By Tong Kim
It is far more comforting to talk about talks than to discuss the dangers of war on the Korean Peninsula. Last year was full of tension and confrontation between the North and South, which culminated in the sinking of the ship the Cheonan allegedly by a North Korean torpedo, an exchange of artillery fire over Yeonpyeong Island, and an ensuing escalation of readiness for war.
Perhaps, the tipping point from tension to talks was reached when the North chose not to fire back, contrary to its dire warnings of a nuclear war, in response to the December 20 live fire drill by the South Korean forces. Yet, the South had continued its intense military exercises to assure strong retaliation against future provocations by the North, which had caused concerns in Beijing and Washington that the South might be foolhardy in military confrontation with the unpredictable North.
A crack in Seoul’s posture appeared when President Lee Myung-bak started making conflicting comments on North Korea for better or worse during the year-end reports from the ministries of unification and foreign affairs. By that time, Lee may have concluded that he had adequately addressed public calls for a stronger posture against North Korean provocation, but realizing that a resolute security alone would not be enough to resolve the North Korean issue.
Some of Lee’s statements deserve scrutiny. “There should not always be military confrontation between the North and South. We should also work for the settlement of peace through inter-Korean dialogue.” (Dec. 29 to the unification minister). “We should not be discussing unification by absorption. The North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved through the six-party talks during the year 2011, because North Korea aims at becoming a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ in 2012… Judging from the Yeonpyeong incident, unification is a distant story.” (Dec. 29 to the foreign minister)
Even with a positive spin on these statements, the Lee government is still seen as shunning genuine dialogue with the North Korean regime. President Lee’s ministers and advisors are determined to look for an eventual collapse of the Kim “royal family” and a “peaceful democratic unification” for which Lee urges his people to work with the neighboring countries including China and Russia. The unification ministry even said it plans to work on the people in the North to precipitate the process of unification, meaning to turn them against the Kim Jong-il regime. Given the surveillance system of North Korean society, few believe this strategy will work. George W. Bush had rhetorically tried to differentiate the North Korean people from their rulers, but that only produced an adverse effect on his negotiations with the North Korean government.
In a New Year address on Jan. 3, President Lee told the North that the path to dialogue and peace is “still open.” On Jan. 5, Pyongyang issued a more aggressive joint statement proposing to hold unconditional talks with Seoul in the name of the DPRK government, the Workers’ Party and other organizations. The North Koreans say they “are ready to meet anyone anytime and anywhere.”
What stands in the way of talks now is a question of how to define North Korea’s “sincerity.” All parties, with the exception of North Korea, seem to agree that any resumption of the six-party talks must be preceded by an improved inter-Korean relationship. Seoul has held a firm position that it would not talk to Pyongyang, unless the North Koreans take responsibility for the incidents of the frigate Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and they prove their sincerity.
Other than that, there is no agreed set of preconditions for resuming talks with the North, although there has been a lot of talk about possible requirements, including stopping provocations, suspending all uranium enrichment and other nuclear activities, inviting back IAEA inspectors, and a credible demonstration of commitment to the September 19 Joint Statement.
For whatever reason, North Korea has dropped its own conditions to the resumption of the six party talks _ by keeping silent on its pronounced demands for lifting U.N. sanctions and a U.S. commitment to discuss a peace treaty. The North Koreans might think it is the South’s ``sincerity” that is questionable. Once the six-nation talks are resumed, the North is most likely to talk about its rights to a nuclear state and to develop a uranium enrichment program for peaceful purpose. The North still insists that its position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has not changed.
Conservative skeptics and supporters of the Lee government want to discard the latest North Korean overtures as a typical peace offensive that follows provocative brinksmanship. Here is their warning. The North Korean blanket offer of talks is a measured strategy that intends: (1) to portray the South as the party causing trouble to stability; (2) to drive a wedge between the South and the United States; (3) to exacerbate internal bickering between the right and the left in the South; (4) to extricate itself from the condemnation for its provocations; and possibly (5) to move on with its domestic agenda for the completion of succession and for the 100th birthday of its founder Kim Il-sung in 2012, which would be difficult if not impossible to achieve without economic assistance through improved relations with the South.
Progressive critics of President Lee’s North Korea policy welcome Pyongyang’s offer for talks, as they believe: (1) dialogue can diffuse the tension and help prevent further deterioration of the security situation; (2) there has reemerged a loose international consensus that the North Korean issue should be resolved through dialogue; (3) the six-party talks may be resumed regardless of Seoul’s position _ the government could be left out of the process of starting the talks by the powerful dynamics of superpowers’ interests; (4) Koreans on both sides must take an initiative in the resolution of their own issues to create the most favorable environment for international cooperation; and (5) the government should stop its hostile policy and go back to the engagement policy of the past governments of Roh Tae-woo, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.
North Korea will be an important topic for Obama’s meeting with Hu Jintao on Jan. 19. The summit is not expected to agree on specific conditions for talks, but it will likely agree on a broad, general path to move forward. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.
