New phase of confrontation

By Tong Kim

North Korea has slowed down or exhausted its war threats, while rejecting offers of dialogue from Seoul and Washington. Fortunately, most such threats seem to have ended as rhetoric amid continuing tensions. Pyongyang was not expected to respond positively to Washington’s call for conditional dialogue or to Seoul’s proposal to discuss resumed operations of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.

The North has accused the South of having turned the Gaeseong complex into a potential starting point of war, by planning special force operations to rescue South Korean workers, should they become hostages. Pyongyang claimed its “tentative closure” was a precautionary measure to protect lives in the area. Pyongyang is clear it will deal with the issue of the industrial complex separate from other issues.

Following the South Korean government’s decision to withdraw its workers from the joint complex, 125 of them returned to the South on Saturday, leaving the future of the complex in uncertainty. An additional 50 people are scheduled to return April 29. This may indeed lead to complete closure of the complex. Both sides appear prepared to accept closure. Seoul is saying enough is enough. Pyongyang is saying Seoul is responsible for the fate of the complex. President Park Geun-hye has said she was determined to break “a vicious cycle of provocation and assistance”.

However, there is still one more step that has to be taken to end the joint economic venture, often called “a symbol of economic cooperation,” “the last bulwark of peace” or “the last link in inter-Korean relations.” The South has yet to cut off electric and water supply to the complex. The remaining issues would involve legal matters for the breach of the inter-Korean contract by which the North had guaranteed a 50-year lease of the land and protection of investment.

A complete shutdown would not create a big economic burden for the South whose GDP exceeds $1 trillion, but it would inflict an enormous economic loss on the impoverished North. For the South, it would impose an immediate policy challenge to the two-month-old administration, which started with a nebulous but positive-sounding policy of “trustpolitik” to engage North Korea for peace. In a new phase of confrontation with the North, the Park government may have to reassess the whole spectrum of its North Korea policy ― to define what is optimally desirable but unrealistic to achieve, and what is possible to achieve and to settle for.

Whereas the denuclearization of North Korea is a multilateral issue involving the United States, China and other countries, the Gaeseong complex is an inter-Korean issue, which if not reopened, could complicate security aspects on the peninsula. In the worst case, the North may bring back artillery units to Gaeseong to target Seoul from closer positions. Improved North-South relations are a prerequisite to any denuclearization process.

In the big picture, the nature of the North Korean issue has not changed. North Korea wants to survive, preserving its system no matter what others may think of it. It believes its security is threatened by the hostile forces of the United States and South Korea. It believes that without nuclear weapons, rather than without Chinese support, it will be finished. It believes in the value of sovereignty over the benefits of capitalism. It takes rewards when offered, but rejects any offer that could undermine its system. North Korea realizes that it will no longer be rewarded for provocations.

The North has rejected the U.S. offer of denuclearization talks that demanded proof of the North’s seriousness to fulfill its international obligations in the framework of the six-party talks, which the North had said were nullified. In a recent flurry of visits by high level officials ― including the U.S. State and Treasury secretaries and the JCS chairman, China’s six-party talks representative and South Korea’s foreign minister ― among Washington, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo, a consensus was reached to work for the revival of North Korea’s obligations.

Washington tends to read too much into China’s frustrations with the North, holding unrealistic expectations of China’s ability to reign in the North’s nuclear program and provocative threats. China watchers argue such criticisms represent only the views of one group in Beijing, labeled as “strategists” as opposed to “traditionalists,” who still value the strategic asset of the North. While it is clear that the Chinese leadership is “recalculating” its North Korea policy, it is too early to conclude that China will abandon North Korea.

In the meantime, the North has defined its own conditions for dialogue ― lifting of U.N. sanctions, withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the region, and suspension of the “hostile nuclear war exercises” against the North. Of the South, the North demanded an apology for joining the U.S. in its efforts to “stifle our republic and to have brought in the latest versions of war equipment.” These demands are unacceptable to the South and the U.S., as unacceptable as the demands of the international community are to the North.

Hence, there is no prospect of dialogue with the North Koreans in sight. There will be no talks unless both sides agree to dialogue, without preconditions, for no concessions or rewards, but just to verify what the true intentions of each side are, and to remove misunderstanding and prevent miscalculation. Talks can contribute to peace. What’s your take?

The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.