Seoul should win trust of US, other partners

South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest nuclear power generator, and the sixth exporter of atomic power plants. But the nation has never been a full-fledged user of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, nor will it be in the future unless the United States agrees to Seoul’s right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. And possible discord during the upcoming negotiations over this issue could cause a split in the watertight alliance between the two longtime partners.

Recycling of used material is an urgent problem for this country, which will no longer be able to find space for storing the highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel by 2016. Reprocessing is crucial both economically and environmentally, as it would allow nearly 95 percent of the spent fuel to be reused, leaving only 5 percent to be stored as waste, in a complete reversal of the current shares of used and stored materials.

Standing in the way of attaining the full cycle in the peaceful use of nuclear power is a 54-year-old bilateral accord. Concluded in 1956 and revised in 1974 with core content unchanged, the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Energy Agreement virtually prohibits Seoul from reprocessing or enriching nuclear fuel, the first phase to producing atomic weapons.

The U.S. is wary of South Korea’s nuclear ambitions not without reason, as Seoul briefly toyed with its own weapons programs in the 1970s and experimented with reprocessing later. So the first job facing the Lee administration is to prove Seoul has completely given up such intentions.

For now, the nation has not many choices but to step up both technological and diplomatic efforts. To start with, Seoul needs to bring to perfection the proliferation-resistant technology of ``pyroprocessing,” which produces plutonium not pure enough to be used for nuclear weapons. It will also have to stage all-out diplomatic efforts toward Washington, involving both the government and parliament, as Japan has done to win the similar right a few decades ago.

At stake is how to convince the U.S. and other nuclear powers about Seoul’s peaceful intention by, for instance, proposing to placing itself under the constant ― and resident ― surveillance of international inspectors. There will be no better stage for Seoul to conduct this diplomacy than the next round of the global nuclear security summit it will host in 2012.

From Washington’s standpoint, North Korea always provides a handy excuse for saying no to Seoul’s request, saying any go-ahead could cause a nuclear “domino effect” in this part of the world. North Korea, however, will continue to expand its nuclear programs whether or not Seoul reprocesses spent fuel ― as long as the allies keep up pressure instead of luring it back to the dialogue table.

What all this means is depending on how the allies make up their minds, Washington can induce Pyongyang to denuclearize, and Seoul can show to the world there also are Koreans who are capable of using nuclear energy for the best and most peaceful purpose.