By Andray Abrahamian
On the day following the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death the KOSPI dropped 3.6 percent and news outlets around the world sternly talked of instability and uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula.
The major worry is that political infighting behind the scenes will become uncontainable, degrading the government’s ability to maintain its control over society. This could then lead to some sort of military conflict. There are several reasons why this is unlikely in the near to medium term.
Kim’s death is of great importance, but we tend to become overly transfixed by the personality-cult aspect of North Korea’s system. This is hardly unsurprising, for two reasons. First, it is as pervasive as it is iconic.
As Westerners, it takes us back to the bygone era of the Cold War, occupying an emotional space that other contemporary dictatorships do not. Its images dominate North Korean public spaces, media, pop-culture and education to a degree that is unmatched.
Second, it is an image that they want us to see. When Western media or tourists go to Pyongyang, they see little other than the “single-hearted unity” that supposedly drives North Korean society.
Kim was the most important part of North Korea’s ruling system, but at the end of the day he was just one component of it. More important than the son he has left behind is the ruling structure that continues. This is one that includes competing factions of elites in various organizations, crossing boundaries of state, party and military institutions.
Disagreements and infighting will be taking place in this system, just as they did when Kim was alive. Ultimately, just as before his death, the ruling elite know that trying to drive policy too dramatically in a new direction risks their whole system.
This is well understood by the circle that now surrounds Kim Jong-un. It should be noted that miscalculation is a possibility, but the people now in charge have been intimately involved with running the country for decades.
Age is a factor here too. As with any society, real changes tend to take place only as one generation passes away and is replaced by younger leadership. Kim Jong-il may be gone, but apart from the youthful new successor, the political elite are dominated by sexagenarians and older.
These (mostly) men have a privileged place in North Korea but have no stake in any post-collapse scenario. There is no incentive for them to change anything with rapidity.
The social surveillance system remains in place, as do the basic ideas that still inspire support in much of the population.
Many are pointing out that Kim Jong-il had 20 years to prepare for taking over from Kim Il-sung, but Kim Jong-un has had only one year. This is mostly true, in that Kim Jong-un’s public figure only really took off about a year ago.
However, propaganda organs had been hinting about succession for a couple years before that, and Kim Jong-il almost certainly began grooming Kim the younger several years earlier.
This past year may have been short, but it wasn’t idle. Because of Kim Jong-il’s health, preparations flew along with a pace, intensity and focus that accomplished a great deal. In 2010 and 2011 Kim visited China four times ― staggering for such a reclusive leader ― and his son was dispatched at least once to meet the Chinese leadership and secure backing.
China, while pushing for more openness in trade and economic relations, is not going to push for any changes that could undermine North Korea at such a sensitive time.
Meanwhile, ensuring domestic support among key elites has been an ongoing project centered on Kim Jong-il’s sister and brother-in-law. Organizations to deal with investment and finance have been developed and put under the control of loyal and influential figures.
The sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island may well have been part of a series of measures intended to show the military that their preeminent position will be maintained in the post-Kim Jong-il era.
Another fear, then, is that the military will push for something similar in the months ahead. However, the risks of such a provocation are not as great as we might think; last year’s events probably provide Kim Jong-un’s circle with the capital necessary to resist the more extreme calls to demonstrate military might.
From the outside, everyone can only monitor the situation, looking out for signs that the factors contributing to stability are failing to operate.
Andray Abrahamian teaches international relations at the University of Ulsan and is a director at Choson Exchange, a nonprofit group that organizes educational exchange with North Korea in economics, business and law. He can be reached at andray.abra@chosonexchange.org.