By Tong Kim
Eight months after Kim Jong-un took over power following the death of his father, North Korea appears to be adopting a new ruling structure, and cautiously undertaking economic reform. The nation’s top priority remains the same: fine-tuning a sustainable strategy for state survival.
Perhaps, the biggest puzzle during the transition was the dismissal of Ri Young-ho from all powerful positions including vice marshal, the KPA’s general chief of staff, vice chair of the party’s central military committee, and politburo member. We still don’t know exactly how this happened.
However, we can theorize an explanation from a careful study of publications from Pyongyang. Here is an interesting theory developed by Lee Ki-dong, a North Korea specialist in Seoul, that Ri’s dismissal was carried out contrary to what the late Kim Jong-il might have had in mind. Kim had prepared an elaborate succession plan of checks and balances between the party and the military to help his son’s rule until the young leader could gain a firm grip on power and attain an unchallenged unitary ruling system.
Kim Jong-il rebalanced power distribution between the National Defense Commission (NDC) and the Workers Party. He transformed his civilian confidants into army generals and appointed them to some of the critical positions in the military. He may have wanted to build a military-civilian cooperative system based on a troika among Ri Young-ho of the military, Jang Seong-taek of the family and Choi Ryong-hae of the party, without allowing the emergence of a number two man in power.
Jang is the husband of Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hi, both of whom were appointed to the rank of army general. Jang was later appointed as an NDC vice chairman, retaining the chair of the party’s department of administration. The face that Jang was not made a full politburo member indicates that Kim Jong-il did not want him to become a regent who could exercise power in the name of the young successor.
Choi Ryong-hae was a party secretary, appointed as a general to be in charge of the KPA’s general political bureau, which supposedly conducts political surveillance over all military units. He also became vice chair of the party’s central military committee along with Ri. Choi was further promoted to vice marshal in April and he now also serves as a politburo member.
It is possible, as believed by some, that Ri was fired due to his disproportionate surge in power and his political ineptness to respond to the new dynamics of the power play in the aftermath of Kim Jong-il’s death. It is suspected that Ri’s dismissal was because he was reluctant or unwilling to support the implementation of the new leader’s plan to transfer a major economic role from the military to the Cabinet.
Whatever the reason for Ri’s fall, the decision to let him go seems to have been initiated by Jang and Choi with the support of a few other politburo members before it was approved by Kim Jong-Un. No visible detection of repercussions or disruption from this unexpected turn of events attests the continuing efficacy of the unique, secretive North Korean oligarchic system for stability.
If Ri was a victim of a power struggle, he was either helpless or without hope to muster his strength to fight back. If he behaves, repentant of his mistakes, he may even be called back to work later, as often was the case with Kim Jong-il’s former lieutenants, including Jang himself. There is some speculation that cleaning up the remnants of Ri’s followers may yet follow, signaling a potential source of instability.
Jang is known as a reform-minded veteran player who witnessed how Kim Jong-il motivated loyalty through reward and punishment. Kim Jong-un has appointed 70 new general-grade officers since he took command of the military. Jang may be the most influential source of advice to Kim, but it would be highly unlikely for him to challenge or usurp the young man’s authority as the highest leader.
Kim Jong-un has demonstrated a leadership style more like his grandfather Kim Il-sung than like his father. Well-choreographed showcases dramatize his personal touch with the people, along with public speeches, frequent appearances with his warm-looking wife and his personal interest in the welfare of both the soldiers and ordinary people. To the surprise of many Western observers, he has completed power consolidation in a very short period free of any detectable obstacles.
The third generation leader has pledged to raise the people’s living conditions through “new economic management improvement measures” on June 28, 2012. The North tried but failed in a similar plan announced on July 1, 2002. Jang’s recent visit to China is seen from the context of the new regime’s urgent need to improve the economy, which constitutes one of the three requisites for survival, along with security and stability.
The new ruling structure in the North appears to be anchored in the support of Jang, Choi and Vice Marshall Hyun Young-cheol, who has replaced Ri. There are other loyal members of the second-tier elite group representing the party, the military, and the Cabinet who are dedicated to maintaining the continuity of a Confucian nationalist dynasty called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. What’s your take?
The writer is a research professor of the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.