing the North for opening and reform, ending the dynastic succession, multilateral preparation for a possible collapse of North Korea, or the future of the peninsula ― are practically futile as long as China stands in the way. The Cheonan has pushed the ROK and Japan closer towards the United States at the expense of their relations with China. In Seoul, the major opposition leader and other liberals question the wisdom of the government’s unbalanced policy that has contributed to strain relations with Beijing.
The United States still is the unchallenged superpower in terms of its economic resources and military might. The U.S. produces 24 percent of the world’s total production and spends about 40 percent of the world’s defense expenditures, exceeding the total defense spending of the next nine countries. On the other hand, the projection of China’s growth shows that China will surpass the United States in GDP by 2030. China is becoming increasingly assertive in voicing its interests in the region and the world, including its territorial claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) and other islands in the South China Sea.
To the chagrin of South Korea, China is more concerned about the collapse of the North Korean regime than its nuclear programs or its provocations against the South. China supports Pyongyang’s position on many controversial issues against Seoul. Only last week, Xi Jinping, presumably tapped for succeeding Hu Jin Tao in 2012, said that the Korean War was ``a great, just war against American aggression.” (Xi’s comment should be interpreted against the backdrop of the U.N. forces’ march into the north of the 38th parallel that brought the Chinese volunteers into the war.)
China may not be a truly ``strategic cooperative partner” of South Korea, but it is Korea’s largest trading partner with 20.5 percent of Korea’s total trade, followed by 10.5 percent with Japan and 9.7 percent with the United States. China has more than $800 billion of U.S. treasury bills, which supplement U.S. budget deficits, and it enjoys a trade surplus of approximately $28 billion. During the midterm elections in the United States, several candidates blamed China for the U.S. economic trouble at home. On top of all these ominous indicators, China produces 95 percent of rare earths (natural mineral elements) used as key components in the manufacture of high-tech products such as iPods and hybrid cars. China had stopped supplying the earth elements to Japan to successfully coerce the release a captured Chinese ship from Japanese retention, reviving a territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands.
Under these circumstances, South Korea should come up with a new strategy to improve and develop a better cooperative relationship with China, while maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. Japan is not in a different situation. Conversely, the United States also faces the same challenge: to maintain its alliances with Seoul and Tokyo, while pursuing constructive cooperation with China.
Seoul and Washington have problems with Pyongyang’s provocation and nuclear weapons. Washington has problem with Beijing’s undervalued currency and the opaqueness of the intent and plan of its role in the region. Japan has territorial disputes with China and security concerns about China’s growing power. Korea and Japan both claim territorial rights on the Dokdo islands.
The trilateral summit between South Korea, China and Japan on Oct. 20 had reached an agreement that there should be ``no talks for the sake of talks” but in the six-party process when resumed ``talks should produce results,” according to Cheong Wa Dae. President Lee Myung-bak had suggested that the parties wait for the right timing to restart the talks. China announced that it would not use its rare earth metals as a bargaining chip in international disputes. MB deserves credit for facilitating the holding of the trilateral summit despite the tense Sino-Japanese relationship.
In the rapidly changing power relationships in the region, South Korea still can play a leadership role in inter-Korean relations. In this regard, MB has clarified some basic doubts about his North Korea policy. In an interview with The Financial Times last week, the president said: (1) he does not look for a sudden collapse of North Korea at some point, (2) it would be ``unpalatable” for the North to fall more deeply under China’s political influence, (3) proposal for a unification tax is not to prepare for the North Korean collapse, (4) he prefers a gradual approach to unification, (5) North Korea is under Chairman Kim Jong Il’s strong rule and no drastic change is expected, and (6) the North should emulate China for economic reform.
MB’s comments are congruent to his August 15 speech, in which he laid out his three stage unification policy for the first time _ beginning with building a ``peace community” through dialogue, exchange and denuclearization, going through the second stage of an ``economic community” to improve the livelihood of the North Korean people and narrowing the economic gap between the North and South and completing a ``community of the nation” to unify the systems of the both sides for unification.
Seoul’s policy of ``denuclearization and opening 3000,” has changed in the timing and condition of providing aid to bring up the per capita income of the North to $3,000 from the completion of denuclearization to a given point in progress made in the denuclearization process. In other words, the North would start getting economic benefits as part of the denuclearization process, not as the result of denuclearization. This is an important change in the thinking of the policy makers, to which the North Koreans should pay serious attention, instead of continuing to reject the South Korean offers.
The Lee government also faces political pressure from his own party that the continuing state of confrontation with the North might become an unwelcome issue in the big elections in 2012. Some in pro-government circles cautiously raise the desirability of an inter-Korean summit, as low level working meetings cannot resolve the big issues of denuclearization or peaceful cooperation between North and South.
If the prospect of a North Korean collapse is slim, the Lee government must start doing something different in order to perform a balancing act between the United States and China and to work with both giants for peace and security on the peninsula and the region.
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