By Andy Jackson

Perhaps I have been in Korea too long but, upon seeing Euna Lee and Laura Ling depart their plane on American soil with former President Bill Clinton, I found myself hoping that the first words from them would be a ``sincere apology" for getting themselves in a position that necessitated his going to Pyongyang to spring them.

During a conversation I had with a journalist with National Public Radio several months ago, she mentioned that her employer prohibited her from trying to cross into Burma to do a report. Either Current TV, Lee and Ling's employer, does not have the same level of professional standards or the two crossed over without authorization. In either case, their arrest and any information that North Korean authorities may have gained from it could have put the lives of North Korean defectors in jeopardy.

Every government, even one as odious as North Korea, has the right to determine when or if foreign nationals may enter its territory. It is now apparent that Lee and Ling deliberately crossed into North Korean territory, where they were apprehended. If not for the grossly disproportionate sentences they received, the most appropriate response of the American government would have been to simply wait until they served their time.

Of course, Pyongyang did not want justice in the case. It wanted to use Lee and Ling as diplomatic weapons to use against Washington. That in turn necessitated President Clinton's going to Pyongyang to pay homage to the Dear Leader.

In the narrowest sense of the word, Clinton's trip to Pyongyang was a success. He went to North Korea to pick up Euna Lee and Laura Lee and he came back with them. For that, at least, we can be grateful.

However, there is a real danger of misinterpreting that success in ways that will make it even more difficult to successfully deal with Pyongyang in the future.

First, the Clinton factor in the release of Lee and Ling has created a potentially damaging misconception that big, bold overtures are what is needed in dealing with Pyongyang. The early drafts of an emerging myth of a Clinton diplomatic triumph can be seen in stories like ``Let the Big Dog Run," a column by Maureen Dowd in the Aug. 4 issue of the New York Times. The gist of their argument is that Bill ``Big Dog" Clinton succeeded where normal diplomacy failed.

In fact, Clinton was more of a show pony than a ``big dog." His visit was a term worked out in negotiations using the same back-channel process Washington and Pyongyang have been using for years.

Daniel Sneider at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center noted that Clinton ``didn't go to negotiate this, he went to reap the fruits of the negotiation."

That is not to say that Clinton did not do anything. His connections in the business world allowed him to pay for the private jet and other expenses related to his trip without the use of taxpayer money. It also took someone of his stature visiting Kim Jong-il (former vice president Al Gore had offered to go but Pyongyang rebuffed him) to close the deal. But it is important to point out that his role has been over-hyped.

The danger here is that President Obama, egged on by those inside and outside of his administration and enamored by ``Clinton's" success in freeing Lee and Ling, may fall into the trap of seeking the one big gesture and grand agreement that will untie the Gordian Knot of diplomacy with Pyongyang.

Alas, most such gestures or big deals, including Clinton's own Agreed Framework and Bush's taking North Korea off of the list of state sponsors of terrorism, have failed to end North Korea's nuclear programs.

There is simply no substitute for painstaking, methodical negotiations in concert with America's allies in the region. North Korea being what it is, there is also no substitute for strictly and consistently applying sanctions and other forms of pressure on the Kim regime

There is also the danger of Seoul trying to repeat the formula of the Clinton visit to save South Koreans (a Hyundai Asan employee detailed at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and a fishing boat crew that drifted over the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea) being held by Pyongyang or for other inter-Korean issues. Unfortunately, Pyongyang will likely seek more substantial concessions from Seoul than a photo op.

Appeasement, like other forms of bribery, can work but only if the appeased can stay bought. As such, it is a diplomatic tool that should only be used for limited, short-term goals.

The Clinton visits worked because it was for a specific short-term return and will have little to no impact on larger issues between Pyongyang and Washington. The danger is that Washington or Seoul will try to emulate his small success in other aspects of relations with Pyongyang with larger forms of bribery.

As Seoul has discovered after a decade of the Sunshine Policy, once Pyongyang has had a taste of appeasement, its appetite only increases.

Andy Jackson has taught courses on American government and has been writing on Korean politics and other issues for four years. He is the chairman of Republicans Abroad-Korea. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com.