By Doug Bandow

Much of Europe rejoiced at the ouster of Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski in last fall's election, but Washington is a major loser in the government changeover.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk affirmed his intention to preserve close ties with the U.S., but not necessarily to participate in America's proposed missile defense system.

The Bush administration was counting on Poland to host 10 interceptor missiles. However, Defense Minister Bogdan Klich opined that Warsaw must ``weigh the benefits and costs,'' while Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski pressed for compensation from Washington.

That means military assistance and a stronger security guarantee, more than the normal privileges of membership in NATO.

A further disappointment for Washington is Prime Minister Tusk's plan to withdraw Poland's 900 soldiers from Iraq by October. The pullout will put increased pressure on the Bush administration to draw down U.S. force levels as well.

Washington swallowed news of the latter with nary a peep. Moreover, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently promised aid to upgrade the Polish air defense system and reaffirmed America's responsibilities under Article V of the alliance.

In turn, Foreign Minister Sikorski said his nation is prepared, in principle, to host the interceptors.

Although the Bush administration seems prepared to pay any price, no matter how extravagant, to achieve its foreign policy goals ― the ultimate cost of the Iraq war will be in the trillions of dollars ― others in Washington may be less enthused about buying Polish support.

In early November the Democratic Congress cut the $85 million slated for constructing the Polish site.

Even if legislators reverse course, they are unlikely to pay a much higher price for Warsaw's acquiescence. Washington already has provided Poland with more than $700 million in military assistance.

Moreover, the Democrats might cancel the entire project if they win the White House in November.

Far more problematic, irrespective of the party in power, is providing an additional American security guarantee for Poland.

The Polish government has every right to decide whether participation in missile defense benefits Poland. And relations with Russia, which has vigorously criticized America's plans, should play a part in that calculus.

But Warsaw should not expect extra goodies on top of Washington's NATO commitment. To be blunt, Poland needs America more than America needs Poland.

Poland lives in a historically bad neighborhood. Although war with either Germany or Russia seems exceedingly unlikely, one can understand Warsaw's wariness. For that reason Poles view NATO membership and particularly their relationship with Washington as an important security backstop.

This commitment is not cost-free for America, however. The U.S. must maintain military forces to back up every defense promise.

Moreover, the commitment to Poland automatically subsumes all Polish disputes with Russia. Washington has lost the ability to say ``not my problem,'' irrespective of the nature and importance of any confrontation between Poland and Russia.

Yet facing down Russia would be different than bombing Serbia or Iraq. In the worst case, the U.S. would be risking Washington to defend Warsaw.

But why? Poland's independence is a matter of moral, not military, concern to the U.S. After all, America prospered during the Cold War even though the Soviet Union dominated all of Eastern and much of Central Europe.

Alas, Washington receives precious little in return for its promise to defend Poland. Warsaw does not bolster America's military capabilities: In 2005 Poland spent less than $6 billion on the military, a bit more than one percent of U.S. defense outlays.

From America's standpoint, Warsaw is a net security consumer, demanding more in protection for itself than it provides in protection for others.

Poland's participation in Iraq, a political gesture of minimal military value, was never a sufficient offset. Even hosting interceptor missiles would more likely benefit Poland and Europe than the U.S.

After all, America is most likely to face a Russian attack as a result of a European/NATO confrontation with Moscow. It seems ludicrous for America to pay Europe to place missiles in Europe to defend Europe.

It might be too much to expect other nations to exhibit gratitude for U.S. protection, but Washington should drive a much tougher bargain. It is not in America's interest to promiscuously scatter security guarantees around the globe.

Poland is a good place for Washington to begin rethinking its policy of constantly expanding NATO, and thus its defense responsibilities.

A nation has permanent interests, not friends, Britain's Lord Palmerston famously said more than a century ago. The case of Poland demonstrates yet again that friendship is a dubious basis for a foreign policy. Washington must remember its interests as it negotiates with its friends.

Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and the author of ``Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire'' (Xulon Press). He is a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He can be reached at ChessSet@aol.com.