``The government should seek an 'exit strategy' to get out of the inter-Korean stalemate, including another summit through secret contacts."
This is not a demand from some opposition parties or civic groups but a recommendation made recently by the National Unification Advisory Council. It is good to see the presidential consultative group make a rare timely ― and correct ― policy suggestion.
Seen reversely, however, how dismal is the incumbent administration's North Korea policy that even the largely titular, rubber-stamp organization comprised of conservatives had to give such plain advice?
Of course, the council's report calls for some strong measures with respect to the deadly sinking of the frigate Cheonan in late March, including all-out diplomatic efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the North's unprovoked attack that cost the lives of 46 sailors; and the conducting of cross-border psychological war.
Drawing our interest more for their unusual directness, however, are such parts as, ``the government should consider not just ideals but reality in shaping and implementing inter-Korean policies," and ``there is an opportunity in the crisis in the South-North relationship, too." Yet most significant of all is the official comment on the exit strategy by a presidential advisory group.
Since President Lee Myung-bak's War Memorial speech last month, the government has severed all inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, demanding Pyongyang's apology and the punishment of those involved in the sinking. It has also prepared to resume a propaganda war, pushed for a ROK-U.S. naval exercise in the West Sea and brought the case to the UNSC.
Few of these diplomatic and military initiatives have born visible results so far except for raising tension on the peninsula; The joint naval drill has been postponed twice amid a diplomatic poker game between Washington and Beijing; propaganda broadcasts have yet to begin in the face of potential risks that far outweigh substantive effects; and the discussion of the Cheonan issue at the U.N. will unlikely pick up steam until next month, pushed aside by more urgent issues involving Iran and Israel.
The international condemnation of North Korea will be more symbolic than substantive, while Pyongyang is hardly likely to satisfy Seoul's demand for an apology. Unfortunately, time does not seem to be on the side of the Lee administration as far as the so-called "Cheonan diplomacy" is concerned.
In a recent interview with a foreign media, President Lee said the goal of inter-Korean relations is ``not confronting North Korea but changing it." But diplomacy is a two-way game and unilateral demands for change on the other side is simply unrealistic, as long as the sides that make such demands do not show any sign of policy change.
In a worst-case scenario, Seoul will have to lose all leverage and watch the faces of Washington and Beijing play a no-win game with Pyongyang.
Despite President Lee's vows to respect the agreements of the two previous summits, he has all but neglected the progress made by his predecessors over the past decade.
North Korea seems to think it has little to lose from inter-Korean disruption. It would have been totally different if there were not just one but around 10 joint industrial parks, like the one in Gaeseong, however. Lee must realize that was exactly what the ``sunshine policy" had sought.