Change Means Un-Bush

By Marc Belisle

In the 2008 race for the White House, both the Republican and Democratic primaries reflected the shadow cast by President George W. Bush's legacy.

Bush's approval rating has hovered around 28 percent for months, rivaling Truman's as the all-time lowest for an American President. His disapproval ratings are approaching 70 percent, and are possibly the highest (or worst) ratings on record.

It is rare for 70 percent of Americans to agree on anything, especially in politics. In the presidential primaries, this overwhelming majority of voters stood ready to flock to the most thematically ``un-Bush'' candidates.

Even among Republicans, disaffection over Bush is broad, and it set the tone for the Republican race. The Republican primaries reflected a complete collapse of the ``Reagan Coalition."

Ever since Reagan stitched together his winning base of economic conservatives and religious conservatives, those groups have formed the two tusks of the GOP elephant.

For over 25 years, the two groups have been disciplined, cooperative and patient. Like Reagan, Bush was elected and re-elected on the turnout of these two voting blocs.

This spring, there were three major contenders for the Republican nomination. Gov. Mike Huckabee is a religious conservative, former Gov. Mitt Romney is an economic conservative, and Sen. John McCain is a centrist ``maverick."

For the first time since 1980, the religious conservatives and economic conservatives each proffered a different champion. Those two candidates fought each other to a stalemate. Out of the dust emerged McCain, a man considered a bipartisan traitor by many stalwart conservatives.

McCain also won because of his history with Bush. McCain was the dark-horse candidate running against Bush in 2000. Bush beat back his momentum in South Carolina's primary with a smear campaign alleging that McCain had sired a black lovechild.

Among moderate conservatives, McCain's nomination represents a regression to the 2000 campaign and a desire to undo the outcome of that race. McCain won the nomination because disaffected independents and moderates overpowered Republican base voters.

Change to Spare

The Democrats' two major contenders were Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. While the Republican primaries showed broad disapproval of Bush, the Democratic primaries demonstrated deep disapproval, as the two candidates broke all sorts of records for voter turnout, fundraising and first-time voters.

Both candidates represented a sea of change. As of February, it was inevitable that one of two perennially underrepresented segments of society ― blacks and women ― would have a champion as the Democratic nominee, and one would not.

Their historic candidacies were made possible by their supreme political talents, demographic shifts, evolving attitudes, and overwhelming public disapproval of Bush. Obama edged out Clinton because he understood better than anyone the potential of appealing directly to disaffection with Bush.

By owning the theme of ``change" Obama cast himself as Bush's opposite, and thereby surfed the wave of disaffection with Bush to the nomination.

Because ``change" essentially equals ``un-Bush" that buzzword became the spirit of the primary season. All the candidates who couldn't completely embody ``change" tried in vain to diminish its importance.

Clinton's Democratic centrism and message of experience energized a movement of working class, Appalachian and middle-aged female voters. Nonetheless, Obama's ``change" message created a Gordian knot for Clinton, who was partly banking on her husband's name brand.

She appealed to nostalgia and offered an implicit vow to return to policies of the 1990s. These positions were inherently antithetical to ``change." Clinton's dynastic gravitas also tied her thematically to Bush, who ran on his father's brand.

Presidential Race

As the candidates embark upon the general election, ``change" places McCain in a political Bermuda Triangle. In order to rally his base, McCain needs to flash his conservative credentials, which will tie him to Bush and alienate independents. To win swing states, he will need to display his centrist leanings, which will reinforce conservative apathy.

Any attempt by McCain to co-opt ``change" will fall flat, because his Republican affiliation and his support for the Iraq war and Bush's tax cuts will make him change-lite to Obama's change-deluxe. Furthermore, at 72, any attempt by McCain to embody ``change" may come across as comical.

McCain has more experience in his war-wounded shoulder than Obama does in his whole body. But Obama's ``change" already checkmated Clinton's ``experience." Voters who disapprove of Bush may be looking for an outsider this year, anyway.

McCain also has to compete with Obama's talent for public speaking. Obama's rhetorical ability represents ``change" in a way, since he is such a stark contrast to Bush, whose epic struggle with the English language is legendary.

Both candidates have promised to run a civil campaign about the issues (as presidential candidates do every four years). But McCain may decide his only real option is to take the Willie Horton and Swift Boat route and run as the ``un-Black'' candidate.

Obama's candidacy challenges the notion that racism is a permanent feature of American society. But McCain may calculate that his best bet is to use the very tactics that defeated him in 2000, to stoke white prejudice until it simmers hotly enough in swing states to carry him to the White House.

If he adopts that strategy, McCain's slogan could be: ``The more things change …"

Marc Belisle teaches English composition at Semyung University in Jecheon, North Chungcheong Province. He can be reached at marcabelisle@gmail.com.