A U.S. flotilla, led by nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the USS George Washington, left Korea Wednesday after a four-day joint naval exercise. More than a few people here are concerned what will happen now and how effectively the government will handle this touch-and-go situation. Their nervousness is not unfounded.
Since it took office nearly three years ago, the Lee Myung-bak administration has been long on words but short in action as far as its North Korea policy is concerned. The incumbent government has been more hard-line against Pyongyang than any of its predecessors, even including those under generals-turned-presidents, by shutting almost all dialogue channels. The hawkish stance itself can be justified under some circumstances. If unaccompanied by perfect military preparedness, however, it could invite disaster, as witnessed in repeated military clashes this year.
It is beyond dispute that the opposite of the present policy ― that is, flexible in diplomacy but maintaining great inner strength _ is more suitable in dealing with a cunning and, at the same time, ruthless enemy.
Lee’s defense officials, who have boasted they could repel any North Korean provocation in minutes, were caught off guard not once but twice. People have long lost confidence in their military, disappointed with both the maintenance of equipment and combat readiness of personnel.
The fact that five out of top six officials of the government who meet at Cheong Wa Dae’s underground bunker everyday have failed to finish their obligatory military duties sums it up. The governing party chairman who mistook burnt thermos flasks as shell cartridges was almost comical. So much so that even a leading ruling party official had to call for President Lee to kick out all military service dodgers from the top security meeting.
It is often people who are ignorant that tend ― or pretend ― to be the most brave. Most Koreans must be hoping they do not reaffirm this adage in matters of national security. And it also explains why the Lee administration shouldn’t have spurned China’s proposal for an emergency six-nation consultation to discuss easing tension.
President Lee might have been miffed ― with good reason ― with the Chinese government’s seemingly one-sided defense of the perpetrator of the unprovoked attack. Instead of an emotional rejection of the proposal, however, the South Korean leader should have made a counterproposal by calling for Beijing’s clear condemnation of the North Korean act as a precondition for the diplomatic approach.
Unlike the case of the torpedoed warship in March, for which Pyongyang denies responsibility, Seoul would have nothing to lose _ even gain a clear victory ― by bringing to U.N. the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in which the communist regime almost seems to be reveling, inviting the criticism even from its traditional backers, like Russia.
No one is saying Seoul should turn the other cheek. It should hit back ― far more harshly ― when hit. But this cycle of tit-for-tat neither should last forever nor can it fundamentally solve the problem. Diplomacy should go together with a military response.
No South Koreans in their right minds would trust, much less sympathize with, North Korea. Nor should they need to fear the Northern warmongers. People say one should be ready to lose a finger to remove an arm of the enemy. True, yet one must not risk becoming disabled for life while managing to kill the opponent.