By Andrei Lankov
So the military operation in Libya continues. Its eventual outcome is not quite clear, but the prognosis is not good for the regime in Tripoli. However, it is already clear that the developments in Libya are likely to influence the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, where tensions between the North and South have been remarkably high in the last few years.
It seems that in Korea the impact of the international intervention in Libya will produce results that at first glance might appear to be contradictory. In one regard it is likely to make the North Korean government more confrontational while in other ways will probably make it more cautious.
Kim Jong-il right now may feel very happy about his wisdom which he demonstrated by stubbornly rejecting denuclearization proposals. Colonel Gadhafi in 2003 did exactly what Kim said he would never do ― Gadhafi agreed to swap his nuclear weapons program for better relations with the West and economic rewards. As we see, it did not help the eccentric strongman. Once his subjects rose in rebellion, the West intervened and chose its military might to assist the rebels.
In private conversations, North Korean officials often say: ``Had Sadam had nukes he would still be in his palace right now.” From now on, they probably will add: ``And had Gadhafi not surrendered his nukes, nobody would have intervened when he was exterminating the rebels.”
But what is the likely overall impact of such thinking on the North Korean actions? If anything, it increases the already high probability of another nuclear test and/or missile launch. The preparations for such undertakings have been underway for some time. Now, North Korean leaders might believe that this is a good time to show off their steadily growing nuclear and missile capabilities. This is a way to send a message to the Obama administration, and the message will read like this: ``Mr. President, we are dangerous and its better not to get involved with us even if we do something which is not to your or anybody’s liking”.
At the same time, it’s now less likely that North Korea will attempt a major provocation aimed at South Korea. Until recently, one could be almost certain that in the near future (in April or May, perhaps), the North would repeat what they did with frigate Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. Now they will probably think twice before making another attack.
While the attacks on Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island are usually described as ``provocations” this is essentially a misnomer. ``Provocation” describes an act whose goal is to elicit an irrational and/or excessive reaction from the target of the incident. It was clearly not the case with the Cheonan or Yeonpyeong attack. The North attacked under the assumption that the South would not react in a meaningful way and would be incapable of inflicting any serious damage on assets valuable to the North Korean leadership (the lives of rank-and-file soldiers do not belong to this category).
North Koreans are aware that currently the South Korean public and government are in an unusually bellicose mood. They therefore expect a massive retaliation to follow in the event of another attack. Until recently the North Korean leadership probably anticipated that the South Korean retaliation would be limited, since neither the South nor its major ally, the United States, would do anything which might lead to an escalation of an exchange of fire on the border to a full scale war.
Therefore from Pyongyang’s point of view, another military operation made perfect sense. It would be a good way to demonstrate that North Korea is not going to be quiet when ignored. They wanted to show that for Seoul and Washington, it’s essentially cheaper to pay some protection money to Pyongyang (in the shape of aid and concessions) than to deal with the ever-present possibility of a North Korean attack and related sense of tensions and instability.
However, the recent developments in Libya might have changed the equation ― for a while, at least. Libya shows that under certain circumstances the U.S. and its major allies may indeed choose to launch a large-scale military operation. The assumption that Seoul and Washington will avoid escalation seems still to be true, but Pyongyang may have started to have grave doubts about this.
So it is quite possible that the coming spring will be quieter than the present author (and many of his colleagues) have until recently expected. This does not mean that North Korea has turned into a pacifist state, but from the vantage point of Pyongyang it makes sense to postpone their operations against the South and wait for the dust to settle. And of course, by being quiet for a while they can save resources which will be needed to better prepare the next missile launch and next nuclear test.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.
