The Democratic Party enjoyed handsome gains in June’s by-elections by capitalizing on the issue of free school meals. On Thursday, the main opposition expanded it to also include free medical care and childcare plus halving tuitions, by adopting the ``3+1” welfare as a party platform.
It seems the DP felt it necessary to emphasize it is the party for ordinary people, by going far further than the welfare pledge of the ruling party.
The Grand National Party predictably wasted no time attacking the plan, saying it is only a populist vote-gatherer that will ruin the nation by emptying its coffers.
While the DP says it can finance the programs with just 16.4 trillion won ($14.7 billion) a year, the GNP refute that free medical care alone would cost up to 54 trillion won. The wide gap reflects not just wholly different calculating methods but the gulf between the viewpoints of the two parties on this issue.
It also points to the need for calm discussion ― not political dogfights.
The Lee Myung-bak administration trumpeted forth Korea’s inclusion in the G20 last year. Such self-praise loses its luster as far as public welfare is concerned. Among the world’s 30 richest countries, Koreans work the longest, while sleep and the rest shortest; the number of poor people is sixth largest; people pay the highest portion for public education; the state’s welfare provision for children is second to last; and the percentage of old and needy people is three times the OECD average.
Nothing sums up Korean people’s hard life better than the two world records: the highest suicide rate and lowest birthrate. In this jungle of cutthroat competition and an extremely loose social safety net, one misstep means a fall to the bottom ― with little chances of rebounding. So at stake is not whether it needs a better welfare system and tighter net but how ― what kinds of and how many welfare programs and at what cost.
In short, the nation needs to develop a welfare system that best fits its current needs and is sustainable in the future by limiting the demands to the financial resources available.
The Korean welfare model should not sap economic vitality but maintain, if not enhance it. The nation ought not to suffer ``welfare diseases” suffered by Britain and some North European countries, as the only good thing about being latecomers is to be able to avoid the trials and errors of front-runners.
The DP and its progressive supporters also seem rather too sanguine about securing financial resources. Some civic activists say it would be easy for the government to raise 100 trillion won in revenue by slapping heavy taxes on real estate and financial assets, tightening nooses on habitual tax dodgers and shifting the government’s spending focus from construction to welfare-strengthening projects.
They may be right in part. But the truth is, no sharp welfare expansion is possible without a corresponding increase in tax burdens. Politicians must never deceive the people or themselves on this point.
Nor should welfare be the only weapon to fight the polarizing income gap and other social inequality. This is why politicians, academics and other social leaders need to pool their wisdom on how to rectify the abnormally unequal asset and wage structures in this society for fairer economic rewards.
Two years are left before the next presidential elections, meaning this is no time for premature political and ideological wrangling on election issues.
If the politicians are really interested in improving Korean’s lives, what they should do is to set up a bipartisan research group and let it discuss the A to Z of the Korean welfare model.