Events in both halves of this divided peninsula last week showed how the two Koreas keep moving farther away from each other. North Korea staged a military show, broadcast live globally to speed up another father-to-son power transfer. South Korea discussed with the United States steps to prepare for the sudden collapse of the impoverished North.
Whether the third-generational communist dynasty will succeed or not is anyone’s guess. Though anachronistic and nonsensical, it would not be totally impossible for ``Kim the youngest” to pave the road for his reign if he could ease economic hardships through reform and openness. Given what Pyongyang has been doing, however, that sounds too optimistic even for inter-Korean well-wishers.
Most North Korea experts agree Pyongyang would not drop its nuclear programs until the very last moment. This means Seoul has two choices at this juncture: to induce the regime in transition to a soft landing through more contacts and dialogue, or just sit and watch ― or even facilitate ― its crumble through more sanctions. If the Lee Myung-bak administration has decided on the latter one, the question will be whether it would be able to handle such a situation, economically and otherwise.
Yet the Lee administration’s North Korea policy ― or lack thereof ― has revolved around the two improbable surmises ― Pyongyang’s voluntary denuclearization or its eventual implosion. These will be a very long time coming if at all, probably not in the incumbent administration’s tenure.
It is heartening in this regard that some signs of change are being felt on the inter-Korean front. Kurt Campbell, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia and Pacific, said here recently, ``We believe there would be some signals of dialogue and engagement between the two Koreas, and have been encouraging (Seoul) to continue that process.” Seoul and Washington will also have ``2+2” meeting of foreign and defense ministers in December, a move to more positively cope with the changing geopolitical situations in this part of the world.
What concerns us is whether the Lee administration’s national security team is up to the shift toward the flexible and highly sophisticated strategy of confrontation and conversation.
To start with, new Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, who has been one of the key architects of the current denuclearization-only policy, should be able to make a turnaround in policy mindset. Moreover, the ministry itself is in utter disarray after it was discovered to be the hotbed of personnel favoritism. Defense Minister Kim Tae-young, while making one hawkish rhetoric after another since the Cheonan incident, could neither prevent the rampant cases of the lower dominating the upper within the military nor managed to properly localize military supplies, ranging from armored vehicles to combat boots. Only until a few weeks ago, visitors couldn’t find even the name the North’s heir-apparent Kim Jong-un, on the unification ministry’s homepage.
There is actually less than one year left for President Lee to do as he pleases and with sufficient power. As far as diplomacy is concerned, he should start by streamlining his national security team.