By Oh Young-jin
Assistant managing editor
There was considerable brouhaha concerning the initial reaction by Cheong Wa Dae to North Korea’s Nov. 23 artillery attack of Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea.
The presidential office spoke of President Lee Myung-bak’s order to the effect that all efforts should be made to prevent the Yeongpyeong attack from igniting into a full-fledged war.
In hindsight, it appears to have been nothing out of the ordinary, rather a rational response, considering the Korean peninsula is the world’s last-remaining ideological and military tinderboxes.
Surveys conducted after the North Korean attack that killed two civilians and two Marines consistently indicated that Koreans don’t want a war, as they feel they have accomplished so much from the ravages of the 1950-1953 North Korean invasion and fear they will lose everything in another conflict.
Then, what was wrong with that presidential order?
Simply put, it didn’t seem worthy of a presidential order.
When the nation is under attack, its people look to their leader for direction. Lee didn’t meet those expectations by acting like an ordinary man rather than a commander in chief.
During the 9/11 terror attack on the United States, then-President Bush took nine hours to appear on television and made his first address to the nation with tears in his eyes. Bush vowed to track down to the very end all of the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
It goes without saying that Bush’s spin doctors had spent those precious first nine hours wracking their brains to iron out a “message” that would get to the heart of the nation in a state of shock and rally it around the leader.
With a dose of exaggeration, the teary speech won Bush his re-election. Ironically, it also gave the U.S. and the world a seemingly never-ending multilateral conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. This war on terror has so enervated the U.S. as to push it to the brink of losing its status as the world’s only superpower, hastening the rise of China as its replacement.
For Lee, his first reported reaction cost him and his administration dearly.
First, a serious albeit unnecessary doubt has been cast on his qualifications as commander in chief as well as his key security-related aides. Some critics dredged out old stories of his military service exemption and forced Lee to undergo a public embarrassment that any leader should be spared from.
Then, an enormous amount of time and energy had to be used to redirect Lee’s position that finally settled for a militant vow to get even with North Korea for any future attack. He also had to fire his defense minister.
Lee’s about-face turned out to be further damaging to his reputation, making people raise their eyebrows, as he is now suddenly opting for dialogue with Pyongyang. This in turn has caused confusion among people as to Lee’s true stance on North Korea. The administration’s (mis)handling of the Yeongpyeong mess sounds like a cacophony from an ill-tuned orchestra but, in reality, is an inevitable part of governance at the highest level, which forces the President to deal with one unexpected contingency after another.
However, there is no reason to take this case out of proportion, if Cheong Wa Dae puts it to its best use and redefines a clear chain of command in order to have any future messages coming from the President carefully controlled.
To illustrate my point, I have reconstructed an account about what happened in Cheong Wa Dae on the basis of news reports.
First, top aides gathered around President Lee in the situation room after the attack was reported to him. The aides were divided into two groups _ one rooting for an-eye-for-an-eye reprisal and the other opting for a call for calmness on both sides. One scenario is that the meeting didn’t produce a definite stance but a spokesperson had to leave the meeting early to meet the press pushing for a response from Cheong Wa Dae. The spokesperson inadvertently put too much emphasis on the prevention of a full-fledged war as the initial presidential reaction.
Or, simply, the doves prevailed during the meeting and the spokesperson conveyed the conclusion with the consent of the President to the press, not anticipating such strong public criticism.
I personally think that the first scenario is more likely. If the second is the case, it would be greatly disappointing.
But in either case, it is clear that Cheong Wa Dae would have been better off using a government ministry in charge, in this case, the Defense Ministry, as a main channel of communication with the press. This would have bought some time for Cheong Wa Dae to clearly refine a presidential response to the incident.
Those at Cheong Wa Dae are bound to feel tempted to speak directly to the people and show they are in charge, often failing to understand the significance that their approach is taken to be final in any given situation. For them, saving words and sticking to a code of silence may prove to be a good tactic. So let’s hope that our President’s men will get more gravitas and serve him better during future contingencies. The success of any President irrespective of whom one voted for by and large identifies with the overall interest of us, the people.