By Oh Young-jin
Assistant Managing Editor
George Tenet is best remembered for his famous phrase, ``the slam-dunk case."
In the 2004 book, ``Plan of Attack,'' written by Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, the then-director of the U.S. Central Intelligence used this phrase to convince a wavering Bush that there was unmistakable evidence supporting Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction during a December 2002 White House meeting. Bush consequently authorized a military build-up that led to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
As we all know, there turned out to be neither nuclear, biological nor chemical weapons in Iraq, lending credibility to Bush critics' assertion that Bush lied to his country and entered it in an unjustified war. Some say Woodward relied heavily on Bush aides so that the journalist of the Watergate fame was used in an elaborate scheme to exonerate the conservative President.
To be fair, Tenet later argued that he was a scapegoat for the war gone wrong. In another book, ``The One Percent Doctrine,'' Bush is described as having already made up his mind to attack Saddam with or without Tenet's slam-dunk evidence.
Irrespective of whichever version may be close to reality, the moral here is that an intelligence chief should not put himself on a self-serving mission, whether it is sucking up to his boss or keeping his job. After all, intelligence is a potent commodity that is malleable enough to be bent into half-truth or untruth, causing a nation to go on the warpath at the cost of countless human lives and material damage. Those handling it often find themselves tempted to do what should be forbidden.
Why am I dredging up this old story and trying to give it unnecessary relevance?
It is because of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) behavior shown during the recent cyber attacks that knocked a major hole in the online security of Korea.
Let's set aside the fact that the nation's counter-espionage agency was targeted and its cyber security breached. I am also willing to overlook reports that it detected attacks under way at an initial stage but failed to immediately alert the Korea Communications Commission (KCC), thus leading to a widespread paralysis of the nationwide cyber network.
One thing it promptly did, however, was give a briefing to the Intelligence Committee lawmakers that North Korea was most likely behind the attacks. When pressed to substantiate its allegations, it dropped a leak that one IP address that was used in the attacks was traced to a North Korean ``sleeper.''
Then, it talked about Pyongyang's cyber terror corps. Security experts doubt Korea is capable of elaborately orchestrated attacks such as those last week. Later, it admitted that it didn't have a ``smoking gun'' to tie the Stalinist country to the attacks.
Whether or not North Korea may turn out to be the perp, there are a couple of things the NIS should take into consideration the next time it has to handle, God forbid, a similar situation.
First, it needs the gravitas expected of an intel agency fitting the nation's status. More plainly, it is about time for the NIS to outgrow the limitations from its birth as the K-CIA at the start of a series of Army generals' dictatorships and leave behind its past blotched with red-baiting and political repression, attempted or realized. We know the rest of its history filled with its truth-bending acts and deceit. Although it is a far cry from what it was in those days, it needs to change more.
For instance, it is commonsense that the first pieces of intelligence in a fluid situation often prove to be exaggerated or misplaced, thus requiring time and an intel officer's careful scrutiny. But while handling the early stage of the cyber attacks, it acted like a Tenet who, in Woodward's account, acted as a child trying to please his unforgiving parents.
Its Tenet-like behavior deprived it of credibility and gave weight to its critics' assertions that the NIS tried to make a gain on its hidden agenda. It is public knowledge that the NIS wants the early legislation of the stalled anti-terror law that will prop up its declining power during the rule of the two consecutive liberal presidents.
One interesting development is that despite the bungled handling of the latest act of cyber terror, calls for a so-called control tower for an early warning and smooth coordination are rising, meaning that the NIS may get its wish and see the related legislation pushed through the National Assembly.
On this account, I don't totally agree on the necessity of the control tower, considering that it was Ahn Lab or other private online security firms that came to the nation's rescue during last week's crisis. If there were any need for an online supreme commander to fight in the asymmetric cyber war, the KCC should be in charge. Their job should be limited to intra-government coordination and consultations with private Internet firms.
There may be another motive for the NIS to prematurely bring its unconfirmed intel to the public's attention. Its chief, as a presidential appointee, may feel anxious to curry political favors with his boss, in this administration's case, giving him additional ammunition to build up a case to strengthen its stranglehold on Pyongyang (Not that the communist state deserves anything better, but a subtle approach is direly needed in the current government's North Korea policy).
Intelligence is an indicator of a nation's power. An ill use of this power can turn a nation into a police state with its people being the victims. A good use can boost its national security and boost its global competitiveness. Then, it is beholden for the NIS to meet this new zeitgeist. After all, nobody wants its intel agency to cry wolf too often.