Policy shift on N. Korea

By Tong Kim

North Korea’s third nuclear test in January has forced the new government of President Park Geun-hye to retreat from a “trust building process,” aimed to improve inter-Korean relations and making progress in denuclearization, to a security-first pressure policy similar to her predecessor’s policy, which was tried and failed. The prospects of inter-Korean relations are not promising at this time, due to the aftermath of the provocative nuclear test.

The Park government, as well as the second Obama administration, seems to have no idea on how to move forward to a peaceful settlement of the North Korean issue. It supports more ineffective sanctions that do not faze the North Koreans, and plans to build a “tailored” deterrent, which includes first-strike capabilities against the threats of North Korean nuclear weapons and conventional forces. The increased deterrent is likely to be followed by increased tension and an arms race.

The president said on March 1, “By nuclear development and provocations, North Korea would gain nothing but isolation and pain… If the North makes the right choice, we would be flexible.” This statement says or offers nothing new. The North is not expected to take a different path.

Recognized or not, North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapons state that continues to refine its delivery systems and increase its nuclear arsenal. The North’s nuclear and missile tests should no longer be seen as part of a brinkmanship policy or for leverage to negotiate with the United States. Pyongyang no longer appears to be interested in normalization of relations or a peace treaty with Washington, which it sought in the past to guarantee its survival.

After 20 years of on and off, inconclusive engagement with Washington, Pyongyang apparently reassessed its strategy to opt for nuclear armament in defiance of warnings from the United States and China, ready for international condemnation and sanctions. It declared itself to be a nuclear state in its revised constitution last year. It wants to be accepted as a nuclear state.

Mired in the false expectation of an imminent collapse of North Korea, Seoul and Washington refused to seriously engage the North Koreans, neglecting their nuclear and missile programs as they went out of control. In the meantime, China moved in as an alternative country to provide economic and security support to the North. The North Koreans had previously hoped to work closely with the United States rather than with China. In short, the wrong policies of the South and the United States pushed North Korea to turn to a rising China that is becoming increasingly competitive with the United States in the region.

Pyongyang would not beg for dialogue with Washington, but it would certainly welcome any U.S.-initiated opportunity for engagement. Pyongyang also recently expressed its interest in dialogue with the new government in Seoul, to mend the deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Both Washington and Pyongyang are waiting to see how the Park government’s policy will unfold after the U.N. Security Council takes punitive measures against the third nuclear test.

The Park government’s priority is “strong security” against the North, while the task of “the normalization of inter-Korean relations” has been put on the back burner. It is not clear how long it will take the new government to tackle another campaign pledge of “the internationalization of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean economic cooperation.” In addition, Park’s plan to provide humanitarian aid is now inevitably linked back to the nuclear issue.

Park’s interest in seeking a trilateral strategic dialogue among South Korea, the United States and China reflects China’s growing influence in the region and the importance of China’s support in resolving the North Korean issue. However, this idea sounds more like an academic exercise rather than a practical foreign policy approach, as it would be difficult for Beijing to support South Korea allied to Washington at the expense of North Korea, which China still regards as its strategic asset.

Perhaps, it would make more sense to go back to the six-party talks. The problem is Pyongyang will not easily return to the six-party talks, as long as the talks’ goal remains to denuclearize the North. However, the talks, if resumed, could review and supplement all multilateral agreements that were reached in earlier talks, including the 2005 Joint Statement. This work should reflect the changes that have occurred since the parties last met in 2008. The talks can explore how to contain the nuclear program and to assure non-proliferation, and to seek an eventual resolution of the North Korean issue through peaceful coexistence and dialogue.

The best opportunity to resolve the North Korean issue was available in the late months of the Clinton administration, but it was missed partly due to Pyongyang’s slow response. The Bush administration killed it, and the first Obama administration did not resuscitate it. Presidents come and go. The North Korean issue has become far more complicated. Yet, it offers a new challenge as well as an opportunity to find a way forward. What’s your take?

The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.