By Tong Kim

There is an interesting similarity in strategy between the United States and North Korea. Both sides are taking a two-track approach to the issue of nuclear weapons. Washington's two-track elements are well known as sanctions and dialogue; Pyongyang's two tracks consist of defiant confrontation and conditional negotiation. Pyongyang puts into practice what it quickly learns from Washington to protect and increase its interests.

North Korea took provocative actions last spring, beginning with a long-range rocket launch and a second nuclear test, which brought U.N. sanctions on the North. In return, Pyongyang pronounced the six-party process was dead. Since Bill Clinton's visit to Pyongyang last August, Kim Jong-il has been seeking conditional nuclear negotiation with the United States in both bilateral and multilateral fora. At the same time, North Korea is always ready to fall back on its hard-line stance, if it finds some doubts.

Pyongyang also pursues a double-edged approach to inter-Korean relations, shifting back and forth between confrontation and cooperation. The North had mounted threatening statements and insults against President Lee Myung-bak for more than a year. Last August, the North Korean leadership seemed to have switched its gears to the conciliatory side, by easing up restrictions on the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and by expressing its interest to improve relations with the South through a condolence delegation during the late President Kim Dae-jung's funeral.

Seoul and Pyongyang mutually accuse each other of pursuing a dubious contradictory policy by which each claims that it favors dialogue on one hand but seeks confrontation on the other. There is as much distrust between the North and the South as there is between Pyongyang and Washington.

Since the beginning of this year, North Korea has issued several important policy statements on the issues of denuclearization, a peace treaty and inter-Korean relations. The substance of these statements should not be new, as much of it was discussed during Ambassador Bosworth's visit to the North last December. The North has restated its hard position, yet seeking another round of talks with Washington.

The New Year's joint editorial of North Korea's three major institutes of the party, the military and the youth ― comparable to the State of the Union address or the New Year's Presidential message of the South ― included the following highlight:

``The fundamental problem in assuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is to end the hostile relationship between the United States and North Korea. To secure a durable peace regime and realize denuclearization is our consistent position."

The joint editorial also confirmed Pyongyang's commitment to uphold the two inter-Korean summit agreements as the basis for improving relations with the South, calling on Seoul to come forward for the path of dialogue and improved relations, instead of intensifying tensions or confrontation.

The next move by the North Koreans, which I wrote about in the Dec. 14, 2009 edition of this column, was made in the DPRK's Jan. 11 ``foreign ministry statement," which is known to be the second-highest level of importance after a ``government statement." The foreign ministry statement was ``authorized" by Chairman Kim Jong-il. The North seems to have decided to stick to the theme of a peace treaty.

The foreign ministry statement called for the conclusion of a peace treaty as a confidence building measure ``to bring back the process of denuclearization." It suggested ``an early start of peace treaty talks." It did not say whether a treaty should be concluded first before the resumption of the six-party talks. However, both Seoul and Washington quickly rejected that proposal. Washington stuck to its position that the North should first return to the six-party talks, where a peace arrangement would be discussed as part of the denuclearization process.

A week later on Jan. 18 the DPRK's foreign ministry's spokesman reiterated the peace treaty proposal, adding that Pyongyang would not return to the talks without the removal of the U.N. sanctions. The spokesman also said Pyongyang ``is not opposed to the six-party talks and has no reason to delay them ... The North will make sincere efforts to persuade the parties concerned to accept its proposal."

South Korea charges that the North Koreans are employing a diversionary tactic to shift attention from denuclearization to a peace treaty, to delay denuclearization and to buy time to continue expanding their nuclear arsenal. The problem with this view is that an absence of dialogue would not slow down or eliminate the North's nuclear program.

In the meantime, the confrontational side of North Korea's two-track approach has also been active. The National Defense Commission ― the most powerful decision making body in the North headed by Kim Jong-il ― on Jan. 15 issued a rare public statement of stern warning in reaction to press reports of Seoul's contingency plan in the event of potential unrest or a regime collapse in the North.

A spokesman of the National Defense Commission, also with the Dear Leader's ``authorization," threatened to ``exclude the South from all the forthcoming dialogues and negotiations," unless the South apologizes. The warning continued: If the South completes and puts into practice its plan to bring down the North, there would be ``a sacred retaliatory battle" waged against the South.

On Jan. 13, the Korean People's Army representative on the inter-Korean military working level talks warned that continuation of anti-North Korean leaflet operations would lead to ``an unexpected negative consequence" to inter-Korean relations.

Despite these provocative statements, the North and the South met on Jan. 20 at Gaeseong to discuss the issues of border passing, customs and communication as well as wages for workers in the industrial complex. On Jan. 22, the North proposed an inter-Korean military meeting to discuss ways to improve the operation of the Gaeseong Industrial complex. The limited inter-Korea dialogue is expected to continue. Talks serve as a safety valve.

Watching these developments, we can draw some conclusions.

First, like Washington and Seoul, Pyongyang is pursuing a two-track path: dialogue and confrontation. Second, Pyongyang reacts to anything that challenges the legitimacy of its system. Third, North Korea, while open to the six-party talks, wants to control the agenda for talks by insisting on a start of talks on a peace treaty. Fourth, the sequencing of elements required for denuclearization ― or an action plan regarding a peace treaty, dismantlement and elimination of nuclear bombs and materials, normalization, provision of economic aid, etc. ― should be agreed on. Fifth, the North seeks economic benefits through improved relations with the South, while fighting the U.N. sanctions.

North Korea wants to know at what point in the process of denuclearization it will get political benefits in the multilateral talks. Seoul's ``grand bargain" does not spell out at what point the North would start receiving aid. If Seoul and/or Washington plan to give out what the North wants only after the completion of denuclearization, it will not work.

Seoul's failure to protect the confidentiality of a contingency plan for the North was not helpful. Security leaks could create a dangerous situation. In this regard, the South Korean defense minister's recent mention of a possible preemptive strike against the North was not helpful either. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.