To avoid nuclear war

By Tong Kim

Despite an ominous exchange of mutual threats between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK allies that has reached its highest level of danger in a long time, there is good reason to believe a major war is not imminent: the North Korean leadership is not suicidal at this point. If war breaks out, it would likely be a nuclear war, if the North Korean threats were taken seriously and in view of demonstrated U.S. resolve to respond with nuclear capable weapons. The Gaeseong Industrial Complex is still in operation, a sign of no imminent nuclear war.

Pyongyang’s threatening rhetoric has put Washington on alert to take them seriously. The United States added 14 ground-based interceptors on its west coast to prepare for missile attacks from the North. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said on March 28, “We have to take seriously every provocative, bellicose word and action,” the North has made. The North has cut off military communication lines to the South, and declared it is ready to settle the account with the U.S. in battle.

In reaction to two nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bomber drills in the South, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un put his Strategic Rocket Force on standby Friday to attack U.S. bases in the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Guam and South Korea. Pyongyang released a photograph of an emergency meeting presided over by Kim Jong-un with his military generals, showing a strike plan on the United States. While North Korea does not seem to have the capabilities to strike the U.S., Washington is concerned about a North Korean attack on South Korea.

It is not clear how a spiral of heightening tension will play out or when it will end, as neither side would be likely to blink first in this risky confrontation of might and resolve. The latest round of North Korean threats started with the U.N. Security Council Resolution to expand sanctions on the North for its third nuclear test and the annual U.S.-ROK defensive exercises in Korea. The North has long alleged that the combined exercises were a preparation for a nuclear war.

In the midst of Pyongyang’s apocalyptic propaganda, the allied exercises mobilized B-52 strategic bombers capable of dropping nuclear bombs and the attack submarine “Cheyenne” capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads. The North reacted on March 20, saying, “If the B-52s appear again in Korea, it would not be able to avoid strong (North Korean) military action,” a reflection of Pyongyang’s fear of the strategic bomber’s capability of dropping bombs up to the might of 200 kilotons of explosion.

A rare show of force by the B-52s and B-2s may have had two objectives: to reassure the South Korean skeptics, demanding their own nuclear programs because of doubts of the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella, and to demonstrate America’s capability and commitment to defend South Korea and its other allies. However, it also must have hardened North Korean minds to keep its nuclear weapons and to develop more of them, which they regard as a survival kit.

What is defensive to one side is offensive to the other side. A series of counter provocation plans by South Korea and the U.S. were taken as threats by the North. On March 22, a combined counter provocation plan was adopted to take “immediate and decisive response to any North Korea provocations.” The South Korean military also announced a plan to destroy the statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to inflict a psychological assault on the North Korean people. Pyongyang immediately called the plan “a declaration of war,” while elevating the tone of its own bellicose threats and conducting landing and anti-landing exercises on the east coast.

The combined U.S.-ROK forces have so far been successful in deterring war. However, the concept of deterring provocations through retaliation relies heavily on the efficacy of scare tactics. Although there is no alternative to the strengthening of military capabilities to deal with provocations, it would be wise to avoid unnecessary threats to the potential sources of provocations. For example, the plan to destroy the statues of the former leaders of the North would not contribute to deter provocations.

The current, perilous security situation in Korea is an outcome of mutual hostility and an escalation of threats from both sides. Uncertainty of the intent of North Korean threats ― whether to solidify the leader’s military control at home or to pull off a concession of the international community on the U.N. sanctions ― is not as important as concerns about a possible attack and the likelihood of escalation. The North should understand its threats do not serve its security interest.

For a way out, the North may need some face-saving rationale to calm down. Taking a high road, the South may want to declare that it would keep observing the non-aggression pact and the armistice agreement which the North said were abrogated. The South can further announce that it would reengage the North, if it drops its bellicose rhetoric, to seek a peaceful resolution of differences between the two sides. Military measures alone are not sufficient to deter provocations. What’s your take?

The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.