By Andrei Lankov

To an outside observer, Korean politics of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s might appear a great spectacle: dynamic, full of intrigue and suspense, reminiscent of a good action movie. Indeed, revolutions erupted, generals drove their tanks to the presidential palace and opposition leaders were kidnapped.

However, if one takes a closer look, he or she would soon discover that despite their dramatic nature the political clashes of the 1953-79 era lacked ideological fervor.

Actually, all major political actors agreed on the basics, and what they argued about were the details, often related to vested interests of groups or the personal ambitions of leaders.

Indeed, the politics of those three decades was based on a small number of assumptions that were shared by nearly all South Koreans. There were some dissenting voices, but these were not very loud and generally ignored.

First, Korea during those years was decisively pro-capitalist. At a time when a libertarian economy was very unfashionable and all strains of socialism were in vogue worldwide, Korea was almost unique in its adherence to the free market.

In reality, the situation was more complicated: the South Korean government often interfered with the economy in a quite unceremonious manner. But the theoretical commitment to free market capitalism remained unshaken.

Second, Koreans shared a sense of utter insecurity vis-a-vis their major adversary, North Korea. Nobody doubted that the North was a great threat, and even the most radical opposition groups took care to emphasize the impeccability of their anti-Communist credentials.

Nowadays this is often explained as a clever tactic employed to avoid government persecution. Perhaps, but it also reflected the popular feelings of the era.

Third, the commitment to the alliance with the United States was unconditional. America was seen as both an example to emulate and as a great protector, the major bulwark against the scheming and brutal ``Reds."

In those days, anti-Americanism was, to cite a South Korean scholar, ``as difficult to be found in Korea as a fish in a tree.''

How did all these perceptions develop? The single most important factor was the Korean War. The modern South Korean state is, first and foremost, a child of that war, and the wartime experiences of all who in 1950-53 were old enough to understand what was going on shaped their views.

The war brought about the complete destruction of the South Korean left which had been quite powerful before the conflict broke out. Until 1950, Korea was a deeply divided society (it is again the case nowadays), but in 1953-79 it had no significant supporters of the leftist discourse.

In 1950-51 all major Korean cities (with the sole exception of Busan, the southeastern port city) changed hands at least twice, and often more frequently. This meant that most leftists virtually walked away, following the retreating North Korean armies.

They had good reason to do so: Syngman Rhee's government and its supporters were quite trigger-happy when they saw a suspected ``Commie,'' so running away was the best survival strategy. However, this meant that the leftist opposition essentially exiled itself.

The movement of the rightists from the North mirrored this exodus of the left from the South. While some 300,000 to 400,000 people fled to the North, at least four times this number moved in the opposite direction.

The arrivals from the North were full of hatred for the Communist authorities, and their presence in the South greatly contributed to the general anti-Communist climate.

The short-lived occupation of South Korea by the North Korean forces also contributed to the general feeling. From the first days of their rule, the Northerners began to impose a very harsh version of Stalinism.

Their withdrawal in September was accompanied by numerous massacres committed by their forces. Admittedly, the other side was not much different, but Syngman Rhee's forces committed most of their crimes in the northern part of the country, when they, in their turn, came to rule North Korea from October-November 1950.

In the South, memory of the terror was vivid and contributed both to anti-Communism and to the commitment to the alliance with the U.S.

And, last but not least, the adults of 1953-79 era shared the sense of powerlessness and vulnerability. They experienced poverty, they remembered how their country's economy was kept afloat only by generous American aid.

These shared experiences meant that some assumptions could not be doubted. Of course, the repressive measures of the state did play a certain role, but without a broad public consensus no amount of repression would work.

The politics of the era was largely about regional interests and personal ambitions, but not about basic choices. It seemed that such choices were made, once and for all.

However, everything began to change around 1980 when a new generation entered political life. These people had no first-hand experience of the Korean War, they took rising living standards for granted, they were subjected to the then current intellectual fashions and they were very, very confident.

Their arrival brought ideological debate back into Korean politics, but also produced deep internal division.

Prof. Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He has recently published ``The Dawn of Modern Korea," which is now on sale at Kyobo Book Center and other major bookstores. The book is based on columns published in The Korea Times. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com