By Michael Breen
The bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, which killed two Marines and injured 19 others on Tuesday, prompted a barrage of analysis in newspapers this week around two questions: What was North Korea’s ``message?” How should South Korea respond?
On the first, analysts echoed the defense minister in Seoul who said the attack was ordered to strengthen the position of Kim Jong-il’s son and heir Jong-un. The new No. 2 man will be credited with making the call and the heightened threat will generate unity around him at a time of transition and uncertainty.
Another view is that Pyongyang needs money and was sending a signal to get Seoul and Washington back negotiating.
However, such analysis overlooks the most obvious explanation for military action of this sort between two parties who do not wish to start a war ― let’s be clear about this ― which is more local, less big-picture, and tied up with conflicting objectives, misunderstanding and miscommunication.
That is that this incident, and previous ones such as the murderous attack on the corvette Cheonan in March, happened in disputed waters.
Although not entirely ignored, this crucial context is being downplayed by our side. But North Korea indicated its importance when it said the South had ``recklessly fired into our sea area.”
Such statements do appear in news stories but headline writers miss them because they tend to be included for ``color” rather than meaning. It’s not hard to see why. North Korea lies like a rug and peppers its commentary with such zany communist imagery, it’s no wonder analysts prefer to guess at motivation.
But here, if you will, is the likely North Korean angle: After the G20 summit, South Korea is full of itself, and, rather than paying attention to us again and giving us money, rice and fertilizer, may have other priorities. So, we reveal our brand new uranium site (last week) to remind it and the world why they must pay attention to us. Meanwhile, the South Koreans are conducting a military exercise simulating an invasion of our country, which includes a live fire drill in our waters. This is another step to secure their unilaterally claimed ``Northern Limit Line.” We warned last year that attempts to enforce this offshore extension of the border DMZ would be met with military force. We warned them again on Tuesday morning not to hold their exercise in our waters. When they started firing shells just 12 km off our coast, we fired warning shots into the sea. They fired back and so we fired back, this time at military targets.
As to the second question ― how should South Korea respond? ― analysts agree we face a tough dilemma. On one side, there is near universal acceptance of the idea that North Korea will only understand a vigorous response.
However, how do you do that without risking escalation? As the world’s 15th largest economy and a democracy, South Korea has complex considerations in taking military action in its own neighborhood. North Korea, by contrast, can risk all knowing the other side won’t. In some sense, it must do so. As an impoverished dictatorship, its only means of remaining internationally relevant is to exercise its ability to cause trouble.
Sensible advice to South Korea varies from negotiations, to the ``show of strength” involving U.S. aircraft carriers and the like, to targeted retaliation.
But analysts, particularly tough-talking editorial writers, need to be mindful of ultimate objectives. South Korea’s are to maintain the peace, avoid instability and contain any eventual collapse. In other words, the preference in Seoul is for a peaceful transfer of power in North Korea.
This vision, if that’s the right word, sharpens the strategic focus in two ways. First, we can see that, as North Korea is a military dictatorship, its leaders need to know that we, too, are tough. Otherwise, they’ll abuse us.
That means retaliation is necessary. However, for reasons given above, retaliation should not be planned for later, Israeli-style. That just engenders an endless cycle. It should come in the form of vigorous response at the time so that North Korea can learn it will always lose a fight with South Korea, regardless of the presence of the U.S. Tough response should be written into the rules of engagement. If hit, strike hard.
Second, the South should do what it can to remove sources of tension and avoid provocations. There is no point conducting live fire exercises 12 km off the coast of the enemy state. As most recent incidents have been related to the NLL dispute, why not start by proposing to resolve it?
Michael Breen is an author, former foreign correspondent and the chairman of Insight Communications, a public relations consulting company. He can be reached at mike.breen@insightcomms.com.